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PREFACE 
This thesis is a survey of "external" aspects of public 
opinion in Australia during the ten years which preceded 
involvement in war with Japan. The work is intended to encompass 
foreign affairs in general, Australian foreign policy in 
particular, the defence issue, and - where related to the fore-
going -Australian politics, British Commonwealth relations 
and foreign trade. Parliamentary speeches, party policies, 
newspaper editorials and reports, journal articles, radio 
broadcasts, pamphlets and contemporary books, memoirs, bio-
graphies, histories and scholarly articles have all been taken 
into account. Where possible reference has been made to the 
actual course of Australian policy, in order to indicate the 
varying degrees of relationship between opinion and policy. 
In order to view the years 1931-1941 in perspective, the 
introduction to the thesis commences with a short essay on 
Australian nationalism and attitudes as developed up to, during 
and after the First World Waro Subsequently the twenties are 
reviewed and the impact of the depression is examined. The 
year 1931 has been chosen as the logical starting-point for 
the thesis proper; for in that year the Japanese invasion of 
Manchuria revealed serious flaws in the post-war system of 
security, and at approximately the same time Australia's Labour 
Government was swept from office (by depression issues) and 
replaced by a Non-Labour Government destined to remain in 
power for almost a decade. The thesis then surveys Australian 
opinion on international affairs (e.g. Abyssinia, the Spanish 
Civil War, the Sino-Japanese conflict), relations with Great 
Britain (Imperial Conferences, the abdication of King Edward VIII, 
etc.), foreign policy (appeasement of Germany, policy to Japan, 
approach to the United States, etc.), defence (ground-air 
strategy v. sea strategy, growing expenditure, etc.), trade 
diversion, the policies of the political parties, and so on. 
The period under consideration ends in December 1941, with 
Australia at war with Japan and forced to appeal for urgent 
assistance from the United States. 
Books are cited in the notes after their first appearance 
by the surname of the author, with a shortened title where more 
than one work by the same author has been cited. Articles 
are cited after the first reference by the author's surname 
and a shortened title, or (where the author is unknown) by 
a short title and the journal name. 
The seminar work for the M.Ao degree was completed in 1963; 
the years 1964 and 1965 were devoted to extensive reading 
and research (on a part-time basis); the actual writing of 
this thesis was accomplished in 1966. The bulk of the reference 
material was located in the Mitchell Library and the Public 
Library of New South Wales, Sydney. Use was also made of the 
Sydney University Library and the New South Wales University 
Library, Sydney, the Public Library of Victoria, Melbourne,and 
the National Library, Canberra. The thesis was prepared under 
the general supervision of Professor J.M. Ward, with advice 
from Professor A.G.L. Shaw and Associate Professor E.Bramsted. 
GoFo 
Sydney, December 1966. 
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PART I- INTRODUCTION 
2~!Pt~!_!=-~~~~!!!!!~~!~!~~!!~~ 
From the middle of the nineteenth century developing 
Australian nationalism found expression in the federal move-
ment.1 British policy had been to encourage the establish-
ment of a central authority in Australia, and in 1857 the 
newly-established responsible governments of New South Wales, 
Victoria and South Australia appointed a parliamentary 
committee to consider federation. All professed agreement 
in principle on the desirability of federal union, but the 
indifference and the vested interests of the several colonies 
proved to be an insurmountable barrier at the timeo Sub-
sequently the federal issue lay dormant for some years, but 
1 
Australian nationalism was also reflected in external attitudes. 
As early as 1867 Australians were demanding that Britain 
annex New Guinea. 2 In 1872 the Premier of New South Wales 
called for the annexation of New Britain, the Solomons, the 
New Hebrides, and the Marshall, Gilbert and Ellice islands. 
It was claimed that "a more extended dominion in these waters 
on the part of Great Britain would be not only consistent with 
the maritime supremacy of England, but would conduce much to 
the tranquillity and peace of these Australian colonieso 113 
Two years later, in 1874, the colonial leaders became alarmed 
about German designs on New Guinea and again urged British 
annexation (at British expense). 
If expressions of nationalism in Australia were for the 
most part isolated and sporadic up to the early 1880s, from 
then on a fairly clear pattern started to emerge. British 
military forces had been withdrawn from Australia a decade 
before, and although Great Britain accepted responsibility 
for the naval defence of the Empire, the Australian colonies 
felt rather insecure when faced with the increasing activity 
of European powers in the Pacific. The German seizure of 
northeast New Guinea and the adjacent islands in 1884 was 
interpreted as a potential threat to Australia; nor was the 
presence of the French in New Caledonia and the New Hebrides 
viewed with equanimity. Australians recalled the warning of 
the year before that any acquisition of territory south of 
the equator by a foreign power would be "highly detrimental 
to the safety and well-being of the British possessions and 
injurious to the interests of the Empire. 114 At the Colonial 
Conference in London in 1887 Australian delegates were active 
in defence discussions. 
The Australian colonies had a tradition of discriminatory 
immigration policies dating from gold-rush days. 5 The first 
real alarm over the White Australia Policy did not occur 
until 1888, however. In that year Henry Parkes, Premier of 
New South Wales and an admitted believer in the "yellow peril" 
(a "threat to our Anglo-Saxon workers, and a danger to our 
2 
-~ 
women and children!"), 6 acted on his own propaganda and 
attempted to rush a highly restrictive immigration bi~~ 
through Parliament. China protested against the "arbitrary 
and irregular proceedings" of the colonial authorities, and 
Britain accused the people of Sydney of causing international 
discord.7 The affair died down almost as quickly as it had 
arisen, but not before New South Wales and Queensland had 
3 
implemented further severe restrictions which, despite British 
pleas for moderation, led to an effective policy of Chinese 
exclusion in all the Australian colonies. Japanese immigration 
to Australia, although mooted for the Northern Territory in 
the late 1870s, never became an issue in Australian politics 
comparable to the Chinese question. But, as time would show, 
the Japanese were not indifferent to the evolving White 
Australia Policy, which was to classify them with the Chinese, 
Indians, Pacific Islanders and Negroes.8 
Prior to federation, therefore, it is possible to identify 
a nascent Australian foreign policy which sprang from an 
"intense racial self-consciousness combined with a continental 
insularity."9 Then, as now, Australian attitudes to foreign 
affairs on the whole tended to fall into one of two categories: 
fear or indifferenceo The federal movement revived in the 
late 1880s and began to gather momentum, partially because 
of external considerations. Faced with the clear need for 
concerted authority federal sentiment consolidated in the 
1890s; public enthusiasm, led by men like Alfred Deakin in 
Victoria and Edmund Barton in New South Wales, eventually 
overcame the fiscal issue and resulted in the adoption of 
an amended federal constitution in 1898.1° From 1 January 
1901 one Australian policy replaced six colonial policies. 
One of the proudest claims of the new nation was a 
"98 per cent British" population. This enduring myth11has 
been examined and found wanting on several occasions, how-
ever. A detailed study of the Australian population published 
in 192712demonstrated that the ''British" element did not 
exceed 88 per cent of the total population at the turn of 
4 
the century.13 Even this lower figure is subject to strong 
qualification, moreover, for it included Australians of English, 
Scottish, Welsh and Irish extraction. That the first three 
groups (66 per cent of the total population) were of British 
origin may be accepted, but it is difficult to regard the 
great majority of the Irish element (22 per cent) as "British", 
except in a strictly legal sense. In terms of race and religion 
the Celtic, Catholic Irish-Australians were distinctly different 
from the predominantly Nordic, Protestant British-Australians. 
A subject people, the Irish occupied a second-class position 
in Australian society, and there was considerable antipathy 
between Australians whose forbears came from opposite sides 
of the Irish Sea. 14 In any meaningful sense, therefore, the 
population of Australia at the time of federation might be 
5 
described as about two-thirds British. But even this would 
be rather misleading, for the overwhelming majority of the 
population had been born in Australia. After more than a 
century of settlement the people of Australia were essentially 
Australian, a majority of whom retained a sentimental attach-
ment for Great Britain and a large minority of whom were 
implicitly anti-British in outlook. 
In the years preceding the First World Yar Australia 
continued to concentrate on internal development, seldom dis-
tracted by events in the outside world (with a few exceptions, 
such as the signing of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance in 1902).15 . 
The 1900s witnessed the establishment of a clearly-defined 
party systemo The Labour Party (which traced its history back 
to the early 1890s) consolidated its position to the extent 
that it was able to maintain briefly a minority government 
in 1904. The Liberal Party officially emerged in 1908, as a 
result of a fusion of free-traders and protectionists.16 Both 
parties were in varying degrees nationalist in outlook, though 
within the Liberal Party the Deakin protectionists (supported 
by the Melbourne A&!) were decidedly more nationalist than 
the free-traders. (The other leading nationalist organ of the 
day, The Bulletin weekly, was nominally non-partisano) It 
was a Non-Labour Government which in 1906 accepted complete 
responsibility for Papua (annexed by Britain in 1884 at the 
urging of Australia). And it was Alfred Deakin who returned 
6 
from the Imperial Conference of 1907 with a programme for 
"ships altogether Australian in cost and in political control ••• 
both in peace and war. 1117 The naval programme was inaugurated 
by the Fisher Labour Government, which took office in 1908, 
for it was Labour's programme also. The Fisher Government 
was defence-minded in other ways, organizing a militia based 
on universal compulsory training. Labour and Non-Labour were 
in complete agreement on the necessity for the White Australia 
P 1 . 18 o 1cy. 
Was Australia a sovereign nation before the First World 
War?19 In internal matters, unquestionably. But many Australians 
thought of their country as "a lonely outpost of Western 
civilization in a profoundly alien sea. 1120 This attitude, to-
gether with traditional sentiment and economic realities, made 
for a self-imposed limitation on Australian sovereignty in 
regard to defence and foreign affairs. Important as the British 
navy remained in Australian planning, the new nation never-
theless was taking a growing share of the responsibility for 
defenceo Foreign policy was something else, however, as was 
illustrated at the Imperial Conference of 1911. Replying to 
Australian complaints, the British Prime Minister, Asquith, 
conceded the desirability of consultation on matters of foreign 
policy affecting Australia, but he maintained that in the final 
analysis the conduct of foreign affairs was the responsibility 
of the British Government, and "that authority cannot be 
7 
shared."21 
In 1914 the Fisher Government pledged itself to the defence 
of Australia and the British Empire "to the last man and the 
last shilling."22 Fisher resigned in October 1915 and waa 
replaced by the remarkable W.M. Hughes, then aged 53, who 
throughout his long career exhibited an extraordinary mixture 
of social welfare views in domestic affairs and nationalist-
imperialist chauvinism in foreign affairs. Hughes was obsessed 
with a black-and-white outlook on the war (the good British 
against the bad Germans) and became the outspoken advocate 
of a total war effort for absolute victory. The Australian 
Prime Minister went to London in 1916 where he immediately 
became the "darling of his fellow jingoes", and in due course 
Hughes developed the conviction that only by adopting con-
scription for overseas service could Australia properly give 
full allegiance to the cause of the British Empire. 23 
The conscription campaign of 1916 - fought in a bitter, 
vituperative atmosphere, for which Hughes was largely to 
blame - divided Australians as no other issue before or since. 
In essence the controversy reflected two opposing attitudes 
in national consciousness: the lingering colonial tradition 
and the spirit of independent Australian nationalism. There 
was an abhorrence of conscription in any form, which had its 
origins in the reaction to the regimentation of penal colony 
days. 24 The anti-conscription campaign attracted the support 
8 
of a large section of the Labour Party (for Hughes's actions 
had had the predictable effect of splitting the party), Irish-
Australians, and large numbers who simply felt that conscription 
was wrong in principle and in any case unnecessary because 
of heavy voluntary enlistmentso The Irish-Australians, dis-
turbed by the British suppression of the Easter Rebellion in 
Dublin, were especially influenced by the speeches of the 
Catholic Archbishop of Melbourne, Dr. Mannix, who claimed 
that when all was said the war was "just an ordinary trade 
war."
25 The conscriptionists in general and Hughes in particular 
resorted to the tactic of calling their opponents "disloyal" 
(meaning disloyal to Great Britain, not to Australia) - an 
old catc~ry in Australian politics. In the event Hughes's 
proposal was defeated, although its sponsor managed to retain 
the Prime Ministership as the head of the new Nationalist 
Party (a fusion of Liberal and Hughes Labour forces), which 
was opposed by the broken remnants of the Labour Party. Having 
secured the position of the Government by the decisive electoral 
victory of May 1917, Hughes made a second attempt to have 
conscription endorsed by referendum late in 1917, but was 
defeated more decisively than on the first occasion. If Australia 
had been dishonoured in 1916 and 1917, it was not by the "no" 
vote {as the conscriptionists claimed) -for the nation's con-
tribution to the British cause was beyond question - but by 
the lasting, bitter disharmony generated by the two campaigns. 26 
What was left of the Labour Party lurched to the left and 
was destined to remain in the political wilderness for the 
27 
next 12 years up to 1929. 
Australia's nationhood was confirmed on the battlefields 
of the First World War; more than 300,000 volunteers had 
9 
been sent to fight overseas and of this total 60,000 had died -
an extraordinary accomplishment for a country of only five 
million people. 28 Already in 1917, with the formation of the 
Imperial War Cabinet at the instigation of the British Prime 
Minister, Lloyd George, the Dominions had confirmed the right 
to full participation in the formulation of British policy -
a departure from the position enunciated in 1911. Hughes 
demanded separate Australian representation at the forthcoming 
peace conference. Not only that; the Australian Prime Minister 
made it clear that he sought retention of all the German 
colonies in the Pacific, maintenance of the White Australia 
Policy and a punitive indemnity from Germany. 29 It was thus 
inevitable that Hughes would clash with President Wilson, 
the symbol of a moderate peace, and this happened on a number 
of occasions. Thus Hughes became the ally of the French Premier, 
Clemenceau; Australia helped make it possible for France to 
obtain a more severe treaty than the United States, and to a 
lesser extent Great Britain, had hoped for. German New Guinea 
and the neighbouring islands went to Australia as a Clasa C 
mandate, which differed little from outright annexation. One 
of the ugliest events of the peace conference occurred when, 
following a Japanese request for the inclusion of a fairly 
innocuous "racial equality" clause in the preamble of the 
Covenant of the League of Nations, Hughes objected and put 
on "one of his most characteristic displays of intransigence 
and effrontery". 30 The Japanese proposal failed, and Hughes 
left Paris successful in almost all his endeavourso As he 
later wrote, Australia had been "powerful enough to induce 
the conference to support its national policy. 1131 
At the Imperial Conference which met in London in June 
10 
1921 the Dominions played an influential part in the formulation 
of British foreign policy. The question of the renewal of the 
Anglo-Japanese Alliance came up and Hughes, a recent convert 
to the idea, became its most ardent proponent. 32 Canada, how-
ever, strongly influenced by the United States, opposed renewal 
and the matter was deferred. At the Imperial Conference of 
1921 it became clear that Australia and New Zealand were quite 
opposed to any further elaboration of Dominion autonomy and 
independence, as advocated by Canada and South Africa (and 
later Ireland). 33 For a change Hughes did not get his way. 
The Anglo-Japanese Alliance was definitely terminated by the 
Four-Power Pact, which grew out of the Washington Conference 
of 1921 and 1922 (in which Australia participated indirectly); 34 
the United States, Great Britain, France and Japan agreed to 
a non-aggression pact in regard to their respective Pacific 
possessions. The disarmament agreement, also concluded at 
Washington, had the implicit effect of authorizing Japan to 
strengthen greatly her actual naval position in relation to 
the British Empire and the United States.35 
By the early 1920s Australia, a separate member of the 
11 
League ot Nations and a nation in her own right beyond dispute, 
was still reluctant to accept all the implications of sovereign~. 
Japan, whieh had been insulted by the Australian Prime Minister 
at Paris, was distrusted, and Australians did not believe 
that the problem of defending their isolated continent had 
been entirely solved by the League of Nations or the Washington 
Conference. 
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A development in Australian politics which was to have 
a lasting influence on the federal scene was the emergence 
of a separate Country Party at the end of the war. In the 
1919 election 15 candidates endorsed by primary producer 
organizations had been elected to Parliament, and in January 
of the following year 11 of these formed the Country Party.1 
Earle Page, a New South Wales country doctor, became the 
leader of the new party in April 1921 and joined dissident 
Nationalists in a campaign against the Prime Ministership of 
W.M. Hughes.2 The Country Party increased its representation 
in the House of ~epresentatives to 14 in the 1922 election; 
holding an unchallengeable balance of power it was able to 
force the resignation of Hughes. 3 
The first Nationalist Party-Country Party coalition 
took office in February 1923 with S.M. Bruce of Melbourne 
as Prime Minister4and Page as Treasurer. The Bruce-Page 
Government remained in power for almost seven years - a 
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period in which Australia experienced fairly general prosperity 
and was, as usual, preoccupied with domestic affairs. Never-
theless the new Government was aware of the need to give 
consideration to the problem of the defence of Australia in 
the drastically changed circumstances of the post-war period. 
The Prime Minister posed the question in the following terms: 
"Do we propose to ensure our own safety and not look to the 
Empire for help? Or are we going to provide for our own 
defence within the Empire, believing that the best way to 
defend our own country is by entering into close relations 
with Great Britain and the other Dominions." 5 
At the Imperial Conference of 1923 a number of resolutions 
on defence and foreign policy were adopted. In general it was 
affirmed that each Dominion would be _primarily responsible 
for its own defence; the importance of naval and air co-
operation was stressed, and note was taken of the special 
interest of Australia (and New Zealand and India) in the 
Singapore base.6 After returning from the conference Bruce 
told Parliament that it would be quite impracticable for 
Australia to avoid the obligations of co-operation in Empire 
defence. Neutrality in any war involving Great Britain was 
out of the question, but the actual extent of Australian 
participation in any war would be determined by the Australian 
Government7- a further confirmation of Dominion autonomy and 
an outgrowth of the clumsy British handling of the Chanak 
Crisis in 1922.8 
14 
Great Britain, following the Washington Conference, had 
found it expedient to provide for a major base in Asian waters 
as a replacement for the security formerly provided by the 
Anglo-Japanese Alliance. Singapore was selected as the site 
for the base and thus became a vital element in Australian 
defence planning for the next 20 years. Opponents of the 
Singapore plan alleged that the new fortifications would 
violate the spirit of the Washington Conference and would be 
provocative to Japan. The Australian Government's spokesman, 
Senator Pearce (who had been a delegate to Washington), 
15 
denied this: "The idea of a base being established at Singapore 
was clearly and distinctly understood, not only by the British 
delegation, but also by the American and Japanese delegations, 
to be an essential part of Britain's plan for the defence of 
its interests in the Pacific. 119 Work on the base was scheduled 
to begin in 1923, and the proposal was debated in the Australian 
Parliament in July and August of that year. The Bruce-Page 
Government was strongly in favour of the Singapore base; the 
Labour Party adopted a position similar to that of its British 
counterpart in opposing the base. The Labour leader, Matthew 
Charlton, said: "We have never previously agreed to assist 
Great Britain in defence preparations outside of Australiao 
The load of debt we have to carry now is quite heavy enough. 1110 
Other Labour members argued that the base was badly located 
and would be a white elephant. The Sydney Morning Herald 
expre@sed the fundamental argument in support of the base in 
an editorial on 21 May 1923: "It has not been shown that 
Singapore is not excellently situated for the base of a fleet 
which is designed to protect Australia. Those who disagree. 
appear to hold that the proper way to defeat an enemy 
attacking Australia is to meet him in Australian coastal 
waters or on Australian soil, where Australian promoters 
might make huge profits from the cinema pidbres of the 
spectacle: but where the enemy would, even if defeated, be 
able to wreak most damage upon Australian property. It must 
bemuse such people to ponder why Nelson did not stay in the 
Channel to receive the French fleet instead of chasing it 
to the West Indies. 1111 
In early 1924 a Labour Government under Ramsay MacDonald 
came to power in Britain, and during its brief spell in office 
it was decided not to proceed with the Singapore base. The 
debate on the question was renewed in Australia {and Great 
Britain and New Zealand) 12only to be superseded by the re-
instatement of the plan by the British Conservative Government 
when it returned to power later in the same year. 13 Indeed 
Singapore was destined to remain a controversial issue, and 
the work was suspended on several future occasions. Through-
out, the Non-Labour parties supported the base and the Labour 
Party opposed it, but at no time was Australia willing to 
assist with a financial contribution. 
The Bruce-Page Government instituted a modest defence 
16 
programme within the policy enunciated at the Imperial Conference 
of 1923. Australia had demobilized rapidly after the war and 
in the early twenties was extremely reluctant to contemplate 
rebuilding defences. The mood was one of war weariness, 
economy and particularly a hopefulness of peace founded on 
the Washington Treaties and a system of collective security 
through the League of Nations.14 Nevertheless , the budget 
submitted in 1924 provided for a five-year programme of 
defence measures under which a total of £36,250,000 eventually 
was expended. The main feature of the programme was the 
construction of two cruisers, two submarines and a seaplane 
tender for the navy. The strength of the army was raised from 
37,500 men to 45,000 men in a compulsorily-trained militia. 
The air force, which had become a separate service in 1923, 
was slowly expanded. Provision was made for the growth of 
•t• 1 15 mun1 1ons supp Y• 
In the context of the optimistic twenties the Labour 
Party, fundamentally different in outlook from its pre-war 
version, inclined increasingly towards a policy of isolationo 
Charlton had stated in Parliament in 1923 that "the Labour 
Party's policy is to promote world peace and, consistently 
with Australia's goodwill to her kindred overseas, declares 
its readiness to take full responsibility for Australia's 
defence, but is opposed to the raising of forces for service 
outside the Commonwealth, or promise of participation in any 
future overseas war except by a decision of the people. 1116 
The Opposition applauded the decisions of the Washington 
Conference but warned against interference in the affairs of 
17 
other countries. The Labour leader thought that Australia's 
participation in the Imperial Conference of 1923 was a waste 
of time and energy better devoted to internal development.17 
The Opposition deprecated the role of the British navy in 
the defence of Australia and argued against Australian spend-
ing on cruisers, which would tend to involve Australia in 
British imperialist adventures. The suspension of work on 
Singapore was welcomed as a "gesture for peace"; some Labour 
members advocated a base in Australia instead.18 
Only a minority of Labour members in the early twenties 
were unquestioning pacifists or extreme isolationists; most 
realized a practical necessity for defence planning. Even 
before the end of the war a group of Labour spokesmen had 
begun to suggest the development of a large air and submarine 
force as the solution to the strategic problems of a large, 
sparsely-populated continent. Charlton outlined the plan in 
1923: "With adequate air and submarine forces, the aircraft 
going out 500 miles beyond our shores, we would keep the 
invader out of Australia and, if not, every man capable of 
shouldering a rifle would be ready to do so. Thus Australia 
could defend itself from any foe that might come here. 1119 
A second element in the Labour plan for Australian security 
was the goal of industrial self-sufficiency through the 
encouragement of the steel industry, engineering plants, ship-
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yards, etc. Labour expressed confidence in the Lea~ of Nations 
as a peacekeeping institution without worrying about the 
implied responsibilities of collective security. And in 
general Labour supporters were usually much more concerned 
with domestic problems than with world affairs, which they 
were inclined to place in convenient , evil categories such 
as "imperialism" and 11 capitalism 11 • 20 
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At the Imperial Conference of 1926 Australia was indifferent 
or even opposed to the concern of Canada, South Africa and 
the Irish Free State for a formal confirmation of the status 
of the Dominionso However, Great Britain yielded gracefully 
to the pressure for an authoritative definition of the Empire, 
and the result was a report prepared by a committee led by the 
British Foreign Secretary, Lord Balfour. The crux of the report 
was the affirmation that Great Britain and the Dominions were 
"autonomous communities within the British Empire, equal in 
status, in no way subordinate one to another in any aspect 
of their domestic or external affairs, though united by a 
I' 
common allegiance to the Crown, and freely associated as members 
of the British Commonwealth of Nations. 1121 Yet it was conceded 
that in regard to foreign affairs and defence, "the major 
share of responsibility rests, and must for some time continue 
to rest, with the British Government. 1122 The Imperial Conference 
dealt with a number of other important matters, such as the 
lack of consultation by Great Britain on the Locarno Treaty 
and the positions of Governors-General, but the Balfour Report 
was clearly the principal achievement. 23 
In Australia the metropolitan press was disposed to 
regard the Balfour Report as of no more than secondary 
importance.24 Both the Melbourne Age and the Melbourne Argus 
thought that the report illustrated the need for a lowering 
of trade barriers within the Empire. 25 In Sydney The Bulletin 
thought that the report offered something to everyone and 
impiously paraphrased it in "Alice in Wonderland" terms: 
"We are one and many - I We are tied and free - I Each is 
as good as any I And we'll never disagree!n 26 And the Labor 
Daily criticized the lack of concern about "the welfare 
of the great bodies of industrious working people without 
whom Britain as well as the so-called Dominions would be but 
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empty wastes." Still, something could be said for an association 
of English-speaking nations, "provided no attempt is made to 
make helots of the colonials or to use the Dominions as cannon 
fodder." 27 Upon his return from the Imperial Conference of 1926 
Bruce told Parliament: "We have demanded for ourselves the 
status of full equality with Great Britain and the right of 
consultation respecting her foreign policy. We found ourselves 
involved in the Great War because of a foreign policy about 
which we had never been consulted, and I think we are all 
determined that we shall never again be so involved ••• If 
Britain were confronted with a great disaster we should be 
involved." But, "this House recognizes that the measure of 
co-operation that we are to give to Great Britain in wartime 
is for this Parliament to determine. 1128 Charlton said that 
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there was danger in becoming mixed up in all of Great Britain's 
troubles, which largely arose from the business of British 
investors and manufacturers. If a crisis made it necessary to 
side with Britain Australians could make their decision, but 
they should not commit themselves in advance. Nor should 
Australians become embroiled in the concerns of Europe, but 
keep their liberty to act as they thought fit at any time and 
. . t 29 1n any c1rcums ances. 
Australia was active in League of Nations affairs in the 
1920s. Of the various attempts to strengthen the League in 
those days the most important was the 1924 Geneva Protocol, 
which provided for compulsory arbitration of disputes of a 
non-justiciable nature and compulsory submission of all 
justiciable disputes to the Permanent Court of International 
Justice. In this way it was hoped to clarify the Covenant on 
the vital questions of "aggression" and "legitimate war". Much 
controversy was caused by the problem of domestic jurisdiction, 
and the Australian delegation feared that the Geneva Protocol 
would "make possible interference in domestic affairs. 1130 
After much debate and amendment in which the Australian and 
Japanese delegations played an important part, the Geneva 
Protocol was accepted unanimously by the League Assembly and 
transmitted to the member countries for approval. However, 
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British opposition was stirred by a hostile press which made 
the wild charges that the British navy was to be handed over 
to the League and that the Japanese would be able to bring 
immigration questions before the League Council. The Australian 
Government endorsed the British rejection of the Geneva Protocol, 
announced on 12 March 1925, although Charlton (who had been 
a member of the Australian delegation to Geneva) objected to 
the Government's decision without a debate in Parliament. 31 
Britain's attitude had been decisive and the Geneva Protocol 
failed to come into effect. Subsequent efforts to ensure peace 
were not made directly through the League, the Locarno regional 
guarantee of 1926 being a case in point. In 1928 the Kellogg-
Briand Pact was signed in Paris; Australia joined the other 
nations of the world in solemnly renouncing war as an instru-
ment of national policy - except in self-defence or because 
of treaty obligationso 32 
In Australia the Bruce-Page Government had won a decisive 
victory at the polls in 1925, but its margin in the 1928 
election was considerably reducedo Questions of defence and 
external affairs remained very much in the background; the 
political debate centred on the tariff, unemployment, industrial 
relations and arbitration. Charlton retired from the leader-
ship of the Labour Party in April 1928 and was succeeded by 
J.H. Scullin of Victoria. During 1929 industrial disputes 
reached a post-war peak and the Government, which had seen 
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its request for greater authority in industrial affairs 
rejected in the 1926 referendum, suddenly reversed its position 
through an impetuous blunder by the Prime Minister. Without 
warning Bruce announced that it was his Government's deter-
mination to withdraw from the arbitration field and leave 
such matters to the states in future. 33 This provided W.M. 
Hughes with a long-awaited opportunity, and on 10 September 
1929 he led a group of seven rebels who joined the Opposition 
to defeat the Government in the House by one vote. 34 In the 
ensuing election the Labour Party gained office in an over-
whelming fashion, even defeating Bruce in his own electorate. 
With a margin of 46 to 29 in the House of Representatives, 
Scullin took over the Prime Ministership just in time to 
face the great economic crash. 
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The early months of 1929 had witnessed a sharp fall in 
wool and wheat prices; this combined with a drying up of 
the London money market to produce a severe financial strain 
in Australiao Even before the depression officially began 
with the Wall Street crash of October 1929, all Australian 
governments were faced with drastic budgetary crises. 1 The 
election which brought Labour to power had been for the House 
of Representatives only, and a Non-Labour majority remained 
in control of the Senate. 2 The Government led by Scullin 
and E.G. Theodore of Queensland, the Treasurer, was urged 
by the ardent Frank Anstey, the Minister for Health, to force 
an early double dissolution, but caution prevailed and the 
advice was ignored. 3 Throughout its two years in office the 
Scullin Government was frustrated by the hostile Senate, "an 
unreasoning political opposition which clearly showed that 
while the conservative Senate was largely bankrupt of ideas, 
it was rich in a capacity to obstruct."4 Without defeating 
all Government proposals for dealing with the rapidly worsen-
ing economic situation, the Senate refused to pass those 
crucial parts of the Labour programme (usually devised by 
Theodore, the "strong man" of the Government) which could be 
labelled "unorthodox". The Scullin Government was further 
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restricted by the unco-operative attitude of the Commonwealth 
Bank (administratively independent since 1924) which was 
directed by Sir Robert Gibson, an implacably anti-Labour, 
traditionalist banker. A stalemate had thus deVB~ped. 
In its first months in office the new Government raised 
tariffs and stopped immigration; new marketing arrangements 
for wheat and wool were proposed. The depression stimulated 
a bitter debate between Labour inflationists and Non-Labour 
deflationists, who drew moral support from men like Gibson 
and Sir Otto Niemeyer of the Bank of England. Legislation and 
administrative actions which would be regarded as commonplace 
today were unhesitatingly denounced. 5 At this juncture the 
Government temporarily lost the services of its two most 
important members, for in mid-1930 Scullin departed for an 
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Imperial Conference in London and Theodore was forced to resign 
and answer charges of corruption raised by his Queensland 
political opponents. In their absence the Government was left 
in the hands of J.A. Lyons and J.E. Fenton, both of Tasmania, 
who became Treasurer and Acting Prime Minister respectively. 
The Labour Party now began to come apart at the seams, for 
the conservative Lyons and the weak Fenton found themselves 
in conflict with a radical element led by J.A. Beasley, who 
was the federal spokesman for the New South Wales Labour 
leader, J.T. Lang. 6 Lang had been Premier of New South Wales 
in 1925-1927 and regained that office in October 1930; by 
then Lang had achieved complete control of the Labour machine 
in New South Wales and had converted a Sydney newspaper, the 
Labor Daily, and Sydney radio station 2KY into organs of 
7 Lang propaganda. 
The stage was now set for the 1931 "battle of the plans". 
The Premiers' Plan, agreed to by all state leaders except 
Lang, was a deflationist call for a general reduction in 
wages, public employment and public expenditure. The rival 
Lang Plan demanded a suspension of overseas interest payments, 
a reduction of internal interest on public borrowings to three 
8 per cent and an abandonment of the gold standard. In due 
course a modified form of the Premiers' Plan was endorsed by 
Parliament; Lang went his own way and defaulted on overseas 
interest; the Labour Party split into three parts, Lyons 
followers entering into negotiations with the Nationalist 
Party, Lang supporters confirming the separate existence of 
the New South Wales Labour Party (the Lang Labour Party) and 
faithful Scullin men apprehensively awaiting the final blow. 
On 25 November 1931 the Lang faction joined the Nationalists 
and Lyons supporters in voting the Scullin Government out of 
office by 37 to 32, and the "remnants of the Labour Party 
poured into the lobbies where two years before they had 
streamed in triumph. 119 
During its short term of office the Scullin Government 
had little time for defence and foreign affairs; nevertheless 
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there were several important developments. Within a fort-
night of coming to power in late 1929 the new Labour Govern-
ment had implemented its long-standing promise to abolish 
compulsory military training.10 This was accomplished by 
administrative act and was neither an economy measure nor a 
considered part of defence planning. The Prime Minister made 
it clear to Parliament that the service chiefs had not been 
consulted, for the decision was a matter of party policy. 11 
The new Government also reduced defence estimates, primarily 
affecting the army. At the same time discussions on voluntary 
training were instituted. 
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By the time Parliament next met in March 1930 the depression 
had deepened to the point where immediate, drastic steps had 
to be taken. The Opposition had previously attacked the abolition 
of compulsory training as a blow to the strength and efficiency 
of the militia. At a time when many other nations had begun 
to rearm, what some Labour members had called a "gesture for 
peace" was, said Senator Pearce, "more likely to be regarded 
as a gesture either of insanity or infinite foolishness. 1112 
But economic realities could no longer be denied and what 
had been initiated as a matter of policy was now accelerated 
as a matter of economy. Annual defence expenditure was reduced 
from £4,513,500 to £3,896,800; five warships were put in 
reserve and naval personnel were cut by 700; general economies 
13 
were ordered for the army and the navy. In due course the 
size of the volunteer militia was set at 35,000 men, in place 
of the force of 47,000 compulsory trainees. (However, the 
actual strength of the militia did not exceed 27,000 during 
the period 1930-1932.)14 Ministers found much to praise in 
the Scullin Government's defence policy. The Attorney-General, 
Frank Brennan, in a speech at the League of Nations in 1931, 
said: "Australia tells the world, as a gesture of peace, that 
she is not prepared for war ••• We have given practical proof 
of our earnestness ••• We have drawn our pen through the 
schedule of military expenditure with unprecedented firmness. 
We have reversed a policy which has subsisted in Australia 
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for 25 years of compelling the youth to learn the art of waro 1115 
But to the new Minister for Defence, J.B. Chifley, to whom 
"neither the amount nor the nature of the parliamentary or 
public interest in defence could have been very encouraging,"16 
the position in mid-1931 was that "no further reduction in 
defence expenditure can be made, unless there is a general 
survey of the position to ascertain whether the skeleton force 
we have can be better controlled by consolidating our strength 
on particular lines, rather than spreading our activities 
over a wide field." 17 
In the latter part of 1930 Scullin was in London to attend 
the Imperial Conference which, inter alia, prepared the ground 
for the passage of the Statute of Westminster by the British 
Parliament the following year. 18 A contemporary development 
reflecting on the status of Australia was the question of 
the appointment of an Australian as Governor-General; 19 
in this matter, in contrast to his behaviour on some domestic 
issues, the Prime Minister stood ''stubbornly firm". 20 Scullin 
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had first put forward the name of Sir Isaac Isaacs, a prominent 
Justice of the High Court, in March 1930, but the proposal 
met with great resistance from King George V, palace advisers 
and the British Government (which constitutionally no longer 
had any say in such matters)o At the King's request the question 
of the appointment was delayed for more than eight months, until 
it could be personally discussed with Scullin in London in 
October and November 1930. 21 After the initial meetings the 
King and his advisers still flatly refused to accept Isaacs, 
primarily on the ground that he was Australian and not British; 
further, the Australian Government's submission of only one 
name denied the King a choice, "was a departure from the usual 
custom and would establish a precedento 1122 The lengthy 
negotiations reached a deadlock; the King's advisers argued, 
pleaded and insisted, but Scullin remained unmoved. Finally, 
in order to avoid a referendum or public controversy, the 
King yielded, admitting that as a consatutional monarch he had 
to accept the Australian Prime Minister's advice. The King, 
not without a final show of displeasure, approved the appoint-
ment in December 1930. 23 The affair produced further confirmation, 
if such were needed, of Australia's independent nationhoodo 
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PART II- THE LINGERING DEPRESSION, 1931-1934 
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Following the defeat of the Scullin Government in 
Parliament, an election was scheduled for 19 Decembero The 
1931 election was marred by partisan bitterness unequalled 
since the days of the two conscription referenda. Although 
the campaign was almost entirelydevoted to the desperately 
serious economic crisis, it is necessary to survey the 
Australian political scene as it was in late 1931 and 1932, 
in order to understand the background of the conflicting 
viewpoints on defence and foreign policy which were asserted 
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in succeeding years. The influence of the depression was not 
confined to the thirties; during the first period of war at 
least until Dunkirk, "the memory of the depression was probably 
as powerful a determinant of Australian conduct as the peril 
1 
of the war." 
The new United Australia Party was another example of a 
fusion of right-wing Labour and Non-Labour forces led by an 
ex-Labour man, in this instance J.Ao Lyons (cf. the Nationalist 
Party and WoMo Hughes). The Labour Party under Scullin's 
vacillating leadership, disastrously split, attacked on its 
flank by the Lang faction and impotent in the face of the 
depression, had forfeited public confidence. The mood of the 
conservative press was expressed by the Sydney Morning Herald, 
which said that "Comrade Lang's phrases had produced disquiet 
thousands of miles away ••• Mr. Scullin's failure to stand up 
to his job has produced a bad impression among foreign powers, 
to whom, a very few years ago, Australia was a coming country 
with a great future in commercial and diplomatic relations. 112 
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(Only the week before, in a leading article entitled "Germany's 
Plight", the same newspaper had concluded that "on the balance 
of evils it would be better for civilization" if Germany turned 
to the Nazis rather than to the Communists.) 3 
The election "at no stage looked like having any result 
other than the obvious one. 114 On a platform of "More Jobs for 
the Workers; Down with the Communists; Away with Inflation 
and Protect the People's Money; On with Primary Production; 
Renew World Confidence 115 the United Australia Party won almost 
by default. Labour Party membership in the House of Representa~ 
was reduced to 14 while the Non-Labour parties 1' total rose to 
54; five Lang Labour and two independent members completed 
the roll. Scullin's greatest single loss was the defeat of 
his Treasurer, E.G. Theodore, by a Lang man. Other prominent 
future Labour leaders John Curtin and 
J.B. Chifley- swept away on the tide of Non-Labour and Lang 
Labour votes. The satisfaction at the results of The Bulletin 
was typical of Australia's overwhelmingly Non-Labour press: 
"Australians have told the weakest ••• the most dangerous of all 
their federal governments that they will have no more of it. 
They have routed alike the Labour groups that stood for 
inflation ••• and interest default. There will be no political 
control of banking and currency ••• The electors have proved 
themselvesworthy of the franchise; they have voted wisely; 
they have nobly expressed the real Australian spirit. 116 
The 1931 election confirmed the formal, separate existence 
of the Lang Labour Party, and seven of its members (five in 
the House, two in the Senate) sat in the new Parliament. Dis-
missed from the Premiership of New South Wales by the Governor 
and defeated at the subsequent election in June 1932, Lang 
none the less succeeded in further tightening his dictatorial 
grip on the state party organization; federal Labour influence 
in New South Wales was virtually eliminated by 1934. Radical 
but not Communist7 - most of its supporters were Catholics-
the Lang Labour Party functioned on and off between 1931 and 
1941 and was a nagging thorn in the side of the Labour Party. 
Thus the Labour ~arty was seriously divided for most of the 
period under consideration in this study, and this was to be 
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one of the factors which affected the debate on external policy. 8 
In early January 1932 the Lyons Government was sworn in, 
having decided that Country Party participation was expendableo 
Lyons took the Treasury portfolio and appointed JoG. Latham, 
Attorney-General and Minister for External Affairs; Senator 
Pearce,Minister for Defence; J.E. Fento~Postmaster-General; 
and S.M. Bruce,Resident Minister (later High Commissioner) 
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in Great Britain. The Lyons Government had the good fortune 
to achieve office at a time when the economic tide had already 
begun to turn. Throughout 1932 and 1933 export prices improved 
and industry revived, enabling the Government to reduce the 
budget deficit. 'rhe 1934 budget showed a surplus, and some of 
the cuts which had been made to salaries and pensions were 
restored. Although by no means completely recovered from the 
depression, by the end of the Lyons Government's first term 
conditions in Australia were substantially improved over what 
they had been when the term begano 
As J.A. Lyons was to occupy the Prime Ministership for 
the next eight years, it is worth pausing briefly to examine 
his personalityo Lyons had begun his career as a primary 
school teacher and eventually became Labour Premier of Tasmania, 
before transferring to federal politics. A Catholic (the first 
and only member of his church to lead a federal Non-Labour 
party) and the father of 11 children, he generally kept personal 
religion separate from public politics. A plain man, charming, 
easy-going and tolerant, Lyons exhibited a homespun quality 
which appealed to the electorate. But although he believed in 
improving the lot of the ordinary people, Lyons was "not deeply 
critical of the sort of society in which he lived," and he was 
endowed with "no outstanding intellectual gifts."9 His mild 
nature would prove a handicap when his leadership came under 
attack from within his own party in the latter part of his 
period in office. 
The position of the Lyons Government was eroded by the 
1934 election, which marked the beginning of a growing in-
stability in the Non-Labour parties. Again, the campaign was 
dominated by domestic economic issues. And again, the metro-
politan press, with one obvious exception, was unanimous in 
its opposition to Labour. The Bulletin, for example, while 
deploring that the election should be fought on the issue of 
the banks to the exclusion of other important questions, 10 
asserted that "Labour's ideas are not British or Australian 
ideas; they are alien ideas. 1111 Although the party in office 
was "stodgy, self-satisfied and deficient in inspiring leader-
ship," a Labour Government "would bring about a crisis worse 
than the crisis of 1931. 1112 The Canberra Times wrote: "The 
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Lyons Government deserves the approval of a large majority of 
Australian electors. 1113 The theme was repeated in other capital 
cities: "A vote for Mr. Lyons is a vote for the right road -
the only road consistent with sanity, safety, continued pro-
gress and continued hope. 1114 "It is absurd to suppose that 
any intelligent community should prefer Labour meddling, 
ineptitude and incapacity to the skill, energy, ability and 
foresight which have marked the present Ministry's term of 
office. 1115 "The very stupidity of the Labour Party has surely 
made the Lyons Government's appeal irresistible. 1116 The only 
dissenter was the Sydney Labor Daily, which hopefully predicted 
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the defeat of the Government. 17 
The foregoing commentary was typical of the press partisan-
ship which existed in Australia during the 1930s. In 1934 
internal considerations were still paramount; later external 
problems became increasingly significant. But the ultimate 
political loyalities of the newspapers seldom waveredo 
Some seats were lost by the United Australia Party in 
1934, and it was forced to re-establish the Country Party 
coalition of the twenties, thus returning the strong-willed 
Earle Page to the Government. The Lang Labour Party raised 
its number of seats in the House of Representatives to nine, 
further dividing the Opposition. An important feature of the 
aection was the entry of R.G. Menzies into Parliament and 
his subsequent appointment as Attorney-General (in place of 
Latham, who later became Chief Justice of the High Court)o 
Hughes re-entered the Government and the following year R.G. 
Casey became Treasurer. Lyons thus found himself surrounded 
by men whose personalities tended to overshadow his own. It 
appeared that the United Australia Party was beginning to long 
for one of its "own" men as leader (again cf. the Nationalists 
and Hughes); Menzies was to prove the Prime Minister's most 
formidable rivalo 
After taking office in January 1932, the Lyons Government 
had been forced by economic circumstances to further reduce 
defence spending to a figure (£3,159,960) slightly below that 
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of the last Scullin budget (£3,184,836). 18 In reply to criticism 
from within his own party the Minister for Defence, Senator 
Pearce, had admitted that "with the amount expended on defence 
today, we cannot anything like adequately bear our share of 
Empire defence. 1119 The Labour Party and the Lang faction had 
accepted the position. 20 Thus by the beginning of 1933 Australian 
defences had fallen to the lowest point for 20 years. 21 
The first, cautious move in the direction of a stronger 
defence system began with the presentation of the budget for 
1933-1934. Provision was made for an increase of defence 
expenditure by about £1,000,000 (to £4,157,494) and a three-
year expansion programme was initiated. 22 The Government gave 
priority to the navy: "Australia's primary aim should be the 
provision of an efficient squadron of ships, able to co-operate 
efficiently with the British navy ••• If Australia's markets 
were closed and her imports and exports stopped by enemy action, 
she could be forced to sue for peace without a single enemy 
soldier coming within sight of her shoreso 1123 In urging the 
need for stronger defences a private member of the United 
Australia Party, E.F. Harrison, reminded the House that "Japan 
in 1933 has 259,000 men with the colours and 2,000,000 men 
trained as reserves. Australia in 1933 has 27,000 men in her 
regular army, no reserves and distinctly inadequate defence 
equipment. 1124 A division in Opposition opinion appeared in 
the debate. E.J. Ward, the Lang Labour firebrand, alleged 
that the greatest danger to Australia was "the professional 
soldier, who spends his time in engineering wars •• oagainst 
the workers of other landso 1125 Norman Makin thought that 
"we should be careful not to provoke other nations into 
pitting their finances against ours in a foolish endeavour 
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to arm to the teeth." Added E.J. Holloway: "I would be 
prepared to urge that Australia should not bother about arm-
ing to defend herself, because no other country will interfere 
with her. 1127 When the question came to a vote, three leading 
Labour members (Scullin, Green and F.Mo Forde) voted in favour 
of the Government estimate, which was passed by 44-12o 
In the 1934 debate on defence the Labour Party was united 
in opposing the further increase in spending (to £5,457,800) 
planned by the Governmento Scullin chose to contest the pro-
posed order of a new cruiser from Britain, but his motion 
was defeated on party lines. 28 
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~~~E~~E-2:_!~~-~~E~~!~!_!~!~~!~~~!-~~~ch~E!~ 
As a result of the Washington Conference a naval armaments 
race which the British Empire, in comparison to the United 
States, could ill afford, had been avoided; Japan's agree-
ment not to fortify the western islands of the Pacific Ocean 
had at least deferred the threat of Japanese expansion to the 
south; the basis of Anglo-American co-operation in the Pacific 
had been confirmed. 1 Few Australians had fully realized that 
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an inevitable consequence of the Washington Treaties was a 
significant increase in Japanese power, both absolutely and 
relative to British Empire and American strength in the Pacifico 
The position of China and Southeast Asia had become more 
vulnerable. The spirit of positive co-operation which had been 
characteristic of relations with Japan during the years of 
the Anglo-Japanese Alliance had been replaced by a negative, 
restrictive attitude. 
In the decade following the Washington Conference those 
few Australians who concerned themselves with such matters 
continued to pay more attention to European affairs than to 
the Pacific. Australian policy towards Japan was ill-defined 
and suffered from a conflict between a desire for close 
relations and a vague fear of long-term Japanese intentionso 
There was a steady growth of exports to Japan, and Australia 
avoided anything which might "rock the boat" in the Pacific. 
Japan, on the other hand, renewed in self-confidence, was 
not reluctant to exploit external situations. 
The Manchurian conflict began in Mukden on the night of 
18 September 1931. At the time it was difficult to recognize 
what was involved because of the complexity of the situation 
in Manchuria, contributed to by Chinese disorders, Japanese 
encroachments and disputed treaty rights. Accurate information 
was almost impossible to secure. China's division between 
rival regimes, accompanied by the threat of military rebellion 
in the north, did not simplify matters. In Japan the army 
was increasing its ascendency over the civil authorities, 
resulting in a greater immunity to external pressure. 
In Australia the Scullin Government was preoccupied with 
urgent internal problems and took little notice of develop-
ments which did not seem to require immediate action. The 
first Australian newspaper to comment editorially on the 
events in Manchuria was the Sydney Morning Herald, which 
from the beginning defended the Japanese cause: "The alleged 
murder of a Japanese army officer is quoted as a pretext for 
the move Japan has now made to assert her rights and authority 
in the Manchurian railway zone. But there are ample reasons 
for the exhaustion of Japanese patience. The Japanese army 
has now taken lightning measures to assert control over the 
whole region of Japan's interest and has ejected Chinese 
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police and officials. From Port Arthur to Harbin and along 
the Mukden-Tientsin line, Japan intends to maintain her treaty 
rights and privileges." 2 
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The next day the Sydney Morning Herald made a strong 
accusation: "The wanton aggression by Chinese which precipitated 
the trouble places Japan in a position as strong diplomatically 
as strategically. Neither China nor Russia can at the moment 
legitimately reproach Japan for her action ••• The Chinese 
Government has appealed to the League of Nations. This appeal 
has its comic side, for the aggressor both in Manchuria and 
elsewhere, by direct action and by boycott, has been China.o. 
Moreover, if the League on the present case were to do any-
thing save recognize that Japan had every excuse for her 
action, it would only embitter the position. There is perhaps 
no more impossible task which the League could conceivably 
set itself than to procure a Japanese abandonment of her 
rights."3 For some months the Sydney Morning Herald was the 
only Australian newspaper to consider the conflict in Manchuria 
important enough to warrant frequent editorial examination. 4 
There were several questions about Manchuria in Parliament 
during the early months of the dispute, but on each occasion 
the Prime Minister declined to be drawn.5 A typical exchange 
took place when E.J. Ward asked& "Having regard to the ominous 
developments in the Far East, will the Prime Minister give 
an undertaking that in no circumstances will Australian lives 
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be sacrificed in the event of a war for Chinese markets?" 
Scullin replied: "We are all watching with a great deal of 
interest and anxiety the developments in the Far East. I 
do not think they will culminate in war; at any rate we hope 
not. We shall be wise if we do not anticipate trouble, and 
refrain from making statements that might aggravate the present 
strained relations between China and Japan."6 Ward's question 
was representative of the Lang Labour viewpoint; the Prime 
Minister's reply was in keeping with the "three wise monkeys" 
attitude, which all too often has been the Australian disposition 
to foreign affairs. 
Japan launched a naval attack on Shanghai in late January 
1932, leading to an acceleration of League of Nations activityo 
Now that it was no longer merely a question of international 
principles but a threat to British trading interests in China, 
the Sydney Morning Herald began to have second thoughts: "The 
peril at Shanghai of all foreign communities alike is manifest 
and immediate." And "it is perfectly clear that independent 
Japanese action in that region has gone far enough ••• Japan 
has done more than attack China. She has shocked the world 
into a realization in earnest of the insufficiency of the 
League of Nations."7 
The Labor Daily supported the League of Nations and China, 
but only if this required nothing of Australia. The Labor Daily 
was sufficiently worried about the possibility of Australian 
involvement in the fighting that the conflict briefly received 
front-page prominence& "The League must act or quit. The 
Council no longer has the excuse that it is not in possession 
of adequate details of the dispute, and it must now act or 
proclaim its impotence to the world."8 The next day the 
newspaper's headline read "League's Last Yarning, Japan Must 
Keep Yord."9 The day after: "Not Our Yar - A grave suspicion 
is beginning to dawn on Australian circles in London that 
attempts may be made to drag Australia into the war in China. 
The fear was accentuated today by an amazing suggestion in 
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the House of Commons that Australia was in danger from Japanese 
. "10 aggress1on. 
When the first Parliament of the new Lyons Government 
assembled in February 1932, there were many anxious references 
to the situation in China.11 The attitude of the United 
Australia Party in power differed little from that of its 
Labour predecessor. The new Minister for External Affairs, 
J.G. Latham, claimed: "Members will agree that no good purpose 
could b& served, while harm might be done, by any attempt to 
deal in detail with the events or to try to assign reasons 
for them."12 It was asserted in the House that economic sanctions 
against Japan, especially in regard to wool, were impracticable. 
In the Senate a Labour spokesman, J.P. Dunn of New South Wales, 
moved that Australian forces should not be allowed to actively 
operate outside of Australian territory and strongly opposed 
Australian participation in a "sordid trade war". 13 The motion 
was defeated on party lines, but the Government gave an 
assurance that it would do everything in its power to avoid 
Australian involvement in any war. Government policy was 
influenced by an apprehension of Japanese power and a natural 
reluctance to jeopardize an important market for Australian 
primary products; exports to Japan were helping to prevent 
the complete collapse of the Australian economy during the 
worst years of the depression. Some Australians thought that 
the conflict in Manchuria and China was not entirely to be 
regretted, because the "inevitable'' Japanese expansion was 
being directed west towards Asia instead of south towards 
Australia. Manchuria would take a long time to digest, and 
Australia was in no danger of attack "because of the heavy 
responsibilities" Japan had assumed there.14 
A ceasefire was arranged in Shanghai, but the League of 
Nations eventually had to concede the failure of its sustained 
efforts to bring about a peaceful settlement in Manchuria. 
Japan insisted that the Manchurian problem was a question of 
life or death on which no concession or compromise was 
possible; without the use of force -which League members 
were not willing to contemplate seriously - there was nothing 
further to be done. 
The Australian press was divided in its assessment of 
Japan's successful defiance of world opinion. The Sydney 
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Daily Telegraph said that war with Japan was inevitable, 
asserting that this was the belief in "a host of Pacific 
centres ••• in California, in Hawaii, New Zealand, Australia, 
Singapore and Netherlands India."15 The Bulletin believed 
that"the assumption that any neighbour is an enemy is the best 
way to make him an enemy. The Japanese have a case and we 
Australians should recognize it."16 The Labor Daily applauded 
the announcement of an Australian goodwill mission to Japan 
to be led by J.G. Latham, hoping that this would counteract 
the "war scare" and the "anti-Australian feeling created in 
Japan because of war-mongering propaganda in many Australian 
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newspapers and utterances by public men in Australia regarding 
'aggression' from the East. 1117 Although it was admitted that 
Japan urgently needed the resources and markets of Manchuria, 18 
the Melbourne Argus reminded its readers that a few Australians 
were in occupation of an immense country, "and the question 
is whether, in the present situation of the world, it can be 
taken for granted that peaceful possession will be allowed 
to continue indefinitely.••19 The Melbourne ~, in keeping 
with its protectionist tradition, criticized the economic 
nationalism of Japan as a threat to Australia's industry and 
living standard. 20 Some months later the A&! said that there 
could be no valid defence for the Japanese invasion of 
Manchuria, but while "Australia keeps her powder dry, she 
has nothing but the highest respect for Japan." 21 In Perth 
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the West Australian welcomed the peaceful intentions professed 
by the Japanese Foreign Minister. Nevertheless, "Australia, 
living in an area that might be disturbed, must be in a 
position to protect herself ••• It is the business of statesman-
ship to persuade Japan to a policy of self-control in the 
face of temptations and at the same time to relieve her of 
the encirclement complex."22 
Concern with the outcome of the Manchurian crisis was a 
factor impelling the Lyons Government to seek closer relations 
with Japan. Thus, although the Latham mission of early 1934 
went to a number of Asian countries, it was clear from the 
beginning that the visit to Japan was the most important part 
ot the itinerary. Trade consideratio~ which will be discussed 
later, were one of the responsibilities of the Minister for 
External Affairs; he was also vitally interested in obtaining 
Japanese assurances on other matters. Hirota, the Japanese 
Foreign Minister, denied that his country planned to fortify 
the western islands in violation of the League of Nations 
mandate. On the contrary, Japan's intentions in all inter-
national questions were entirely peaceful. Latham was able 
to satisfy himsilf that the Japanese did not resent Australia's 
restrictive immigration policy; he stressed to the Japanese 
that it was a false idea that Australia had "great unoccupied 
and fertile areas that might support a large population."23 
On the subject of the possible exchange of diplomatic 
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representatives between Australia and Japan, Latham expressed 
the traditional, insular Australian viewpoint: "Today, I say, 
the less dip1lomacy a country has the better are its chances 
of happiness."24 Australia's interests were looked after by 
British diplomats. Besides, if an Australian ambassador should go 
to Tokyo, said Latham, the same question would arise in respect 
to Washington, Nanking and other capitals. Hirota was persuaded 
that "there was no need for diplomatic representation by 
either country in the other."25 
From the time of the conflict in Manchuria to the beginning 
of the Pacific war ten years afterwards, Australia experienced 
mixed feelings and variations in policy towards Japan. The 
Manchurian affair was a blow to supporters of collective 
security. Perhaps the League might still be useful in the 
affairs of Europe, but there were now grave doubts about its 
ability to maintain peace in the Pacific. It was not the 
League itself which was to blame, W.M. Hughes pointed out. 
"The League is composed of nations and is what they make it."26 
But this was not much consolation to Australians who tradition-
ally regarded Japan as the nation most likely to menace their 
security. The easing of anxiety brought about by the Latham 
mission was short-lived. Manchuria was not easily forgotten. 
Japan, Australia's near neighbour, was the cause of a loss 
of faith in collective security - a system which Australia 
regarded as an important safeguard. Fear of Japan was to be 
an important factor in the determination of Australian 
policy in the years to come. 
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The passage of the Statute of Westminster by the British 
Parliament in December 1931 had been foreshadowed by the 
recommendations of the Imperial Conferences of 1926 and 
1930. In general the Statute clarified the powers of the 
Dominion Parliaments, which in future would be able to legislate 
in those matters of Dominion concern which previously had 
been controlled by the British Parliament. The Dominions could 
repeal existing imperial legislation; they could make laws 
having extra-territorial application; British enactments would 
apply only at Dominion request. 1 In contrast to Canada, Ireland 
and South Africa, Australia and New Zealand had resisted the 
movement towards legal endorsement of Dominion sovereignty. 
Thus Australia and New Zealand had secured the insertion of 
a section which stipulated that the powers conferred by the 
Statute of Westminster would not apply until formally adopted 
by the respective Dominion Parliaments. 
That Australia would delay ratification of the Statute 
was only to be expected. The Lyons Government showed no 
enthusiasm for the decentralizing tendencies which the Statute 
reflected. R.G. Casey, later to join the Government, expressed 
the prevailing Non-Labour attitude in a public address& "Any 
threat to the unity and strength of the Empire is clearly to 
our disadvantage. The increasing degree of independence being 
assumed by the Dominions means increasing difficulty in co-
ordinating and welding the separate voices of the Dominions 
into one with that of Great Britain ••• The precise doctrine 
of logical Dominion nationalism can be, and has been, carried 
too far." 2 The Labor Daily believed that "the imperial tie 
is maintained by 95 per cent of the people of Australia, not 
out of any uneasy feeling that the country could not exist 
without the imperial tie, but out of a sentimental attachment 
to the old country ••• The people of Australia could defend 
themselves against possible enemies.") The Sydney Morning 
Herald complained that the Statute of Westminster could serve 
no useful purpose and might have mischievous consequences. 
"It is inexpedient to crystallize imperial relationships in 
a hard and fast formula ••• There are fears that the cumulative 
effect of all these innovations may be to make the Dominions 
too self-conscious and to weaken the imperial tie. As things 
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are we have all that we can possibly desire& liberty of action, 
freedom from interference and the protection of the British 
navy."4 "The Statute of Westminster is loaded," concluded 
The Bulletin. 5 
A study of the policy debate in Australia in the thirties 
must always take economic factors into account. The depression 
had spurred a revival of the old, visionary ide& of Empire 
free trade, which was advocated as a panacea by dedicated 
Empire loyalists.6 Thus when an imperial trade conference 
met in Ottawa in July-August 1932, there were high hopes on 
the part of the Dominions. It was unanimously agreed that at 
the root of the Empire's economic troubles was a "calamitous 
fall in commodity prices. 117 The Australian delegation was 
led by S.M. Bruce, who forcefully put his country's case for 
preferential treatment in the British market. "Our primary 
object," said Bruce, "is the promotion of intra-Empire trade 
and the consummation of a closer economic union among the 
British nations."8 But the Ottawa Conference could not ignore 
the connection between the economic welfare of the Empire 
and the economic welfare of the world; Stanley Baldwin, the 
leader of the British delegation, stressed the impossibility 
of separating Britain's trade within the Empire from foreign 
trade which was vital to the British economy. In the event, 
however, Britain agreed to protect Australia's share of the 
British market for certain commodities, especially wheat, 
sugar, dried and tinned fruits, but~er and processed milk. 
There were to be some limitations on the supply of Australian 
meat. In return for these concessions, Australia was expected 
to reduce tariffs on British manufactures.9 
The press viewed the Ottawa Conference with mixed feelings 
of optimism and anxiety. The only openly hostile note vas 
sounded by the Labor Daily, which in a leader entitled "The 
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Quackery of Ottawa" attacked the "old conception of the Dominions 
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as the •wood and water joeys' of Britain."10 The Sydney 
Morning Herald and the Melbourne Argus, roth traditional 
advocates of free trade, were hopeful about Ottawa, although 
the Argus realized that "the value of the agreement depends 
entirely upon the spi~ in which it is implemented in Australia~~ 
"Something good has come out of Ottawa," wrote The Bulletin.12 
The protectionist Melbourne A&! was restrained in its attitude: 
"Australia will be glad if further data enable her to join 
in that effusive gratification over its achievements which 
the Ottawa delegates seemingly shared."l), 
Ottawa led to a rise in the proportion of Australian 
exports going to Britain, so that for some items Britain 
became in effect the only market. The only Australian products 
which remained clearly in the world market category were 
wool and wheat. The Lyons Government decided to use the Tariff 
Board as the least controversial means of effecting reductions 
in duties on imports from Great Britain. 
Had the new trade agreements been implemented in the spirit 
of the principal Ottawa Conference resolution ("that by the 
lowering or removal of barriers among themselves provided 
for by these agreements, the flow of trade between the various 
countries of the Empire will be facilitated, and that by the 
consequent increase of purchasing power of their peoples, the 
trade of the world will also be stimulated and increased")!4 
Australia might have been better able to avoid future political 
repercussions. To understand the position it is advisable 
to review Australian trade with Asian countries, especially 
Japan. 
There was a wide division of opinion as to the benefits 
or otherwise of Australian trade with Japan. An article in 
a conservative Empire journal speculated that "perhaps at 
last the Asiatic peril to industry that every magazine used 
to discuss 30 or 40 years ago is upon us ••• Australia, as one 
of Japan's nearest neighbours, is affected by this competition 
in most embarrassing ways."15 Another outlook was expressed 
by Australia's largest commercial bank: "The industrialization 
ot Japan promises to bring with it great possibilities for 
the development of markets for Australian foodstuffs and raw 
materials ••• Of the total Japanese imports into Australia in 
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1932-1933 nearly half were goods not competitive with Australian 
manufactures, though two-thirds were, to some extent, competitive 
with British goods ••• The improved quality of Japanese goods 
compares very favourably with the quality of similar exports 
from other countrieso"16 Indeed, the depression had greatly 
enhanced the importance of trade between Japan and Australia. 
Wool was a case in point: in 1928-1929 Australia exported 
108,200,000 pounds of wool to Japan (12.7 per cent of Australia's 
total wool exports}; in 1933-1934 the figure was 225,600,000 
pounds (21.3 per cent}. Japanese imports of Australian wheat 
showed an even more extraordinary advance. At the same time 
Australia became for three years China's chief supplier of 
wheat. It was only natural that imports into Australia from 
Japan also increased; this was especially evident in textiles 
(e.g. cotton piece-goods purchased from Japan rose from 
24,000,000 square yards in 1926 to 87,000,000 square yards in 
17 1935). None the less, the balance of trade between Japan and 
Australia remained very much in the latter's favour. The table 
shows the relative growth of trade between the two countries: 
Australian-Japanese Trade (percentages of total) 
1909-13 1922 1930-31 1931-32 1932-33 
Imports from Japan 1.2 3.5 4.0 5.5 6.3 
Exports to Japan 1.6 6.2 10.5 10.8 11.7 
Most Australian newspapers conceded that the rapid growth 
in imports from Japan in the early 1930s was a corollary of 
the enormous expansion of Australian sales of primary products 
to Japan. The Sydney Morning Herald was of the opinion that 
"Japan attaches more value to markets than to unfettered 
tac:ili ties for migration. By exports alone, she contends, can 
she pay for the foodstuffs and raw materials essential to her 
existence. 1119 In a lengthy editorial the West Australian 
concluded: "Australia can sell Japan the wool she wants at 
the best available terms, and Japan is a good customer 
producing serviceable articles, many of them not produced 
in Australia, at prices which, in those respects, must tend 
to raise the standard of living of the Australian worker."20 
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The Bulletin worried that the admission of the Soviet Union 
to the League of Nations might one day find Australia obliged 
by League resolution to sever all trade and financial relations 
with Japan, "a nation which in its relations with Australia 
21 has always played the game." 
The principal dissenters were the Melbourne Age and, to 
a lesser extent, the Melbourne Argus. Both newsp~s loudly 
and repeatedly complained about alleged Japanese dumping in 
1933. The ~made its case in two long editorials& "Facts 
daily increasing attest how serious is the menace to this 
country of the imports of cheap Japanese goods. There is in 
progress a trade war ••• The standard of living of the workers, 
the reasonable profits of manufacturers, the opportunities 
for the unemployed, the prospects of young people ready to 
enter the economic field - all are being placed in greater 
jeopardy owing to the unfair competitive liberty being allowed 
to a foreign country. It is not due to Japan's superior 
technical skill or industrial organization, but to methods 
Australia can be relied upon never to adopt - mean wages, 
serf conditions, long hours, a seven-day week, child labouro"22 
"It is not extravagant to assert that a state of commercial-
industri.al emergency exists. " 23 
By 1934 Japan was taking almost one-third of Australia's 
wool exports and one-eighth of the total exports from Australia. 
The A&! and the Argus no~/Withstanding, most of the resentment 
CATASTROPHE. 
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caused by the sale of Japanese goods to Australia came from 
British - not Australian - manufacturers; and in 1934 Australia 
had a favourable balance of payments with Japan, but a very 
adverse balance with Britain. 24 So it vas not surprising that 
the Latham mission led to the opening of negotiations for a 
trade treaty between Japan and Australia. Only two years 
after the event Australia was moving away from some of the 
questionable implications of Ottawa and vas moving in the 
direction of a more rational policy, which gave greater emphasis 
to trade with Japan and other neighbouring countries. 
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PART III- AUSTRALIA AND THE WORLD, 1935-1936 
~E~!r_7- Th!_Ab;rs!!!!!~_£!!!!! 
By mid-1935 relations between Italy and Abyssinia had 
deteriorated to the point that only the undisguised rearmament 
of Germany was seen as a greater threat to the peace in Europe. 
For years Mussolini had waited for an opportunity for an 
aggressive assertion of his country's pretensions to great 
power status. To Italy, therefore, Abyssinia represented the 
chance to gain colonial territory in the manner of Britain 
and France in the nineteenth century, the chance to blot out 
the humiliations of the First World War and Versailles, and 
even the chance to avenge the defeat of the invading Italian 
army by the "primitive" Abyssinians at Adowa in 1896. Mussolini 
felt assured of France's neutrality and was undeterred by 
British diplomatic pressure, which was applied too late to be 
effective.1 Attempts at conciliation were ignored: the Italian 
attack on Abyssinia began on 3 October 1935. 
The Australian press had begun to comment on the Italo-
Abyssinian dispute several months before the outbreak of 
hostilities.2 At first the Sydney Morning Herald paid lip 
service to the rights of the Abyssinians: "A unilateral policy 
by Italy in regard to Abyssinia disregards the fact that 
Abyssinia has appealed to the League."3 But a month later the 
Sydney Morning Herald reverted to the indifferent attitude 
it had shown on the occasion of the League's first failure: 
"Sheer unreasoning aggression is no more to be judged the 
actuating motive with Italy today than with Japan in Manchuria 
in 1931 ••• Whether the League sinks or swims is ultimately 
a minor consideration with Britain. 114 The ~ recognized that 
"certain intelligible reasons underlie Italy's action." 5 
Unconcerned about obligations to the League and confident 
that the Abyssinian question did not affect British interests, 
the Argus vrotea "Just as the people of Australia could not 
be roused to intervene on behalf of either party, so it may 
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be assumed that the British people ••• would scorn as an absurdity 
the idea that failure to avert war between Italy and Abyssinia 
6 
would bring nearer a world upheaval." And a week later the 
incredibly complacent observation that "war will enlarge 
rather than contract the demand for Australian exports. The 
acceleration of spending in Europe must be regarded as an 
inflating development tending towards higher prices for primary 
products, including metals. 117 Yet when it became clear that 
Britain was genuinely alarmed about Abyssinia, the Argus 
immediately swung into linea "World opinion has gone too far 
to permit Italy to maintain a war of conquest against a 
fellow member of the League of Nations. 118 The West Australian, 
which earlier had noted with apparent approval the possibility 
of Japanese intervention on the side of Abyssinia, 9 was equally 
t ' t' th B 't' h 't' t G lO •- 1't promp 1n suppor 1ng e r1 1s pos1 1on a eneva. ~ 
became increasingly obvious that Italy intended to take 
Abyssinia by force, 11 The Bulletin retreated into isolation 
while continuing to disparage the League of Nations: "To 
boycott is to fight, and the Australians won't fight the 
Italians •ither to protect the Abyssinians or to preserve the 
tottering League."12 Unlike most of the Non-Labour press, 
The Bulletin was occasionally unwilling to follow the usual 
uncritical "Britain knows best" line& "Australia is the best 
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judge of its own interests, and its interests do not lie in 
defending Abyssinia ••• Neither will Australia follow England."13 
Further, "many Australians agree ••• that Britain should stand 
aside from the League."14 
In examining the editorial policy in regard to Abyssinia 
of the Labor Daily, 15 it is well to re~ the warning of a 
Labour historian that "there is never a 'Labour' view on 
defence or international affairs. There is a collection of 
views held by different groups inside the Labour movement. At 
the most a resolution at a union or a political conference 
can be said to express at that time the views of the majority 
present; but the minorities are not silenced, are only 
occasionally suppressed, an influence continues, and never 
does unanimity prevail on any topic. 1116 In the beginning the 
Labor Daily, mouthpiece of the Lang Labour Party, gave un-
qualified support to the League of Nations and collective 
security. A cartoon portrayed a "Fascist imperialist" Mussolini 
The Bulletin, 18 September 1935 
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getting "too big for his boot."17 "Peace and collective 
security can be organized effectively only through the League 
of Nations ••• determined to apply the sanctions of the Covenant 
against the aggressor, and thus develop an unbroken front of 
war-resistance that no nation dare challenge.n18 Britain "would 
19 have no other recourse but to close the Suez Canal." The 
strongest leader of all appeared on 22 August 1935: "Germany's 
return to the League at this stage would assist materially 
in enabling Europe to present a united front against Mussolini ••• 
The immediate convening of a conference of the major powers 
to present an ultimatum to Mussolini ••• appears to be the most 
expeditious way of handling a very difficult problem."20 The 
next day, however, the Labor Daily began to change its tune. 
Abyssinia was the "vortex of an international whirlpool that 
appears dangerously close to dragging civilization into a 
second world war more devastating than the first." Readers 
were warned of "clandestine negotiations likely to embroil 
Australia." 21 The Labor Daily proceeded to demand the recall 
of the cruiser "Australia" from the Mediterranean, because 
"a naval blockade of the Suez Canal would constitute a virtual 
declaration of war against Italy and would be impossible to 
justity. 1122 Collective economic sanctions could rightly be 
invoked, but "it was never visualized that League membership 
should become the means of giving legal sanction to military 
operations."23 For a fortnight the newspaper devoted almost 
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every leading article to Abyssinia; this campaign culminated 
in a big "anti-war" rally on 4 September. Lang, Beasley and 
other speakers "called upon the people to demand for Australia 
a policy of isolation and a formal declaration of neutrality 
by Parliament ••• The clarion call went out to keep this young 
nation out of the blood hunts of European imperialism."24 There 
was virtually no mention of the critical issue, namely the 
fate of Abyssinia and the League of Nations. 
What had happened to cause this turnabout in Lang Labour 
policy? Briefly, 25 it can be seen in part as a result of Lang's 
tactical decision to terminate his long-standing alliance 
with the Communists. To Lang, Abyssinia presented the opportunity 
to strike a blow against his opponents by uniting Catholics, 
pacifists, anti-Communists and others. A contemporary observer 
said later that "the influence of the Catholic Church on the 
Labour movement in New South Wales had been most important. 1126 
In general, however, the predominantly Irish hierarchy of the 
Catholic Church in Australia did not have much sympathy with 
Italian aims and was equivocal in its reaction to the Abyssinian 
crisis. For example, in a public address Archbishop Mannix 
reminded his audience that he had been against a trade war 
in 1914 and was against a trade war now, "whether the aggressor 
be Italy, England, France or any other nation. The Treaty of 
Versailles left Italy with no possibility of expansion of 
territory and Italy, rightly or wrongly - I think wrongly 
has taken the opportunity of making war on the unfortunate 
Abyssinians.n 27 
The Government's position was st&ted by Lyons on 25 
August& he had pledged Australia "to the hilt" to support 
British efforts to maintain peace. 28 Hughes, however, retorted 
that there was no surer way of "unleashing the dogs of war 
for another more terrible world conflict than a single-handed 
attempt by Great Britain to intervene between the Italians 
and the Abyssinians.n29 Fears of Italian power were wildly 
exaggerated, 30 and there was concern about a possible threat 
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to the Suez trade route. Thus the Australian Government steered 
a cautious course, more concerned with Britain's position than 
that of the League. Parliament reassembled in late September 
and became the focus of the debate on Australian policy on 
the crisis, despite the typical plea by some newspapers 31that 
it would be better not to discuss the matter. Lyons and Pearce 
again expressed the Government's guarded endorsement of British 
attempts to restrain Italy, while F.M. Forde (acting leader 
of the Labour Party following Scullin's resignation) averred 
that "the control of Abyssinia by any country is not worth 
the loss of a single Australian life."32 Both sections of the 
Labour Party supported Beasley's motion for a declaration of 
Australian neutrality, which was lost 27-21 the week after 
the Italians had launched their attack. 33 An interesting 
feature of the debate was the Government's anachronistic view 
of Australia's status, as shown by Menzies's plea that it 
was not possible "with one King who makes peace or war, for 
the Crown to be at war in relation to Great Britain and at 
peace in relation to Auatralia."34 
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The League Council named Italy as the aggressor (S.M. Bruce, 
representing Australia, voted for the resolution) and called 
for economic sanctions. A sanctions bill was subsequently 
put before the Australian Parliament and passed on party lines. 35 
At the very moment that sanctions were being debated in 
Parliament, there appeared a book by W.M. Hughes, then Minister 
for Health, which caused something of a sensation and led to 
his enforced resignation from the Government - primarily 
because Labour members made effective use of the book's 
arguments. "The League of Nations cannot preserve peace; it 
cannot ensure security," wrote Hughes. "Any sanctions imposed 
by the League can only be effective to the extent that they 
are backed by armed force ••• This, of course, means war ••• 
Yet Australia is almost defenceless. 1136 
On 9 December 1935 it was reported that Britain and France 
had secretly agreed to a "compromise settlement" which would 
have awarded Italy more than half of Abyssinia in recognition 
of military success. The most disturbing aspect of the notorious 
Hoare-L&val plan was the revelation that at the very moment 
when Britain was most emphatic in expressing wholehearted 
loyalty to League ideals, the British Government was in favour 
of a plan for "settling" the war in Abyssinia which was a 
"brutal travesty of the League's central principles."37 But 
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in Australia public opinion was predisposed towards a compromise 
settlement and was not therefore universally outraged by the 
publication of the Hoare-Laval plan. {The outcry in the other 
Dominions and in Britain resulted in the jettisoning of the 
plan and the sacrifice of Hoare.) The Labor Daily condemned 
this "typically cynical, old-world diplomacy"of Britain and 
France, 38 but the Adelaide Advertiser was mildly optimistic& 
"Peace, when it comes, will be hailed with something more than 
relie£."39 In Melbourne the~ admitted that the Hoare-Laval 
plan was being discussed in some quarters with "marked dis-
favour". But it added hopefully that there need be no fear 
that "Britain will betray those who have put their trust in 
her."40 "Those who cherish the ideals for which the League of 
Nations stands," said the Argus, "must feel disappointed if 
the aggressor nation should profit by its defiance of the 
41 League." When the Hoare-Laval plan was abandoned and Hoare 
resigned, The Bulletin reacted angrily& "So the pacifists and 
disarmament cranks and the pro-niggers and the Communists ••• are 
now rejoicing." But "the rejoicings are not echoed in .Australia~•42 
It is likely that .Australia, while ostensibly a supporter 
of the initially firm stand taken by Britain at the League, 
had advised the British against a drastic policy of sanctions 
against Italy.43 And it was the failure to include an embargo 
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on oil shipments in the~onomic sanctions which ensured 
eventual Italian success. By the end of 1935 Australian opinion 
had become stereotyped; the press and the political parties 
did little more than repeat previously enunciated positions. 
As the early months of 1936 brought Italy closer to victory 
there was a general call for a "settlement" and a return to 
"normal". The Bulletin wrote that sanctions should be dropped 
and that British foreign policy was a "laughing stock".44 The 
Rhineland crisis occurred at a critical juncture, distracting 
the world while Italian troopa advanced on Addis Ababa. 
Resistance in Abyssinia subsequently collapsed, and on 9 May 
1936 Mussolini was able to proclaim the annexation of the 
defeated country. The Sydney Morning Herald urged recognition 
of Italy's conquest: "Peace is more important than the League."45 
Australia was the first and the most pressing of the Dominions 
to urge Britain to drop sanctions. 46 On 18 June Lyons announced 
that Australia wanted sanctions against Italy ended. 
The failure of the League to prevent the conquest of 
Abyssinia was not in itself of great significance to Australia. 
The League had been ineffective in Asia, and it was not 
altogether surprising that this should also be the case in 
Africa and Europe. "A non-universal League," said Bruce at 
Geneva, cannot "prevent aggression from occurring. •• 47 What 
was significant for Australia was the loss of faith in British 
naval supremacy. If the British doubted that they could retain 
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control of the Mediterranean in a war with Italy, what would 
be the position of Australia in the event of Japanese aggression 
coinciding with a general war in Europe? 
1. Carter, P• 190. 
2. For a comprehensive study of the press debate see R.I. 
Downing and E.J.B. Foxcroft, "The Australian Press and the 
League of Nations in the Abyssinian War" in Ball (ed.), 
Press, Radio and World Affairs, PP• 76-105. 
3. Sydney Morning Herald, 4 July 1935. 
4. Ibid., 14 August 1935. 
5. Melbourne ~' 15 July 1935. 
6. Melbourne Argus, 26 August 1935. 
1. Ibid., 2 September 1935. 
8. Ibid., 12 September 1935. 
9. West Australian, 22 July 1935. 
10. Ibid., 12 September 1935. ("Britain Steadfast; Fidelity 
to League.") 
11. The Bulletin, 28 August 1935. ("Let's Keep Out of It!") 
12. Ibid., 4 September 1935. 
13. Ibid., 18 September 1935. 
14. Ibid., 25 September 1935. 
15. See Eric .Andrews, "The'Labor Daily's' Volte- Face on the 
Abyssinian Crisis, 1935", Australian Outlook, vol. 19, no. 2, 
August 1965, pp. 207-212. 
16. Lloyd Ross, "Some Factors in the Development of Labour's 
Foreign Policies", Australian Outlook, vol. 3, no. 1, March 
1949, P• 35. 
17. Labor Daily, 4 July 1935. 
18. Ibid., 5 July 1935. 
19. Ibid., 26 July 1935. 
20. Ibid., 22 August 1935. 
21. Ibid., 23 August 1935. 
22. Ibid., 28 August 1935.(Cf. 26 July 1935.) 
23. Ibid., 30 August 1935. 
24. Ibid., 5 September 1935. 
25o For greater detail see Andrews, "The 'Labor Daily's' 
Volte- Face", pp. 210-212. 
26. Lloyd Ross in W.G.K. Duncan (ed.), Australia's Foreign 
Policy, Sydney, 1938, p. 33. "The second reason was that Mr. 
Lyons had indicated that he might support collective security, 
and Mr. Lang, being utterly barren of policy, generally adopted 
the policy opposite to that of his opponents. The third reason 
for the change was that Mr. Lang had seen the popular appeal 
of isolation. People could be persuaded that such a policy 
would keep Australia. out of war." 
21. Murtagh, p. 179. 
28o Sydney Morning Herald, 26 August 1935. 
29. Ibid., 27 August 1935. 
30. As shown by later events in Abyssinia, Spain, Greece, 
the Mediterranean, North Africa, etc. 
31. E.g. Melbourne Argus, 1 October 1935. 
71 
32. Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, vol. 147, 23 September 
1935, P• 36. 
33. Ibid., 11 October 1935, P• 731. 
34. Ibid., 9 October 1935, p. 579o (Centuries after the 
British Parliament had become sovereign, and years after 
Australia. had achieved complete autonomy, men of reason 
persisted in the romantic talk of "kings making war or pea.cett 
instead of nations, as represented by parliaments and govern-
ments, making war or peace. However, Menzies did not deny that 
the actual extent of Australian participation in any war would 
be determined by the Australian Government.) 
35. The only Labour member to vote for sanctions was Maurice 
Blackburn of Victoria., who reminded his colleagues that 
"practically throughout the world the Labour movement favours 
sanctions against Italy." Ibid., 1 November 1935, p. 1285. 
36. W.M. Hughes, Australia. and War Todaya The Price of Peace, 
Sydney 1935, PP• 155-157. 
37. W. Macmahon Ball, Possible Peace, Melbourne, 1936, po 91. 
38. Labor Daily, 14 December 1935. 
39. Adelaide Advertiser, 10 December 1935. 
40. Melbourne ~' 11 December 1935. 
41. Melbourne Argus, 12 December 1935. 
42. The Bulletin, 25 December 1935. 
43. Carter, P• 205. 
44. The Bulletin, 29 April 1936. 
45. Sydney Morning Herald, 12 May 1936. 
46. Ma.nsergh, Problems of External Policy, p. 156. 
47. Nicholas Ma.nsergh (ed.), Documents and Speeches on 
British Commonwealth Affairs, 1931-1952, London, 1953, vol. 1, 
p. 1510 
72 
£~!E~!!-~:_!!!~!-~!!!!!!~~ 
In embarking upon a policy of trade diversion the Lyons 
Government attempted to "kill two birds with one stone". That 
is, it was planned that the severe restrictions begun in May 
1936 would simultaneously apply to trade problems with both the 
United States and Japan. The two problems had different origins. 
The principal feature of Australian-American trade had 
been its one-sidedness, for Australia invariably had an unfavour-
able trade balance with the United States. Australian-American 
trade for the decade prior to trade diversion was as follows: 
Imports from the U.S.A. Exports to the U.S.A. 
value in £ % of total value in £ % of total 
1925-26 37,234,257 24.55 12,953,877 8.72 
1928-29 35,308,345 24.58 5,831,794 4.03 
1932-33 8,084,047 14.60 1,341,241 1.36 
1935-36 13,901,705 17o05 ' 5,615,372 4.51 
-- - - --- 1 
During the prosperous 1920s Australia had been able to maintain 
a high level of imports from the United States (petroleum, 
tobacco, machinery, motor-cars, electrical appliances, etc.). 
But the United States had little interest in buying primary 
products from Australia, because the same commodities were 
either produced in abundance in the United States or more 
economically imported from South America. Thus Australian sales 
to the United States (wool, animal skins and sausage c·asings) 
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tended to remain at a relatively low level. 2 
With the onset of the depression there was a rapid fall in 
Australian-American trade; Australian exports to the United 
States were affected by the general collapse of commodity 
prices and by the high tariff wall erected by the United States 
in 1930. This uncomfortable situation impelled Australia to 
attempt anew to close the gap in the trade balance with the 
United States. During 1934-1936 Australia pressed her case for 
easier entry into the American market, but without success. 
For political and economic reasons the Americans found the 
Australian proposals impracticable and declined to negotiate. 
In Parliament the Lyons Government was accused of weakness in 
its dealings with the United States. 3 
A milestone in Australian-Japanese trade was reached in 
1935, when Japan displaced Britain as the largest supplier of 
textiles to Australia; since textiles constituted the largest 
single item in Britain's exports to Australia, concern on the 
part of the British was understandable. This development was 
hardly in harmony with the spirit of Ottawa. Nor was the worry 
about Japan's displacement of British manufactures from the 
Australian market confined to British exporters; many Australians 
deplored this shift for sentimental reasons. Others argued 
that there was a strategic danger involved in a high level of 
trade with Japan, and that security lay in the maintenance of 
the closest possible economic relationship with Great Britain.4 
Nevertheless, at the beginning of 1936 the Lyons Govern-
ment, to all outward appearances, still adhered to the policy 
developed since 1932 of encouraging close trade relations and 
friendly political relations with Japan. Negotiations for a 
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trade treaty had begun late in 1935, but a deadlock was reached 
in theearly months of 1936. Japan was unwilling to place 
voluntary limits on textile exports to Australia, and the latter 
would not agree to more favourable tariff treatment for Japanese 
goods. 5 ttEach Government was acutely aware of its own country's 
difficulties and but dimly conscious of those of the other."6 
Meanwhile delegations of British motor-car and textile manu-
facturers made urgent journeys to Australia. As usual the talks 
were kept secret, and it is a matter for speculation how 
much these discussions had to do with subsequent developments. 
But to the Australian public the announcement on 22 May 1936 
of drastic restrictions on imports from the United States and 
Japan came as a bolt from the blue. "We are aiming in future 
to draw our supplies from countries which are already great 
customers of ours, and which we may confidently expect will 
become greater customers if we increase our purchases from 
them," explained H.S. Gullett, Minister for Trade Treaties.7 
That same day Parliament went into recess for four months, 
effectively preventing debate on this critical change of 
policy until it was too late to avoid the consequences. 
With two notable exceptions the metropolitan newspapers 
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of Australia supported the Government's action. The Melbourne 
~claimed that trade diversion vindicated its past criticisms 
and "hailed with relief" the ending of trade negotiations with 
Japan. It was ingenuously asserted that "Australia's doctrine 
of protection is free from any offensive discrimination or 
studied antagonism."8 The Argus was less divorced from reality: 
"The new tariff is intensely discriminating ••• It aims at 
particular countries ••• It would be a mistake to overlook the 
possibility and even the probability of countervailing dis-
advantages ••• Trade now being carried on with the United States 
and with Japan will be diverted to Great Britain." Still, the 
newspaper consoled itself that trade diversion was a "step as 
practical and definite as any yet taken to cement by positive 
means the relationship of Empire."9 Japan "will not be allowed 
a position in which to command our textile imports," wrote 
the Sydney Morning Herald, which had abandoned its former 
pro-Japanese attitude. "The treatment is drastic; but there 
has been nothing more deadly than the Japanese ousting of 
Britain in recent years from the textile trade in British 
t •t . 10 w 1 t• overseas err1 or1es... e are on y asser 1ng 
11 
considerations, just as Japan does." 
higher national 
The two newspapers which did not rally to the Government 
were The Bulletin and the Labor Daily. The former was indignant 
at the bypassing of Parliament and the Tariff Board and thought 
that the Lyons Government was sliding to a fall. 12 "In Australia 
there is a noticeable dearth of enthusiasm for the Gullett 
stunt ••• The applause of British manufacturers will be dearly 
bought if the Japanese do what we ourselves would do if we 
were in their situation."13 The Labor Daily condemned the 
Government for "declaring a trade war on the two most powerful 
nations in the Pacific, Japan and the United States ••• It 
would appear as if Australia's future has been jeopardized 
in order to meet the demands of the imperialists that the 
Australian market should become a close preserve for British 
manufacturers ••• Economic conflict is a great risk at a time 
when the world is preparing for war. The Lyons Government 
has involved Australia in that risk. 1114 
Criticism of trade diversion was widespread (graziers, 
wheat growers, economists, Labour spokesmen, etc.), causing 
Lyons to "appeal to interested parties to keep out of the 
ring."15 To no one's surprise both Japan and the United States 
promptly took retaliatory measures against Australian exports. 
None the less, Lyons assured the Australian people that the 
entire responsibility for the trade war lay with Japan. The 
16 Japanese"attempted to limit our tariff-making powers." On 
the other side of the world Page and Menzies, who were in 
London on official business, received a rude shock when they 
discovered that the British Board of Trade was anything but 
17 pleased by the unexpected Australian manoeuvre. Australia 
had cut across British plans for closer relations with the 
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The Bulletin, 10 June 1936 
UKE THEIR CEMENT GUN, PERHAPS. 
"We pooieino1y -. ,_ doM it ila't loMecl .... cu't IUt ,_, .... ••• il it cloeo it won't burt." 
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United States and had provoked Japan at an awkward time.18 
Meanwhile negotiations to settle the trade war with Japan 
had begun, but as the months passed they dragged on without 
apparent progress. When Parliament resumed in September the 
Labour Party was divided on the issue and thus unable to launch 
an effective challenge to the Government's policy. However, 
by the latter part of 1936 the Japanese boycott of Australian 
exports was causing serious concern, and supporters of the 
Lyons Government were having second thoughts. "A trade diversion 
policy at its best is the attempt to force trade outof those 
channels in which it runs because it has found them to give 
best results to producer and consumer," commented the !!!! 
Australian. "This first experiment is not encouraging in its 
outlook. It is an abrup·t turn in the opposite direction ••• from 
economic sanity.n19 
Eventually a compromise settlement of the Australian-
Japanese trade war was reached in December 1936, when it was 
agreed that from 1 January 1937 the two countries would resume 
trade at reduced levels. Trade difficulties between Australia 
and the United States were not resolved until late in 1937. 
The results of trade diversion were a. "maximum of irritation 
with a minimum of benefit."20 Australia had contributed to 
the Japanese feeling that they were being shut out of the 
markets of the world; Australia had inadvertently strengthened 
the position of those groups in Japan whieh demanded an 
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aggressive, expansionist policy.21 In addition to trade 
diversion, the United States was alao subjected to Australian 
attempts to restrict American shipping and air services. When 
the tradedispute was over the Japanese quickly regained their 
former share of the Australian market, without returning to 
their former position of dependence on imports of Australian 
wool. And after a year of greatly increased exports to the 
United States, Australian-American trade reverted to much the 
same pattern as before. Later, however, with the approach of 
war in the Pacific and the consequent Australian desire for 
closer co-operation with the United States, Australia was to 
find American memories of the trade dispute a source of embarr~ 
ment. The confused and confusing policy of trade diversion was, 
then, a failure in both its economic and political aspectso 22 
Why were the consequences of trade diversion so dimly 
perceived in Australia at the time? The lingering influence 
of Ottawa, increasingly at variance with Australian circum-
stances, must be taken into account. Another factor was the 
indifference to the United States and the anti-Japanese bias 
of much of the Australian press, which received its news of 
Japan through London. Australians therefore t~nded to see 
Japan "not through the eyes of a neighbour with complementary 
economic interests, but through the eyes of a remote and 
anxious economic rival."23 Finally, not only did the Lyons 
Government not have prior consultations with Great Britain, 
the United States or Japan on the question of trade diversion, 
but it ignored the advice of its own Department of External 
Affairs (which only the year before had been elevated to 
separate Cabinet status). 24 Australia had antagonized a future 
enemy, alienated a future ally and annoyed the old country. 
By default the external relations of Australia had been left 
in the hands of sectional interests. 
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Although the Spanish Civil War "began as a purely Spanish 
affair, grown out of the Spanish soil in the old Spanish way,"1 
by the end of July 1936 it was apparent that the fortnight-old 
rebellion would have international implications. "Anticipations 
of a protracted struggle must cause anxiety, for the interests 
of other powers are now being asserted," observed the Sydney 
Morning Herald. 2 The Labor Daily attacked the "financiers, 
landlords and industrialists subsidizing the revolto" 3 General 
Franco, leader of the Nationalist rebel forces, sought and 
promptly obtained aid from Italy and Germany, initially in 
the form of transport aircraft - without which it is unlikely 
that the rebellion would have lasted more than a few weeks. 
The Spanish Republican Government turned to France for help; 
but Blum, the French Prime Minister, under strong British 
pressure (for at this time Baldwin, Eden and Chamberlain were 
developing a policy of appeasement), decided on "non-interven~". 
That is, France and Britain departed from the usual practice 
of selling arms to the legal government of a friendly country 
threatened by rebellion. The United States followed a parallel 
course. The Non-Intervention Agreement, signed by 27 countries 
in August 1936, effectively deprived the Spanish Government 
of arms from the outside world (with the later exceptions of 
the Soviet Union and Mexico), but did nothing to stem the 
tide of men and materials which flowed to the Nationalist 
rebels from Italy, Germany and Portugal. 
In Australia the press worried about the possibility of 
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the Spanish Civil War spreading. "The savage civil war in 
Spain," wrote The Bulletin, "is another warning to the Dominions 
that the world is in a highly explosive condition and that 
they must look to their defences. 114 "The arms salesmen, who 
were responsible for the present holocaust in Spain, are now 
bringing civilization dangerously close to world conflict," 
added the Labor Daily. 5 Ideological considerations strongly 
influenced Australian attitudes to the events in Spain. As in 
Britain, intellectual, liberal, radical and Communist opinion 
generally supported the cause of the Spanish Republico Well-
known writers like Nettie Palmer and Jack Lindsay (the son of 
Norman Lindsay) frequently pleaded the Spanish Republic's 
case. About 60 Australians (of whom half would be killed) 
travelled to the other side of the world to enlist on the side 
of the Republic, 611beeause they saw a fight between freedom 
and tyranny, and they had to be in it on freedom's side. 117 A 
Spanish Relief Committee was organized in Australia, and 
substantial funds, medical supplies and foodstuffs were sent 
to aid the Republic. 
Conservatives and Catholics in Australia were in sympathy 
with the Spanish Nationalists. Among Australian Catholics, 
"both bishops and laity on the whole supported the military 
cause of General Franco."8 A typical remark was that of Arch-
bishop Duhig of Brisbane& "I am delighted that the Catholic 
forces in Spain under their g•nerals and soldiers have made 
such a magnificent stand ••• against the diabolical, unchristian 
force of Communism."9 It was easy for those who did not want 
to know otherwise to cry "Communist". For the Spanish Republic 
reformist, radical but not Communist - had been isolated by 
Anglo-French policy and thus had no alternative but to rely on 
the Soviet Union for assistance (which in any case never 
amounted to more than about one-tenth of the combined Italian 
and German aid to the Nationalists).10 The Bulletin labelled 
the Spanish Republicans "Reds" and alleged that they were 
losing the civil war not because Franco was receiving "men 
83 
and machines and munitions from Italy and Germany," but because 
the Franco forces were "better fighters, with a moral and 
patriotic appeal to the Spanish people ••• The Marxian warriors 
have less stomach for ,ighting than for making or listening 
11 to speeches." 
The war in Spain roused trade unionists and indeed all 
Australians as few other events overseas had done, but it also 
divided them.12 The industrial left-wing of the Labour move-
ment vas vocal in its support of the Spanish Republicans, 13 
but many Labour supporters disagreed, partly because of the 
objection to overseas commitments and partly because of religion. 
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The Labour Party rationalized its way into an uneasy isolation-
ist neutrality, "essentially from motives of easing internal 
stresses,. within the party.14 Labour did not object when 
Australia followed Great Britain's lead and became a party to 
the Non-Intervention Agreement. On 11 September 1936 the 
Prime Minister "appealed to the Australian people not to 
contribute to any appeal for funds or to take action to assist 
either of the conflicting parties in Spain."15 The Labor Daily 
promptly concurred& "The policy of isolation and rigid neutrality 
is the only policy for Britain as it is for this country, and 
it nov remains to be seen whether British statesmen have learned 
sufficient in recent months to keep out of the European cock-
pit.1116 The Australian press vas unanimous in its desire for 
British neutrality& "Even if other nations were to intervene 
directly or indirectly in the struggle in Spain, Great Britain 
would not be bound to follow the bad example," said the Argus. 
When Empire interests "are threatened Great Britain will be 
obliged to protect them."17 The Sydney Morning Herald thought 
that ''the whole purpose of the British policy of neutrality 
is to assure that existing balances of power in the Mediterranean 
shall not be disturbed."18 
As the year 1937 wore on the Nationalists continued to 
gain ground. At the League of Nations meeting in Geneva the 
British Foreign Secretary, Anthony Eden, did everything in 
his power to prevent the Republican delegate from presenting 
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irrefutable evidence of German and Italian aggression in Spain; 
by this time Hitler and Mussolini had extended de jure recognition 
to Franco. Later in the year the Italians began a secret sub-
marine campaign in the Mediterranean Sea, and a number of 
"mystery sinkings" of ships carrying supplies to Republican 
Spain occurred. Britain and France responded with a brief show 
of determination by establishing a joint naval patrol to protect 
shipping. "Not lightly has Great Britain undertaken police 
patrol duty in the Mediterranean," observed the Melbourne 
Argus. "War vessels of a nation or nations nominally neutral 
have begun a regime of lawless terrorism in the Mediterranean."19 
The "mystery sinkings" ceased for the time being, but the follow-
ing year, 1938, Italian aircraft and Nationalist vessels again 
began to attack British merchant ships. 20 Australian newspapers 
were disillusioned but continued to urge restraint. "Italy 
and Germany have long given up any pretence that they were 
honouring •he pledge to abstain from intervention in Spain," 
conceded the Sydney Morning Herald. "The Non-Intervention 
Agreement has not stopped foreign intervention in Spain, but 
it has stopped a world war ••• To abandon Britain's policy at 
this stage would only provoke extended hostilities beyond the 
Spanish borders - merely a shutting of the stable door after 
the horse had gone. 1121 When the British Prime Minister confirmed 
that Britain would not retaliate over the sinking of British 
ships in Spanish ports, the Argus realized that this was a 
"confession of futility and an assertion of expediency." But 
the newspaper still believed that "Chamberlain was right ••• 
For British retaliation might have been construed as inter-
vention in Spain, and intervention would have involved war ••• 
Peace is preferable to prestige."22 
By early 1939 the Republican retreat was turning into a 
rout, and Britain and France entered into secret negotiations 
which led to Anglo-French recognition of the Nationalists. 
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The Argus was sure that "official recognition of General Franco 
does not mean that Great Britain and France have at last 
decided to abandon their attitude of non-intervention and to 
come down on the side of the Nationalists in Spain."23 The 
Sydney Morning Herald could not deny that "the Nationalists 
gained their victory substantially through the aid of Italy 
and Germany ••• in gross violation of the Non-Intervention Agree-
ment." Yet in its complacent concluding observation, the 
newspaper was not alone in refusing to see the enormous contra-
diction& "The consistent attitude of the British and French 
Governments, as strict neutrals, has been to accept the local 
decision in what is the Spaniards' own quarrel. It is satisfacto~ 
that unity of Anglo-French policy in this respect, which the 
Fascist powers have done their utmost to disrupt, should have 
24 been preserved to the end." 
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There was a growing concern with the defence of Australia 
in the years 1935 and 1936. As part of its programme of gradual 
rearmament, the Lyons Government further raised the level of 
defence spending to £7,014,432 in 1935 and then to £8,065,142 
in 1936.1 However, it should be mentioned that while annual 
defence expenditures in the mid-thirties were approximately 
twice as much as in the worst depression years, they had only 
just regained the level of ten years before - and Australia 
had a much greater need for defence in the 1930s than in the 
1920s. Criticism of the Government's defence policy came from 
many quarters. The fervent book by Hughes, 2 referred to previous!~ 
attracted a great deal of attention. To Hughes, Australia was 
in a very vulnerable position and could not be made secure 
by the British navy. An adequate Australian army and navy were 
necessary, but Hughes wanted to concentrate on the development 
of a strong air force and aircraft industry. A widely-read 
pamphlet of the day predicted that Japan was likely to expand 
in the direction of Australia, and that in the event of war 
Australia would have to "rely solely and finally on her own 
resources and preparations.") Instead of depending on the naTY, 
the author recommended a defence based on "mines, submarines, 
destroyers, coastal fortresses, mechanized land forces and 
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sea and land aircraft."4 The ability of the British navy to 
protect Australia was also challenged in a respected journal 
of Empire affairs. 5 Another writer called for the "re-direction 
of Australian policy ••• so as to provide ••• the bulk of the 
funds available to those land and air organizations which are 
to form the decisive elements in defending Australia."6 Articles 
written by Australian army officers assumed that Japan would 
attack when the British navy was preoccupied in Europe and 
that Singapore would fall. The task of the army and air force 
would be to hold the southeastern "heart" of Australia until 
naval help might arrive some months later.7 (This defensive 
stategy later gave rise to the controversy over the Brisbane 
Line - "a mare's nest out of which the politicians drew fearful 
and wonderful things.") 8 
It was at this time that the Labour Party began to evole 
a new, more positive attitude to defence; the man behind this 
change was the party's new leader, John Curtin, who was to 
play a key part in the affairs of Australia for the next decade. 
Scullin, a defeated, broken man, had retired from the Labour 
Party leadership in September 1935, and P.M. Forde of Queens-
land had taken over as acting leader. There was every expectation 
that Forde would be confirmed, but in the subsequent election 
held on 1 October Curtin was chosen by the narrow margin of 
one vote. 9 The son of an Irish Catholic policeman, Curtin was 
born in a Victorian country town and attended state schools. 
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As a young man Curtin, who became a rationalist, went to 
Melbourne to work as a printer, later as a trade union official I~ 
and journalist. He was soon c::erse in the Labour politics of 
Victoria and during the First World War was a prominent anti-
conscriptionist, in the company of men like Scullin, Blackburn 
and Anstey. In 1917 Curtin went to Perth to work as editor 
of the weekly Westralian Worker, a post he held until his 
election to Parliament in 1928. It has been said that Curtin 
was omitted from the Scullin Ministry because at the time he 
was a heavy drinker, almost an alcoholic.1° Following his 
defeat in the 1931 election, a bitter, disillusioned Curtin 
pledged himself to total abstinence, a decision he adhered to 
for the rest of his life. Curtin was a new man when he re-entered 
Parliament in 1934. A seemingly mild, retiring person, lacking 
in humour, often suffering from self-doubt and frustration, 
Curtin nevertheless proved to be a strong leader; he possessed 
a fiery temper and was a forceful speaker. 
Loyalty to his party and a profound abhorrence of the 
suffering and loss caused by war were two of Curtin's strongest 
motivations. From the day of his election to the party leader-
ship forward, the downward drift in Labour affairs was arrested 
and reversed. Curtin soon succeeded in inducing the Beasley-led 
Lang faction to rejoin the Labour caucus (although this arrange-
ment did not endure, and the final reunification of the party 
was only achieved some years later). Because of his hatred of 
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war Curtin cultivated an abiding interest in international 
affairs and was an enthusiastic supporter of the League of 
Nations in the twenties. This support did not envisage military 
commitments, however, and influenced by the ominous events of 
the thirties Curtin developed into a convinced advocate of 
isolation as the best course for Australia. 
Events such as German rearmament and the occupation of 
the Rhineland in March 1936 forced the Labour Party to give 
serious consideration to the need for national defence; those 
who continued to oppose any rearmament as a matter of principle 
were soon reduced to a small minority. The defence debate in 
ParHament in late 1936 gave a good indication of the various 
party viewpoints at that time. For example, on the question 
of conscription the Government continued to accept the traditional 
Labour policy. Thus the Minister for Defence, R.A. Parkhill, 
hastened to assure a questioner that "no proposal for conscriptwn 
has ever been considered by this Government, which is committed 
to the policy of voluntary enlistment for the defence of 
.A.ustralia."11 The essential difference between Government and 
Opposition attitudes was on the question of naval defence. 
In spite of much evidence and authoritative opinion to the 
contrary, the Government's belief as expressed by Parkhill 
was &ill that Britain would "provide a deterrent against 
aggression and afford naval protection of all parts of the 
Empire territories in both hemispheres."12 Curtin challenged 
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this assumptionz "If an Eastern first-class power (i.e. Japan) 
sought an abrogation of a basic Australian policy, such as the 
White Australia Policy, it would most likely do so when Great 
Britain was involved or threatened to be involved in a European 
war. Would the British Government dare to authorize the despatch 
of any substantial part of the fleet to the East to help 
Australia? The capacity of the naval forces of the Empire to 
ensure the security of this continent is open to very grave 
doubt ••• The dependence of Australia upon the com~ence, let 
alone the readiness, of British statesmen to send forces to 
our aid is too dangerous a hazard upon which to found Australia's 
defence policy."13 Cur~in therefore urged a much greater emphasis 
on home defence, accompanied by a rapid expansion of the air 
force. The Government, however, remained unmoved and declined 
to revise its traditional defence policy. 
The metropolitan newspapers continued to give editorial 
support to the defence policy of the Lyons Government. A 
predictable exception was the Labor Daily, which steadfastly 
maintained its opposition to any form of rearmament until 
late 1937 (when J.T. Lang lost control of the newspaper). For 
two years the Melbourne Herald wrote in favour of the army and 
air force school of thought, but in 1935 it swung back into 
d . b t th 1 . . t 14 line an aga1n egan o express e pro-nava v1ewpo1n • 
Up to 1935 the Department of External Affairs was an 
appendage of the Prime Minister's Department. In that year 
the Lyons Go~rnment took the important and long-delayed step 
of making y.fternal affairs a separate department with full 
Cabinet status under Senator Pearce. The new department vas 
preoccupied with information, because the "collection and 
collation of material is at once the most urgent and the most 
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valuable task in a country in which insularity of outlook is 
equalled only by ignorance of foreign affairs."15 The Department 
of External Affairs commenced to publish in April 1936 a useful 
fortnightly bulletin entitled Current Notes on International 
Affairs, which achieved a vide circulation among the universities, 
learned societies, libraries, newspapers, political parties 
and trade unions of Australia. 16 
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In the mid-1930s the attitudes of Australians to foreign 
policy - including the question of whether their country 
could or should have a foreign policy - depended to a large 
extent on attitudes to Great Britain. Australian reactions to 
the abdication of King Edward VIII in December 1936 were 
indicative of attitudes to Britain at that time. 
Only eight days elapsed between the first appearance in 
Australian newspapers of reports of King Edward's desire to 
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marry a twice-divorced American woman, Mrs. Wallis Simpson, 
and the King's abdication.1 Yet the association between Edward 
and Mrs. Simpson had been openly maintained for several years; 
by the summer of 1936 stories compounded offacts, rumours, 
gossip and fantasy had begun to appear in American and ContineuUU 
newspapers. Nothing of the matter appeared in the press of the 
British Commonwealth, however. By an unprecedented gentlemen's 
agreement the newspaper owners of Great Britain, Australia and 
the other Commonwealth countries decided to suppress any and 
all references, even the most straight-forward, factual items 
of news or photographs, which alluded to the King and Mrs. 
Simpson. Thus although the affair was common knowledge in the 
United States, Canada (where American newspapers circulated 
freely) and Europe, and in the "high places" of Empire, 
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ordinary British subjects were deliberately kept in the dark. 
The silence of the press may have been the result of the 
unanimous coincidence of individual decisions, 2 because "editors 
and proprietors hoped that the rumours would prove false, the 
trouble would blow away, and everyone would be able to congra~• 
himself on having saved the Monarchy from the vulgar and damag-
ing publicity inflicted on it in the United States."3 However 
it originated, the press agreement was confirmed when in 
October 1936 Mrs. Simpson took steps to divorce her second 
husband, the King having enlisted Lord Beaverbrook to obtain 
assurances from the various press groups.4 
The issue was forced by the British Prime Minister, Baldwin, 
vho without consulting either the British Cabinet or the 
Dominions, took it upon himself to confront the King on 20 
October with a warning that "in the face of the kind of criticism 
to which it vas being exposed, (the Monarchy would lose integriw) 
far more rapidly than it vas built up," and once lost nothing 
could restore it. 5 On 16 November (Mrs. Simpson having been 
granted a decree nisi a fortnight previously) Baldwin - again 
without consulting anyone except "four senior colleagues" -
told the King that the people would not approve of Mrs. Simpson 
becoming the Queen, and therefore he must not marry her. The 
King replied, "I am going to marry Mrs. Simpson and I am prepared 
to go."6 At the next interview the following week the King 
asked the Prime Minister to formally examine the question of 
a moTgana~ie maTTiage; on 21 No~embeT B&Ld~in ~Tansmittea the 
proposal to the British Cabinet (which rejected it} and sent 
messages to the Dominion Prime Ministers asking for their 
assessments of the three possibilities of normal marriage, 
morganatic marriage and abdication.7 Without consulting his 
Cabinet, the Australian Prime Minister answered that if Mrs. 
Simpson became Queen it "would invoke widespread condemnation 
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in Australia" and that a morganatic marriage "would run counter 
to the best popular conception of the Royal Family. 118 There is 
evidence that Lyons's telegram was strongly worded, stating 
his view that King Edward "could not re-establish his prestige 
or command confidence in future." 9 
On 3 December 1936 all of the metropolitan newspapers in 
Australia reported the gratuitous remarks of an English provincial 
bishop, who piously hoped that the King vas aware of his need 
for grace. ''Some of us wish that he gave more positive signs 
of such awareness. 1110 On the same day the Labor Daily published 
a portrait of Mrs. Simpson, "the world's most talked-of voman. 1111 
The press agreement then collapsed, and on 4 December the 
Australian people were finally allowed to read about what vas 
going on. (Although in the preceding months occasional photo-
graphs and general articles had been printed, but any explicit 
reference to a link between the King and Mrs. Simpson had 
always been scrupulously avoided.} 12 The news made a great 
sensation in Australia; for more than a fortnight the press 
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was entirely dominated by the crisis. Most newspapers reacted 
to the proposed marriage with stern disapproval, not because 
Mrs. Simpson was a commoner or because she was American-born 
(Australia would have welcomed a symbolic cementing of ties 
between Great Britain and the United States), but on the ground 
that she was a divorcee. The Sydney Morning Herald opened the 
debate by pronouncing that "no community in all the Empire, 
great though its affection and sympathy for King Edward 
personally, would approve the King's marriage, as King, with 
the lady mentioned."13 "No one can prevent the King doing as 
he pleases," wrote the Hobart Mercury, "but if his decision 
should involve imperilling the safety of the Crown, and even 
h f th Em . h tak t d 'b'l't n14 per aps o e p1re, e es a remen ous respons1 ~ ~ Y• 
The Canberra Times insisted that "the King must do his duty. 
H t t th d . f h' M' . t n 15 Th 1 e mus accep e a v1ce o ~s ~n~s ers. e on y news-
paper which did not join in the chorus vas the Labor Daily. 
In characteristic manner it claimed that "by an unprecedented 
act of interference that might drive the King to abdication, 
the Baldwin Government has created one of the gravest crises 
in English constitutional history by serving upon him demands 
concerning his relationship with the American woman Mrs. 
Simpson, which he has refused to concede." After reviewing 
the King's liberal outlook, his sympathy for the poor, his 
visit to the unemployed of South Wales and his implied rebukes 
of Baldwin, the newspaper vent on to say that "the present 
crisis has been very carefully arranged in an effort to secure 
a showdown prior to the coronation, and the Government is 
concerned principally with suppressing the King's democratic 
tendencies and reducing him in status to a royal cypher.••16 
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The following day the Sydney Morning Herald observed that nby 
comparison with (sacrificing Mrs. Simpson) the surrender of 
abdication would seem pitiful, and the compromise of a morganatic 
marriage so ignominious as not to be countenanced.n17 But the 
Labor Daily thought otherwise: "King Edward has refused to be 
a puppet for Toryism ••• The stage has been reached where the 
people must stand with the King to save democracy."18 
In Great Britain the Government was worried about the delay 
in reaching a final decision. Baldwin told the Cabinet that 
the matter had to be finished by Christmas; Chamberlain was 
heard to murmur that "the continued uncertainty has already 
hurt the Christmas trade."19 In Parliament Churchill pointed 
out that as no marriage could legally take place for another 
five months (when Mrs. Simpson's decree nisi would become 
absolute), there was no need for indecent haste. But the 
Government ignored Churchill's plea for patience and tolerance, 
and in order to put further pressure on the King, Baldwin 
asked the Dominion Governments to cable their advice directly 
to the King. The Australian Prime Minister on the night of 
5 December sent a message directly to the King opposing the 
marriage and stating that "any proposal that Mrs. Simpson 
should become Consort and not Queen ••• vould not be approved 
by the Government." 20 The British Prime Minister had succeeded 
in persuading the King that the only choice lay between giving 
up Mrs. Simpson and leaving the throne. 21 "Canberra, Ottawa, 
Wellington, Cape Town- everywhere the story was the same," 
wrote Edward afterwards. "There had been no attempt to assess 
popular opinion, which to the small degree that it had been 
sounded a.t all appeared to be divided. But official opinion 
was solidly behind Mr. Ba.ldwino"22 
Meanwhile in Australia.,W.M. Hughes gave his opinion that 
the earnest prayer of every section of the Australian people 
was that no irrevocable decision should be made without the 
lapse of a period for quiet reflection. "Abdication involves 
unpredictable consequences to Britain, to the Empire and to 
the world at la.rge."23 The Catholic Archbishop of Melbourne, 
Dr. Mannix, said: "The fact that the King has taken it upon 
himself to exercise the privilege (of ordinary citizens) is, 
I think, a great humiliation to the whole Empire."24 Yet on 
the same day the Labor Daily asserted that "the people of 
Australia are unwilling to participate in this sordid infamy. 
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The Lyons Government has no mandate from the people to replace 
the present King in Australia. vithlds younger brother."25 While 
the West Australian sought to reassure its readers that it 
was a "mistake to suggest that abdication would shake the 
steadiness or break the unity of the British people."26 On 
101 
8 December the Labor Daily thundered that "Britain is in the 
throes of a bloodless revolution - a revolution from the Right.•,27 
Nor were the eaitorials of Non-Labour newspapers free from 
overtonesof hysteria. "It is a pity that Mr. Winston Churchill 
in Great Britain and Mr. W.M. Hughes in Australia should have 
thought it necessary to champion the King and to appeal for 
delay and for consideration on his behalf," complained the 
Melbourne Argus. "Delay is fraught with danger.u 28 The Sydney 
Morning Herald held the milder view that "the people know that 
the settlement which will be made, though it may modify the 
succession to the throne, will not alter the daily life of 
the nation."29 
There can be no doubt that the upper classes, the conserva~ 
press, the clergy and the church-going minority, Empire loyalists, 
business men, etc. were against the projected marriage- but 
what of the ordinary people? In Britain on the week-end before 
the abdication there were widespread demonstrations in support 
of the King and opposed to Baldwin. 30 In Australia, despite 
vigorous official attempts at suppression, there was a remark-
able outpouring of sentiment in favour of King Edward. The 
King's name was cheered in theatres, cinemas and restaurants 
in all of the capital cities.31 A number of commercial radio 
stations (some but not all of which were controlled by Labour) 
rallied behind the King. One broadcast said: "It is certain 
that in this battle between autocracy and democracy, the King 
is on the side of democracy ••• Mr. Baldwin, who is a diehard 
conservative, is certainly not speaking for the maas of the 
people ••• Mrs. Simpson will make the finest Queen England has 
known." 32 The Lyons Government immediately warned all broad-
casting stations in Australia that they "must refrain from 
inflaming Australian public opinion on the issue,")) i.e. no 
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deviation from the official line! In Sydney and Melbourne groups 
wanting to hold meetings in support of the King were barred 
from using the town halls. 34 The Constitutional Association 
(a conservative organization) cabled Baldwin: "Strongly urge 
full delay. Public opinion in Australia seriously divided."35 
For Australians the emotional climax was reached on 9 and 
10 December. The Canberra Times declared that "this is a decision 
on which the unity of the British Commonwealth depends." 36 "Ye 
can but pray that he will put aside his personal plans and 
dedicate himself anew to the service of his Empire and the 
world," said the Adelaide Advertiser. 37 The Labor Daily was 
carried away and called Mrs. Simpson a "woman of the people". 38 
The weekly issue of The Bulletin now appeared, and while it 
joined the rest of the Non-Labour press in opposing the 
marriage, it condemned the former policy of secrecy - on the 
ground that this misled the King into thinking that his 
contemplated marriage to Mrs. Simpson might be acceptable. 
"British and Dominion newspapers ••• failed the country, and many 
of them were not above publishing the rankest lies. In the 
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events leading up to the constitutional crisis that was sprung 
on the pe~e last week they failed the King, the object of 
their indiscriminate and head-turning adulation for nearly 40 
years."39 The Lyons Government urgently recalled Parliament 
by wireless message and then refused to allow a discussion of 
the crisis. On 9 December, before the Government applied the 
"gag", Curtin said that the Labour Party opposed special 
legislation to allow a morganatic marriage but would "leave 
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the King unfettered in the choice of his wife.n40 The following 
day Curtin attempted to move a resolution of "loyalty and 
allegiance" to the King, asking him not to relinquish the throne, 
but the Government again stifled the debate. 41 The Government 
waited for its cue from Britain, and Parliament was expected 
to remain docile until the time came to recognize an accomplished 
fact. Private members of all parties complained that "the 
indefinite nature of the situation was embarrassing."42 It was 
reported that members had received a flood of telegrams in 
support of the King.43 
Finally, at 2 a.m. on 11 December Lyons went on the air to 
announce that the King had abdicated. "I express the most 
profound regret at the step which King Edward has taken. We 
must all wish most heartily that he had acted otherwise.n44 The 
Prime Minister announced the abdication in Parliament and moved 
for its acceptance; Curtin concurred.45 A few members on both 
sides of the House were dissatisfied with the Government's 
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handling of the affair. The Lang faction angrily accused the 
Government of concealment and distortion. A private member 
of the United Australia Party, Harold Holt, said that the 
abdication of King Edward was a "major calamity" because "we 
believed that he understood us, and we looked to him to lop 
off from the tree of tradition the dead branches which threatened 
to interfere with its healthy growth within the British Empire." 
Holt added that had the King "chosen to select any woman to 
whom he was legally entitled to be married, as his Queen, I, 
for one, would not have hesitated in my loyalty to him. 1146 
Immediately the abdication was announced, the "responsible" 
press began a campaign designed to promote George VI. "The 
need was never more urgent for a popular rally in support of 
the Monarchy, under the new King, at this most critical juncture," 
pleaded the Sydney Morning Herald.47 Did the Government and 
the Non-Labour newspapers speak for the majority of Australians 
during the abdication crisis? It is difficult to say. Although 
there was undoubtedly a great deal of popular support for the 
King, perhaps the people would not have accepted Mrs. Simpson, 
either as Queen or simply as the wife of the King. But those 
in "high places" were sufficiently alarmed that they went to 
extreme lengths to ensure that public opinion had no chance 
to consolidate and no chance to influence Australia's official 
attitude. 
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Insight into the Lyons Government's foreign policy and 
defence outlook in early 1937 may be gained by examining 
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papers prepared for use at the forthcoming Imperial Conference. 
The Department of External Affairs was emphatic that "Empire 
security demands of British foreign policy that no situation 
shall be allowed to arise in which Germany in the West, Japan 
in the Far East, and any power, such as Italy, on the main 
artery between the two, are simultaneously hostile."1 The 
general situation in Europe was regarded as very dangerous; 
the department was more hopeful of the possibility of averting 
or at least postponing war in Asia. Hence the view that 
Australia should initiate moves aimed at a rapprochement with 
Japan. The department did not anticipate American aid in the 
event or war: "Little has occurred in recent months to alter 
the view that the United States remains at heart isolationist."2 
The Australian approach to defence was outlined in a series 
of Defence Department papers, which made out a strong case 
for closer Imperial co-operation (with the important reservation 
that each Dominion should retain sovereign control of its 
policy). The League would not be able to preserve peace with-
out the support of a substantially strengthened British Empire, 
and the security of Australia was inseparable from the security 
of the Empire as a whole. While agreed on general policy, the 
departmental papers clearly exposed the differences in view-
point within the services, 3 as previously discussed. There 
was anxiety over the British plan which gave first priority 
to the strengthening of defences against a German attack, 
frankly leaving an "unsatisfactory" position as regards Japan 
at least until 1942.4 It is claimed that the series of papers 
showed purposefulness in Australian defence planning. ".Accept-
ing Empire co-operation in defence as the starting point, the 
Australian defence authorities were trying on the one hand 
to obtain common planning for the Empire and on the other hand 
to ensure that local planning for Australian defence would be 
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effective in meeting local dangers and complementary to measures 
taken in other parts of the British Commonwealth. 115 Meanwhile, 
a Cabinet sub-committee suggested that "the promotion of a. 
regional understanding and a. pact of non-aggression in the 
spirit of the League undertakings for Pacific countries might 
reasonably be accepted as an objective of Australian foreign 
policy. "6 
Australia was represented at the Imperial Conference, which 
met in London between 14 May and 15 June 1937, by Lyons, Bruce, 
Parkhill and Casey. The proposal for a Pacific pact had been 
outlined in Parliament by Menzies and Pearce late in the pre-
ceding year, 7 and the newspapeBa assumed that the proposal 
would be submitted to the Imperial Conference. The Labor Daily 
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was apprehensive: "Mr. Lyons is prepared not only to provide 
adequate and necessary means of defence for this country, but 
to sign a blank cheque on the future to thrust Australia into 
another external war and meddle with the affairs of other nations 
to the extent of provocation."8 But the Sydney Morning Herald 
thought that "in this imperfect world we must be content with 
something short of perfection, and the move for a new treaty 
in the Pacific should be encouraged for what it can achieveo"9 
As anticipated, the Australian Prime Minister in his opening 
speech to the Imperial Conference on 22 May indicated that 
"Australia would greatly welcome a regional understanding and 
pact of non-aggression by the countries of the Pacific, and 
would be prepared to collaborate to that end with all the 
peoples of the Pacific region in a spirit of understanding and 
sympathy.u10 To promote the proposal Lyons also met in London 
diplomatic representatives of the United States, Japan, the 
Soviet Union, France, China and the Netherlands; if the response 
appeared sufficiently encouraging, it was thought that a 
conference might be held in Tokyo. The Imperial Conference 
publicly concluded that "if such an arrangement could be made 
it would be a desirable contribution to the cause of peace,"11 
but a confidential proviso was that "the furtherance of the 
matter and all discussions in connection with it should be 
left in the hands of the British Government."12 
Britain, New Zealand, France, China and the Soviet Union 
reacted favourably to the idea of a Pacific pact; the United 
States was non-committal; the Netherlands was negative, Japan 
suspicious and critical.13 In Australia most metropolitan 
newspapers were cautiously optimistic. A scholarly journal 
wrotea "As a gesture the proposal submitted to the Imperial 
Conference is timely and will cause the interested countries 
to concentrate attention upon the Pacific and its political 
14 problems." However, there was also a good deal of press 
opposition to the proposal. The Bulletin examined the idea and 
denounced ita "The more the pact proposal is considered the 
more preposterous it turns out to be. It is in the prevailing 
fashion for sentimental humbug, and that is the best that can 
be said for it."15 The Labor Daily was equally hostile and 
was of the opinion that "every day the Imperial Conference 
meets makes it more evident that there is only one foreign 
policy for Australia - that of splendid isolation and absolute 
neutrality."16 Within a few weeks Britain, now in charge of 
the proposal, began to lose interest, as evidenced by the 
lack of enthusiasm in Eden's summary on 25 June 1937 to the 
House of Commons. "This is a matter which must be approached 
with some circumspection," he said. "It might be unwise to 
attempt negotiations until we know a little more clearly what 
are the views of certain other countries in the matter."17 
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Although not fully realized at the time, the summary issued 
at the conclusion of the Imperial Conference indicated the path 
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to be followed in search of peace. Britain and the Dominions, 
"Yhile themselves firmly a.tta.ched to the ~inciples of democra.cy 
and to parliamentary forms of government, decided to register 
their view that differences of political creed should be no 
obstacle to friendly relations between countries, and that 
nothing would be more damaging to the hop.es of international 
appeasement than the division, real or apparent, of the world 
into opposing groups. 1118 In the two years since the Anglo-German 
naval agreement of June 193) ~he system of collective security 
had broken down,and Germany had served notice of her unwilling-
ness to be restrained by "scraps of paper". But fear and 
feelings of guilt over the treatment of Germany at Versailles 
prevailed; the impotence of the League and the apparent power 
of Germany and Italy could not be ignored; France was completely 
demoralized, the Soviet Union torn by the great purges, the 
United States aloof. Australia and the other Dominions may 
have felt uneasy about appeasement, but they did not have a 
viable alternative. As a result the Imperial Conference confirmed 
appeasement as the policy not only of Great Britain but of the 
entire British Commonwealth.19 
Australia's defence proposals were discussed both by the 
conference and directly between British and Australian service 
representatives; in neither case were significant results 
achieved. 20 Australia and New Zealand wanted to take practical 
steps towards greater Empire security, especially in the Pacific, 
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but South Africa and particularly Canada maintained that the 
Imperial Conference should be limited to discussion and review. 
The consensus seems to have been to try to combine individual 
responsibility without ruling out the possibility of collective 
support. The conference found "general agreement among its 
members that the security of each of their countries can be 
increased by co-operation, but it is the sole responsibility 
of the several Parliaments of the British Commonwealth to decide 
the nature and scope of their own defence policy."21 
When the Imperial Conference closed there was considerable 
disagreement over what had been achieved. The vagueness of 
the conference summary drew strong criticism: "The world today 
is too dangerous a place in which to deceive the mind and 
confuse public opinion by means of verbal generalities,tt said 
a learned journa1. 22 The Sydney Morning Herald had to admit 
that "the conference can show little that is practical in the 
way of achievements." 23 The Argus sought to reassure its 
readers& "It is childish to suggest that because no resolution 
has been agreed to in black and white and its purport blazoned 
abroad, there is no better understanding on matters which 
affect the whole Empire."24 But the ever-suspicious Labor Daily 
thought that "the Lyons Government, in contradiction to its 
professed anxiety to conclude a Pacific peace pact, has joined 
up with the armaments band-waggon. 1125 The secrecy surrounding 
the Imperial Conference inevitably encouraged the circulation 
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of rumours; thus, for example, Lyons was forced to publicly 
deny that Australia had been committed to anything "incompatible 
with complete local control and determination in any emergency." 26 
When Par1iament resumed the Prime Minister said in his 
report that the Imperial Conference had made clear that peace 
was the predominant ideal and purpose of the British Common-
wealth, and that "all efforts would continue to be directed to 
the end of securing world appeasement and peace."27 Lyons 
predicted that the conference would have "far-reaching effects" 
and would be remembered as the occasion when ''were defined the 
principles for which the British Commonwealth stands in the 
field of international relations and conduct. 1128 The general 
reaction of the Labour Party (with the exception of a few 
New South Wales irreconcilables) was summarized by Curtin. He 
agreed that the proposals on foreign policy which the conference 
adopted were in themselves "reasonable and clear 11 o However, 
the Labour leader thought that the trade diversion policy of 
the previous year, directed against the two most powerful 
Pacific countries, the United States and Japan, was a "curious 
sort of prelude to the submission of proposals for a Pacific 
pact." It was "paradoxical" that another pact should have been 
put forward, in view of Britain's decision to rearm because 
of "disregard of covenants and the inability of the collective 
system to afford security against aggression. 1129 Curtin attacked 
the exposition of Australian defence policy contained in the 
conference summary and said that Lyons had made a. "purely 
30 party" statement to the Imperial Conference. 
It is not easy to come to a. balanced assessment of the 
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importance to Australia. of the last pre-war Imperial Conference. 
It was all very well to take regional initiatives, a.s in the 
case of the projected Pacific pact, but if anything was to 
come of such proposa.is Australia. would require the independent 
diplomatic machinery necessary for arranging and conducting 
negotiations, without having to rely on Great Brita.in.31 What 
the Imperial Conference did accomplish was the uniting of its 
participants in an awareness of the common danger. Australia's 
attitude became more determined in the succeeding months and 
years, even though the outbreak of war was to expose 11 so much 
left undone 11 • 32 
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The Anti-Comintern Pact, signed in November 1936, among 
other things confirmed Germany's revived interest in the 
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Pacific. Officially the Lyons Government depreciated the agree-
ment between Germany and Japan, to which Italy became a party; 
Senator Pearce thought the object of the treaty was simply to 
"institute common measures against Communism."1 Many .Australians 
were not so complacent and were apprehensive lest the .Anti-
Comintern Pact should presage a German demand for the return 
of those former colonies now controlled by .Australiao Further, 
the treaty raised the spectre of simultaneous, co-ordinated 
war in Europe and .Asia - war in which Japan would dominate an 
.Australia cut off from British aid. The attitude of The Bulletin 
was typical: "Whatever British editors may write, it is impossible 
for .Australians to contemplate the Anti-Comintern Pact and 
feel blithe about it. If there is a spark of wisdom at Canberra 
at all, the Government will take it as a warning to drop its 
silly quarrel with the republic with which Australia should 
always be on friendly terms, and restore the relations which 
existed with the United States before trade diversion." 2 
The cumulative effect of the ominous developments of the 
mid-1930s and the linking of Japan with Germany and Italy 
account for the much greater public concern in .Australia over 
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Sino-Japanese hostilities in 1937 than in 1931. The Government, 
however, followed the cautious, conciliatory precedent it had 
established six years before, and nothing was done either to 
assist China or to hinder Japan. The rapid advance of the 
Japanese forces in China, which began in July 1937, was referred 
to in Parliament on several occasions without any indication 
that Australia might ultimately be threatened. 3 On 14 September 
Menzies discussed the position in China with particular reference 
to the Japanese blockade and the threat to British interests. 
"The British Government has kept the Australian Government 
fully informed as to this aspect of the situation. Australia 
is not, however, directly concerned."4 In view of the brea~wn 
in collective security and the lack of a clear lead from either 
Great Britain or the United States, Australia saw no option but 
to adhere to a moderate policy. Indeed, it seems that the Lyons 
Government went so far as to urge restraint upon Britain in 
regard to Japan, in order to avoid possible repercussions on 
Australia and New Zealand. 5 An early casualty of the fighting 
in China was the Pacific pact proposal. Menzies advised the 
House that "the Sino-Japanese dispute has inevitably led to 
the suspension of conversations for the time being."6 
Metropolitan newspapers in Australia closely followed the 
renewed Japanese attack on China. The Labor Daily wrote& 
"Behind the scenes there is the suggestion that the Sino-
Japanese conflict carries with it even graver international 
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repercussions."7 But The Bulletin was inclined to underrate 
the seriousness of the situation: "Japan wants to be left alone 
in peace to develop its acquired Manchuria ••• It is a tremendous 
job; it alone counts Japan out as a nation conceivably eager 
for war."8 China was in trouble again, "and the indications 
are that Communism is at the bottom of it.u9 The Lang faction 
interpreted the crisis as a further justification for a policy 
of Australian neutrality.10 A noteworthy feature of the public 
debate was the changed attitude of the Sydney Morning Herald, 
an apologist for Japan's conquest of Manchuria in 1931. For 
the first two months of the new conflict the newspaper tried 
to maintain a sympathetic outlook towards Japan, but by 
September 1937 this restraint had been abandoned. "It is now 
painfully obvious that Japan has deliberately launched a full-
dress national war against China. 1111 "The methods Japan has 
employed to realize (her aims in China) must be condemned as 
both illegitimate and short-sighted."12 
When the Japanese commenced the mass bombing of Chinese 
cities, public opinion in Australia was both appalled and 
frightened. "Japan, not having declared war, has no rights in 
China even as a combatant," said the Melbourne Argus. •tpossibly 
the warnings (of Great Britain and the United States against 
the projected air raid on Nanking) will have no effect upon 
a nation which has made lawless frightfulness its deliberate 
policy within recent years and has chosen to flout civilized 
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opinion when challenged. 1113 The Labor Daily observed that 
"the assault of Japanese bombers upon the native city of Canton 
has sent a shudder of horror throughout the civilized world. 1114 
In a prophetic editorial the Sydney Morning Herald wrote: 
''Japanese air raids on civilian populations in China (inevitably 
give rise to the question) as to what will be the horrors of 
the future if such warfare is allowed to go on unchecked and 
set a precedent which may be followed in Europe or Australia."15 
Only The Bulletin, which was disposed to blame most of the 
world's ills on the machinations of the Communists, hesitated 
to condemn Japan. "A charitable interpretation of the Japanese 
air raids on Nanking and Canton is that they are an effect of 
the hatred and fear inspired by Communism. 1116 To this equivocaticn 
the Sydney Morning Herald replied: "To attempt condonation or 
denial of the horrors in China that have been described so 
reliably and so fully is merely shirking the clear and irrefutable 
facts. 1117 Yet The Bulletin remained unconvinced: "The ways of 
Asiatics are not our ways, and the worst things imputed to the 
Japanese can be matched by Chinese precedents.n18 
The attention of Australian newspapers was again drawn to 
the Anti-Comintern Pact in November 1937, on the occasion of 
its formal confirmation. "The Japanese must ask themselves 
today whether Italy and Germany can recoup them specifically 
for what China can never pay in indemnity, and generally for 
what Japan may forfeit with the loss of Anglo-American friendship," 
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commented the Sydney Morning Herald.19 The Labor Daily was 
alarmed that "the action of the Italian Government in making 
itself a full partner in the Anti-Comintern Pact ••• has sundered 
traditional international cordialities and definitely divided 
20 the civilized world into opposing camps." The .Argus regarded 
the pact as understandable: "Japan seems to have entered the 
Fascist family of nations. The activities of Russia in territory 
unpleasantly near to Japan have alarmed her. The permeation of 
China by militant Communist missionaries and Communist military 
forces has increased her apprehension • .A. friendly agreement 
with politically sympathetic Germany and Italy, therefore, 
occasions no surprise. 1121 "It has to be faced that the situation 
created by the pact can become dangerous," warned The Bulletin. 
"It does represent a group of forces, and the temper of the 
people in those countries has become such that it will not need 
much more blundering to make them not merely united against 
Communism but menacing to us. u 22 
In line with the Lyons Government's conciliatory policy 
to Japan, Bruce reminded the League of Nations on 21 September 
1937 that China should not be misled "into believing that 
she can rely on forms of assistance which may not be forth-
coming.1123 This careful attitude reflected .Australia's sensitivity 
to the implications of condemning Japan. In the event the now 
moribund League was unable to agree on anything beyond a mild 
criticism of Japanese aggression. The principal difficulty 
faced by the Government in maintaining its policy towards 
Japan was the problem of unofficial trade boycotts. The Labour 
Party was divided between those who, like Curtin, wanted to 
keep friendly relations with Japan on the ground of Australian 
self-interest, and those on the left-wing who attempted to 
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apply "working-class sanctions" against Japan. In October the 
Australasian Council of Trade Unions called for a boycott of 
Japanese goods and a ban on exports to Japan. The Prime Minister 
reacted by publicly criticizing the suggestion; boycotts "would 
prejudice collective measures taken for a settlement and might 
have a far-reaching effect on future relations with Japan. 1124 
The Bulletin wanted to convey to Japan that "the boycotters 
here are only the usual meddling bunch of windbags, no more 
representative of Australia than they are of Peru. 1125 
The first move to restrict shipments of war materials to 
Japan came on 25 January 1938, when Sydney waterside workers 
refused to load cargoes of tin scrap; the boycott continued 
for four months and spread to Melbourne, where consignments 
of tin scrap and iron scrap were affected. 26 The waterside 
workers were motivated by a revulsion of Japan's attack on 
China, and many other Australians sympathized with this attitude. 
The Government, however, maintained that private boycotts were 
illegal and "not conducive to international peace." Indeed, 
some of the watersiders' own leaders officially "disapproved 
of the action taken by members in refusing to load ships. 1127 
But the Government's prolonged efforts to persuade the water-
side workers to abandon their policy were to no avail. Only 
when threatened with the application of the Transport Workers 
Act (which would have required all waterside workers to be 
licensed,and would have denied licences to those involved in 
the boycott) did the men finally yield. The boycott ended on 
25 May. 
A similar situation arose in November 1938, when Port 
Kembla watersiders decided not to load the ship "Dalfra.m" with 
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pig-iron for Japan. Again the Government first tried persuasion 
and then coercion to get the ship loaded. The Attorney-General, 
R.G. Menzies, declared that the issue was "not whether the 
waterside workers are right or wrong in their views on what 
the international policy of Australia should be; it is whether 
that policy is to be determined by the duly constituted Govern-
ment of the country or by some industrial section."28 When the 
application of the licensing system did not achieve the desired 
results, further pressure was brought to bear by the closing 
of the steel works indirectly owned by the Broken Hill Proprie~ 
Company, putting some 4,000 men out of work. Still the latter 
continued to support the position of the waterside workers, 
who stood fast in the belief that public opinion was behind 
them; 29 the Sydney Morning Herald criticized the Government. 30 
The affair was eventually settled in January 1939 when the 
Port Kembla watersiders agreed to lqad the "Dalfra.m" in return 
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for an end to licensing and a Government undertaking to reconsider 
its attitude to exports of pig-iron to Japan. The Government 
considered trade union proposals the following month, but the 
policy remained unchanged. 31 
An apparent inconsistency in the Lyons Government's attitude 
to Japan was the decision taken in May 1938 to prohibit exports 
of iron ore to that country. Curtin (who resided in Western 
Australia, the state most affected) opposed the move. 32 The 
Government's case was that increasing domestic industrial and 
defence requirements and a revised, much smaller estimate of 
iron ore reserves meant that all iron ore resources should be 
conserved for Australian use. 33 This embargo did not apply to 
pig-iron, steel products or scrap; the decision caused much 
controversy in juxtaposition with the Government's suppression 
of trade union boycotts. However, an analysis of the matter 
supports the view that the iron ore embargo was effected for 
the reasons stated and was not specifically anti-Japanese in 
. t t' 34 l.n en l.Ono 
As the months passed and Japan penetrated deeper into 
Chinese territory, the Australian Government clung to its 
conciliatory policy towards Japan, but the Sino-Japanese struggle 
caused many Australians to more fully realize the dangers of 
their position. 
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Defence and foreign policy issues played a prominent 
part in the campaign which preceded the Australian election 
held on 23 October 1937; 1 not since the end of the First World 
War had comparable attention been paid to external relations. 
While agreed on the necessity for increasing Australia's 
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defence effort, the political parties diverged on questions of 
military strategy and the position of Australia in world affairs. 
As mentioned earlier, under the pressure of the steady 
deterioration in international affairs the Labour Party, from 
about the middle of 1936, had begun to develop a more realistic 
attitude to the problems ofdefence and to denounce those groups 
which persisted in opposing rearmament. Thus Curtin wasted no 
time in repudiating resolutions of the Australasian Council 
of Trade Unions held in Melbourne in July 1936, which had 
called for opposition to British and Australian rearmament and 
support for collective security through the League of Nations. 2 
In Parliament the Labour Party ceased to challenge the amount 
of proposed defence expenditures (£11,531,000 for 1937); 3 instead 
the party began to scrutinize the allocation of funds. Sceptical 
about Britain's ability to defend Australia in the event of 
world war, Labour continued to stress the need for stronger 
air and land forces, in contrast to the Government's adherence 
to a policy of naval co-operation. Labour also advocated a 
greater capacity to manufacture munitions and larger reserves 
of oil and other essential supplies. None the less, this 
greater emphasis on preparedness did not affect the Labour 
Party's fundamental policy of "non-participation in foreign 
wars", which now precluded collective security through the 
League of Nations4as well as prior commitments to Britain. 5 
Curtin expressed the current Labour Party attitude in a 
speech in the House of Representatives on 25 August 1937. He 
gave an assurance that his party would "stand definitely to 
ensure the safety of the Australian people and the security 
of the territory of Australia. It will take no second place 
to the Government in this important matter." But, said the 
Labour leader, "we on this side of the House insist that in 
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the final analysis this nation shall not be committed to warlike 
activities outside Australia without the absolute and established 
consent of the Australian people ••• Any government elected by 
the Australian people would be expected as a primary obligation 
to resist aggression and to exert its maximum power to repel 
. . 116 1nvas1on. 
The defence policy enunciated by Curtin in the 1937 election 
campaign was based on principles adopted at the 1936 party 
conference; so the policy had already been subject to public 
examination for more than a year. The campaign officially began 
on 20 September 1937 when Curtin, speaking from Perth to a 
national radio audience, made his policy speech. lie promised 
"more docks for the navy, more aerodromes, additional oil 
stores and landing bases and the exploitation of possible oil 
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sources.tt Labour's policy was "to defend Australia with no com-
pulsion on any citizen to serve on foreign battlefields ••• 
Australia could have an air force of 300 machines - equal to 
any force which could be brought against the nation."7 The 
initial press reaction to the speech was mixed. The Sydney 
Morning Herald conceded that Curtin had faced fairly the fact 
that defence was the vital question and had honestly insisted 
on the need for preparedness. But "a balanced progromme of 
defence, such as the Government has designed on the advice of 
experts here and overseas, remains our proper policy."8 The 
Melbourne Argus predicted that Labour would "shirk the first 
task of any government - to defend the country it governs; it 
will thrust the responsibility upon the people."9 
In reply Menzies attacked Curtin on a point which would 
be difficult to answer without alienating a section of the 
party.10 "If an attack was made on Singapore, the defence of 
which was vital to Australia, would Labour require a referendum 
before Australia did anything about it? What would we think 
of Britain if, before she decided to come to our assistance, 
she first decided to hold a referendum? 1111 Page said that 
Curtin was appealing to the electors with a spectacular defence 
policy, after years "during which the mere mention of defence 
was almost enough to provoke a Labour censure motion. 1112 The 
West Australian added that "should Great Britain go down, 
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Australia and her affairs might well become a clause in another 
treaty like Versailles. 1113 
The following week the Prime Minister delivered the Govern-
ment's policy speech in his electorate in Tasmania. He emphasized 
that the defence policy of the Government was designed to 
prevent an enemy from reaching Australian waters. "We are 
determined not to wait until the enemy is at our gates before 
we attack him. An isolationist policy must expose Australia 
to the frightful danger of having her coastal cities and towns 
destroyed ruthlessly, as is happening in other parts of the 
world ••• We consider a policy of isolation from Great Britain 
suicidal. 1114 "And so it must prove," added the Sydney Morning 
Herald. 15 Curtin denied that the Labour Party was in favour 
of isolation as such, or that he advocated Australia's with-
drawal from the League of Nations; 16 Labour would defend 
Australia "absolutely and unequivocally", but would not "drain 
its resources in manpower and otherwise in order to wage war in 
Europe." The Labour Party would co-operate with other nations 
to raise standards of civilization, but would not be a party 
to "any form of collaboration that ends inevitably in further 
wars. 1117 
Pro-Government newspapers were highly critical of the 
concept of isolation. The Brisbane Courier-Mail wrote:"Australians 
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are not so deluded as to think that by casting off all obligations 
and responsibilities to the rest of the world and retiring into 
isolation, they could achieve security for themselves in a 
great continent that would be the certain booty of any combination 
of militarist powers which achieved the destruction of a dis-
united British Empire. 1118 The Adelaide Advertiser said that it 
was 11sheer madness" even to consider renouncing the fundamental 
principle of imperial co-operation.19 In Hobart the Mercury 
pictured isolation as "merely an idealistic way of closing one's 
eyes as a pistol is pointed at one's head."20 The Sydney 
Morning Herald claimed that isolation was not a policy - "it 
is an abject surrender, not only of our own security, but of 
the basic ideals and principles upon which our national life 
rests and which the flower of our manhood died to preserve." 21 
Nor were all sections of Labour content with isolation. "The 
isolationist policy has no relation to living politics, 11 said 
an Adelaide trade union leader, who feared that the policy 
would keep the party in "perpetual opposition11 • 22 
Most metropolitan newspapers denounced the idea of isolation 
as a matter of course. The Bulletin, however, took the trouble 
to examine the problem and came to the conclusion that "to 
make it plain to Britain and the world that Australia would be 
there to help Britain in a war to protect Britain and the 
British Commonwealth, and greatly reluctant to have anything 
to do with wars for any other end, would be sound policy. 1123 
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A scholarly journal observed that the general idea of Empire 
co-operation was "highly nebulous", and pointed out that the 
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Labour Party's policy of isolation showed "striking similarity" 
to prevailing attitudes in the United States and Canada. Never-
theless "the policy of co-operation without commitment will 
prevail. 1124 
On the question of the relative merits of aerial and naval 
defence the press was somewhat equivocal. The Canberra Times 
25 thought that the defence plans of the Labour .Party were "sound". 
The scholarly journal added: "It is essential that voters 
realize that the Labour Party's plea for effective defence by 
air and land rather than by sea is a rational enough programme, 
that it has respectable expert support, that it demands care-
ful consideration, and that it does not necessarily connote any 
lack of patriotism or responsible sense of leadership. 1126 .And 
The Bulletin admitted that "as to some of the actual defence 
measures he proposes, Mr. Curtin is sound enough. 1127 But on the 
air force v. navy issue The Bulletin asserted that "beside the 
capacity for injury of even a single battlecruiser turret the 
power of the gre.atest bombers in existence is feeble. 1128 .As 
later events would demonstrate, of course, the easy assurance 
that the British navy could protect Australia was fallacious. 
As the election campaign progressed the Labour Party, 
particularly in New South Wales, worried about the apparent 
lack of public interest - a good omen for the Government. Thus 
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the temptation to resort to the emotional issue of conscription 
in order to arouse the voters. J.T. Lang charged that the 
leaders of the Government had been to London ttrubbing shoulders 
with the exploiters, the money-bags, the war-lords and the 
munitions barons, and have signed on the dotted line. As sure 
as night follows day they will, if left in office, commit 
Australia to a European war and send a conscript Australian 
army to a foreign battlefield. 1129 The Labor Daily naturally 
agreed: "Collective security and Empire co-operation have the 
same dire meaning for the Australian peopleo They mean war, and 
· to the Lyons Government war means conscription."30 This accusation 
was emphatically denied by Lyons, who pledged his Government 
not to introduce conscription. The Bulletin thereupon castigated 
both sides foT evading the man~ower ~rob~em. "Com~u~sory tr~in-
ing will have to come again, or else all talk about Australia 
being defended will have to be dropped as highfaluting and 
dangerously misleading nonsense. 1131 When Curtin implicitly 
endorsed the Lang accusation the Melbourne Argus retorted that 
the danger of conscription would arise only if the Labour Party 
won office. 32 (None of the major parties regarded compulsory 
service anywhere within Australia in time of war as conscription.) 
As the 1937 election campaign drew to a close, "avoid conscription 
by voting Labour" became the battle-cry of those hoping to 
defeat the Government. Your vote, said Lang, "is as much a vote 
for or against conscription as it was in 1916 or 1917o 1133 And 
133 
the Labor Daily reiterated its claim: "Mr. Lyons has made it 
only too clear that he wants a mandate for war, and a mandate 
f . t• .,34 or war means conscr1p 1on. 
The Prime Minister, in his concluding appeal to the nation, 
said: "A vote for the Government means a vote for Empire 
co-operation innaval defence for the safeguarding of our shores 
from foreign aggression and for the safeguarding of our sea-
borne trade from attack in time of war." A vote for Labour 
would be a vote for isolation from the rest of the Empire. 35 The 
Labour leader assured the electors that his party, while up-
holding Australia's safety against external aggression, would 
"have nothing to do with foreign entanglements leading Australia 
into war outside Australia." 36 But, with the usual exception 
of the Labor Daily, the Australian press saw no reason to change 
its traditional allegiance. "The performances and promises of 
the Government parties are anything but satisfactory," observed 
The Bulletin, "but they are far less unsatisfactory than those 
31 of the Labour "Party." To the Me 1. bourne Argus such pa.rts oX 
Curtin's defence plans as were positive were futile, and such 
parts as were negative might prove suicidal. 38 The Canberra 
Times respected the Labour leader but warned that the electors 
could not "ignore the fact that behind Mr. Curtin are men who 
t b t t d · · · u39 0 1 th L b D "1 f d canno e rus e 1n a cr1s1s. n y e a or a1 y pro esse 
to believe that the Government would lose the election; on 
polling day the newspaper advised its readers to vote for 11 safety 
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a.nd security" by voting La.bour. 40 
The election left the Government parties in secure control 
of the House but with greatly reduced strength in the Senate: 
Party Membership in Parliament, 1937 
before election after election 
~~~!!-~!-~!£!!!!~!!!!!!! 
United Australia. Party 31 29 
Country Party !.2. !&. 
Total, Government 46 45 
Labour Party 28 29 
Senate 
------
United Australia. Party 26 16 
Country Party ~ -± 
Total, Government 33 20 
Labour Party 3 16 
--- - - -- - - - -- · - · - · ----- · - ·-· --· - · · - -----· -- - - -- -- -- - -- -------------- - -- --- - -- ------- ----- --·--- ---- -- - ---
41 
Although there was very little change in the com~osition of the 
House of Representatives, the Labour Party managed to win 16 
of the 19 vacant seats in the Senate. (The magnitude of the 
Labour gain in the Senate wa.s made possible by the existing 
exhaustive preferential voting system, which gave a.ll the Senate 
seats which could be won in a. state to the party receiving the 
majority of votes in that state.) 
It ca.n be argued that in a. year of relative prosperity a.nd 
with the troubles of the outside world not of overwhelming 
concern to the ordinary voter, the electoral victory of the 
Lyons Government in a. generally quiet campaign ma.y be attributed 
more to "better the devil you know" a.pa.thy than to the relative 
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merits of the parties' policies. And of course there had been 
other issues besides defence and foreign policy - e.g. banking, 
national insurance, marketing, Communism, etc. However, to the 
extent that the voters were influenced by the debate on external 
policy, it can be claimed that the people of Australia continued 
to trust the Government, which gave such comforting reassurances 
about the protection provided by the British navy. There can 
be no doubt that the isolationist label had a divisive effect 
on Labour supporters and cost the party votes; 42 imperial 
sentiment was still a force to be reckoned with in Australia. 
Lyons expressed the opinion that his majority would have been 
greater had it not been for the effect of "parading the 
conscriptionist scarecrow."43 A conference of 73 trade unions 
in Sydney in November 1937 listed the policy of isolation as 
one of the reasons for electoral defeat. 44 Another major factor 
was alleged to be the "strife-producing leadership" of "political 
dictators" in the New South Wales Labour Party, 45 and immediately 
following the election there were renewed efforts to dislodge 
the Lang group. 
Though few could foresee it at the time, the 1937 election 
marked a turning-point in the fortunes of the political parties 
in Australia. From theno~he Government was increasingly subject 
to the internal dissension which was eventually to destroy it. 
And from then on the Opposition accelerated its drive for 
unity, the lack of which in 1937 forced Curtin to devise an 
external policy which was an uneasy compromise between the 
obvious need for defence and the necessity of keeping the 
party intact. 
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PART V- THE DRIFT TO WAR, 1938-1939 
Seven months before Munich the course of Australian policy 
had been foreshadowed by the response to the resignation of 
the British Foreign Secretary, Anthony Eden. The immediate 
issue which led to Eden's departure from the British Government 
was the question of yet another attempt to secure an Anglo-
Italian accord. Eden, who had been ineluctably associated with 
the earlier phases of appeasement, nevertheless appeared firm 
in his attitude to the dictators in juxtaposition with successive 
Prime Ministers, Baldwin and Chamberlain. The Australian debate 
centred on the implied change in British foreign policy and 
the extent to which Australia had been consulted.1 
Eden's decision was announced on 21 February 1938 and 
received widespread editorial consideration in the Australian 
press. In a leader entitled "Realists in Command", the~ 
claimed that Australians realized that the drift in Europe had 
to be arrested and recognized that "the type of government in 
any country must not be permitted to forbid relationships 
necessary to general peace. 112 "The circumstances justify and 
3 demand a bold departure." The Argus, which only a few months 
before had been fulsome in its praise of Eden's firmness to 
Mussolini, 4 was now confident that "the stiff-necked adherence 
to certain international principles upon which Mr. Eden insists 
has had a fair trial, and it has failed •• o It is apparent 
that Mr. Chamberlain is acting in the best interests of the 
British Empire as well as of world peaceo 115 Proclaiming "Good 
Riddance!", The Bulletin allowed its anti-Communist obsession 
to produce the startling innuendo that Eden had to resign 
"because it had become evident that he was the instrument of 
Franco-Russian policy, working through the League, into which 
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he had escorted the Red Republic. 116 .Among metropolitan news-
papers only the Sydney Morning Herald indicated misgivings; 
Eden's resignation would be widely deplored "because of the 
uncertainty about the British Government's future course of 
action which his going betokens."7 But within two days the news-
paper felt able to reassure its readers: "It is unthinkable 
that Mr. Chamberlain would so much as consider the sacrifice 
of any vital British interest in a fresh attempt to conciliate 
the totalitarian powers ••• The issue is simply one of what 
practical policy in the present circumstances is best calculated 
to sustain British prestige. 118 
The Lyons Government's reaction to the Eden resignation 
was hesitant and clumsy. Only after the press had complained9 
about the apparent radical change in British foreign policy10 
without adequate consultation, did the Australian Prime Minister 
make any statement at all. Lyons then simply declared that 
Australia had not been consulted because the affair was purely 
a British domestic matter and thus of no concern to Australia. 
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11 When Curtin and even the most conservative newspapers refused 
to accept this naive claim, Lyons replied that he had secured 
Chamberlain's authority to state that the British Government 
still adhered to the policy discussed at the Imperial Conference. 
"There is no change in the attitude of the United Kingdom towards 
the League of Nations and collective security. 11 Eden's resignation 
tl . d. t d 1 h . th d t . . . 1 12 consequen y 1n 1ca e on y a c ange 1n me o , no 1n pr1nc1p eo 
The Sydney Morning Herald was unable to believe Chamberlain or 
Lyons; if a decision ultimately bound up with issues of peace 
and war was not a proper subject for consultation, "it is hard 
t . . h t . "13 "M L . t . b t . th . o 1mag1ne w a 1s. r. yons 1s con r1 u 1ng no 1ng, 
either towards the guidance of Australia or the upholding of 
truth when he states, as he did last week, that there has been 
no change in British foreign policy," commented The Bulletin. 
"Of course there has been a change - a tremendous change for 
the better. 1114 
Shortly after the announcement of Eden's resignation, various 
organizations interested in world affairs had sought to arrange 
meetings to discuss the matter. Thereupon the new Minister 
for Defence, H.V.C. Thorby (Parkhill had been defeated in the 
1937 election), publicly appealed to "all loyal Australians to 
refrain from entering into controversy through the press, over 
the air or from public platforms on the present international 
situation.1115 So it was not surprising when the use of Melbourne 
Town Hall was refused for a meeting to be addressed by well-known 
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speakers, and when a leading commercial radio station cancelled 
a debate on foreign policy. The cant labels "irresponsible" 
and "disloyal" were applied to those who presumed to question 
the Australian Government's slavish adherence to Britain's new 
line in world affairs. 16 
Interest in the Eden affair was soon lost in the events 
culminating in the German seizure of Austria in March 1938. 
Chamberlain's enunciation of the objectives of British defence 
policy, in which protection of the Dominions ranked only third 
in importance after the security of Great Britain and the 
preservation of essential trade routes, provided further 
ammunition for the critics of Australian defence policy.17 At 
about the same time, on the occasion of the official opening 
of the Singapore graving dock, Australian newspapers noted 
that until Britain stationed a battle fleet permanently in 
18 Asian waters there was no reason for complacency. Again Lyons 
had to obtain "clarification" from Britain, and on 14 March he 
announced that Chamberlain had assured him that the British 
Government regarded the protection of overseas territories as 
of first-class importance, and that Singapore was the vital 
point of the whole system of Empire naval defence in the Pacific:9 
Nevertheless the Australian Government's confidence had been 
20 badly shaken. It was in this context that a greatly expanded 
three-year defence programme was first announced on 18 March. 
The new plan superseded the one-year programme of August 1937 
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and called for a total defence expenditure of £43,000,000, 
including £18,200,000 for the "maintenance of existing defence 
services" and £24,800,000 of "new expenditure 11 (navy £7,750,000, 
army £5,500,000, air force £8,800,000, munitions and industrial 
organization £2,750,000). It was planned to purchase two 
additional cruisers for the navy, but it was not intended to 
21 increase the size of the army. The net effect of the new 
programme was to increase the average annual level of defence 
spending by roughly 25 per cent. 
Throughout the northern summer of 1938 Australia apprehensive~ 
watched the deterioration of relations between Germany and 
Czechoslovakia, occasioned by Hitler's demand for the cession 
of Sudeten territory. The Minister for External Affairs, Hughes, 
interpreted Chamberlain's most recent statement of policy as 
assuming "no new commitments in regard to Czechoslovakia11 ; 22 in 
general the Lyons Government supported and encouraged the 
23 British Prime Minister in the quest for appeasement. In July 
Menzies led an Australian trade mission to Germany, and came 
away greatly impressed by Germany's industrial power and con-
vinced that war between Britain and Germany on the Sudeten 
24 issue should be avoided at almost all costs. By the beginning 
of September 1938 a German attack seemed imminent; on 2 September 
the Australian Government cabled strong support of the British 
refusal to make a commitment to go to war in the event of 
aggression against Czechoslovakia. Representations to the Czech 
Government were urged in order to obtain an immediate public 
statement of the "most liberal concessions" which could be 
25 
made to Germany. 
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As the crisis deepened the Australian press praised 
Chamberlain's efforts at mediation. His dramatic flight to inter-
view Hitler at Berchtesgaden on 15 September was seen as a 
"courageous and inspired act of statesmanship". 26 When the Anglo-
French proposals for the cession of large and strategically 
vital areas of Czechoslovakia were announced, both the Sydney 
Morning Herald and the Labor Daily (now under industrial trade 
union control), which had been advocating a firm line towards 
the dictators, were frankly hostile. The former regarded the 
proposals as a blow to British honour and prestige, while the 
latter saw them as proof of Chamberlain's love of Fascism. 27 
The remainder of the press, however, repudiated the strong 
criticism of the British Prime Minister recorded in the cables. 
The Brisbane Courier-Mail noted that "the most bitter criticism 
outside Czechoslovakia is offered by those whose words are 
weighted with the least responsibility.n 28 In Sydney The Bulletin 
was certain of one thing: "Czechoslovakia cannot be preserved 
in its present form, a form which has given the Czechs a pre-
dominance which they must have abused or they wouldn't be hated 
so much." 29 The Melbourne Age thought that having endorsed the 
Chamberlain motive and method the week before, "Australians are 
not so unstable as to be impressed by present criticism, whether 
irresponsible or malign. 1130 .And the Sydney Daily Telegraph 
gave its readers the consolation that the Anglo-French plan 
31 
of appeasement was "not one purely of surrender". 
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Coerced by Great Britain and abandoned by her allies, Czecho-
slovakia saw no alternative but to yield to the Anglo-French 
proposals; but at once Hungary and Poland added demands, and 
Hitler increased the severity of his terms. Chamberlain then 
returned to Germany to meet Hitler at Godesberg on 21-22 
September, but to no avail. Finally, on 26 September, Britain 
and France jointly announced that they would support the Czechs 
in the event of a German invasion, and Germany in turn issued 
an ultimatum expiring on 1 October. The likelihood of war now 
dominated the news and editorial columns of Australian news-
papers. The Sydney Morning Herald wrote: "Democracy dare not 
desert the Czech cause now without abandoning the only virtue 
by which it has a right to endure anywhere." 32 With considerable 
foresight the Daily Telegraph asked "whether war is to be 
averted by giving Hitler a free hand in Central Europe, or 
whether it is only being postponed until he is sufficiently 
strengthened to turn his guns on the West." 33 The Bulletin 
thought that war was preferable to "the black disgrace and peril 
of an alliance with the Russians. n 34 In Parliament on 27 September, 
when the Prime Minister again pleaded his inability to make a 
statement, Curtin rose to reaffirm his opposition to any involve-
ment of Australia in the "quagmire" of another European war. 
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"No men must be sent out of Australia to participate in another 
35 
war overseas." 
As the expiration of Hitler's ultimatum approached, the 
Age warned its readers that "Australia will not be at peace if 
Great Britain is at war ••• The choice is not ours. 1136 However, 
the Australian Government had been "in constant communication, 
both by cable and by telephone, over the whole course of the 
last fortnight with Mr. Chamberlain and Mr. Bruce.n37 On 28 
September Lyons cabled Chamberlain, and early on the morning of 
29 September spoke to him on the telephone about an appeal to 
Mussolini to intervene with Hitler as a possible means of 
averting war. 38 Thus, in contrast to the position earlier in 
the year, the Australian Government was now moving in the 
direction of meaningful consultation with Great Britain. Further 
evidence of consultation was afforded by the fact that Lyons 
was able to place before Parliament on 28 September the text 
of the most important communications which had passed among the 
British, German and Czech Governments. 39 But Lyons's long-delayed 
review of events, delivered to the House of Representatives 
on 28 September, 40 received little notice in Australian news-
papers and was, according to Curtin, "a most extraordinary 
anti-climax" which provided "no additional information". 41 
Although the idea did not originate in Australia, Chamberlain 
did appeal to Mussolini, whose intervention led directly to 
Munich. 
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The Munich Agreement, signed on 30 September (Australian 
time), involved only minor changes in Hitler's latest demands. 
A respite had been secured at the expense of the partition of 
Czechoslovakia; Germany had been confirmed as the largest and 
most powerful Continental state. With some exceptions the general 
reaction to Munich in Australia was one of relief and rejoicing, 
untinged by the sense of shame andbumiliation which was to 
follow. A typical comment was that of the Daily Telegraph: "The 
dramatic success Chamberlain achieved will become historic and 
will earn for him the gratitude not only of his own people and 
possibly enemy people, but of the whole world."42 The ~wrote 
that "the nations have been provided with a striking object 
lesson in an improved international technique."43 The Bulletin 
accepted the Munich Agreement, but thought that in Australia 
"leadership was lacking" and criticized the fact that "this 
country had all along been committed in advance."44 Only the 
Sydney Morning Herald showed that it appreciated what had taken 
place. It may be that Britain has regained the moral leadership 
of Europe, observed. the newspaper, "but H.it~er wi~~ be we~~ 
content to let the moral leadership go while he consolidates 
the material leadership, which he has won without striking a 
bl "45 ow. 
When Parliament met on 5 October, Page (in the absence of 
Lyons) submitted the official text of the Munich Agreement and 
said: "The whole world welcomed with relief the outcome of the 
The Bulletin, 5 October 1938 
NOT THIS TIME, WAR GOD! 
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negotiations at Munich." He hoped that Munich would "inaugurate 
a new era in international relations. 1146 Curtin demanded to 
know if the Government would have committed Australia to war 
if Britain had been involved; 47 Hughes answered that if war 
had occurred it would have required no committal. uwe should 
have been committed to war and no power in heaven or in hell 
could have saved us from it. 1148 The debate was closed by Menzies, 
who deprecated the idea of a separate foreign policy and said 
that Australia had been influential in the formulation of recent 
B •t• h 1" 49 rl. l.S po 1cy. 
Indeed, there can be no doubt that the Lyons Government, 
influenced by the view that in the Sudeten dispute ttthe merits 
were distributed 11 , 50 not only endorsed British policy but 
positively urged Great Britain to bring pressure to bear on 
Czechoslovakia. An assessment of Chamberlain's policy in 1938 
is beyond the scope of this ~udy, but it may be observed that 
the usual retrospective justifications of appeasement (relative 
Anglo-French military weakness, time gained for rearmament, 
lack of public support for intervention, etc.) do not stand up 
well to close examination. 51 The decisive reason for acceding 
to Hitler's demands on Czechoslovakia was that Chamberlain-
supported by the British and Australian Governments - was unable 
to see that vital British interests were involved. 52 Working 
within self-imposed limitations, the Australian Government was 
closely associated with a disastrous policy. 
Faith in appeasement died slowly in Australia. During late 
October and early November the Government continued to press 
Britain to reach agreement with Italy. A section of the Labour 
Party attacked the accelerated Australian defence programme as 
"an utterly unjustifiable and hysterical piece of propaganda" 
after Munich. 53 As late as December 1938 Menzies believed that 
"there was a great deal to be said for Germany rearming:' in 
. f h "t" 54 B t t th t· th L G v1ew o er pos1 1on. u a e same 1me e yons overn-
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ment announced a further intensification in defence preparations, 
raising the estimated expenditure on the three-year programme 
to £63,000,000. Parliament was reminded of an observation by 
the Prime Minister in a recent national broadcast, that "events 
since Munich have not taken us very far along the road to 
peace.u 55 
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The change in Australia's leadership in April 1939 was 
not directly related to questions of defence and foreign 
affairs, 1 but a knowledge of the contemporary political back-
ground is a prerequisite to an understanding of the external 
policy debate. 
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By the latter part of 1938 the position of the Lyons Govern-
ment had begun to deteriorate. It had been established originally 
as an emergency Government, specifically formed to deal with 
the problems of the depression. But now that recovery had been 
achieved, many believed that the Lyons Government had outlived 
its usefulness and was inadequate to lead the nation through 
the troubled times which loomed ahead. At the centre of the 
dissension between the United Australia Party and the Country 
Party was R.G. Menzies, who for more than five years had feuded 
constantly with members of the smaller coalition party. At the 
same time many influential supporters of the United Australia 
Party were growing restive at the long tenure of their ex-Labour 
leader. Menzies appeared to be the spearhead of a Victorian 
drive to recapture the leadership of the principal Non-Labour 
party and the Prime Ministership. 2 
On 24 October 1938, following the break-down of a federal-
state conference on defence planning, Menzies addressed a 
meeting of the Constitutional Association in Sydney. He spoke 
at length on the international situation and said that the 
national effort of Australia compared unfavourably with that 
of Germany. "Hitler gives the German people a leadership to 
which they render unquestioning obedience ••• The first lesson 
for the Government of Australia is that in these times of 
emergency we must not hesitate to take the people fully into 
our confidence and give them leadership along well-defined 
lines. u 3 A number of newspapers took this as the cue to make 
similar observations. For example, the Sydney Morning Herald 
wrote: "It is impossible for the Prime Minister further to 
ignore the growing restlessness of Parliament, the obvious 
dissatisfaction among his colleagues or the protests in all 
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quarters from the body of the public ••• The call is for inspiring 
leadership."4 It was widely assumed at the time - despite 
subsequent denials - that Menzies's remarks implied a highly 
critical view of the Prime Minister as a leader; Lyons was said 
to have felt the "affront" very keenly. 5 In a radio broadcast 
a few days later the Country Party leader, Earle Page, implicitly 
rebuked Menzies by going out of his way to extol ~he virtues 
and attributes of the Prime Minister, recalling his substantial 
contributions to national affairs. 6 
Matters were finally brought to a head by a split between 
the coalition parties over national insurance. Once a pioneer 
in the field of social services, by the 1930s Australia had 
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become a laggard nation. Eventually, under pressure from many 
directions, the Lyons Government made elaborate and prolonged 
studies of a national insurance plan covering sickness, medical 
treatment, pensions for widows and orphans, and improvements 
to maternity allowances and old-age pensions. In spite of 
Country Party opposition within the Cabinet the plan was enacted, 
but implementation of national insurance was delayed. Early in 
1939 there were rumours that the Government intended to abandon 
national insurance, and a meeting of the coalition parties was 
scheduled for 1 March. But Page jumped the gun; on 20 February 
he disclosed that a majority of the Cabinet wanted to postpone 
the scheme on the ground that defence expenditures and industrial 
preparations for war should be given priority.7 Most metropolitan 
newspapers promptly objected to such a course, and the coalition 
parties retreated to the extent of adopting a greatly weakened 
version of the original scheme instead of abandoning it entirely.8 
On 14 March the Cabinet confirmed the drastic modifications 
in the national insurance plan. Menzies immediately resigned 
and issued a strongly-worded statement which said, in part: "I 
frankly do not think we can expect to be taken seriously if we 
start off again with conferences and drafting committees at a 
time when we have already so notoriously failed to go on with 
an act which represents two years of labour, a vast amount of 
organization, and a considerable expenditure of public and 
private funds. 119 But Menzies was not closely identified with 
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the social services (and never became so). His resignation 
seemed to presage the final break-up of the Lyons Government, 
with which it was now politically unprofitable to be associated. 
The man who had been behind much of the disarray within the 
Government and who was in a position to profit most from it, 
chose to leave instead of staying on to collect his reward.10 
It was not generally realized at the time that Lyons's 
health had begun to fail under the strain of trying to maintain 
a fa~ade of Government unity. The Prime Minister hoped to retire 
to a less onerous post and had put to S.M. Bruce the suggestion 
that he return to politics in order to succeed to the Prime 
Ministership. Bruce attached extraordinary conditions, however, 
and the idea lapsed.11 Before further steps could be taken to 
arrange the succession Lyons died suddenly on 7 April 1939. It 
has been alleged that Lyons had wanted at all costs to prevent 
Menzies from becoming Prime Minister. 12 Page freely admitted 
the same object. Australia mourned the dead leader and putting 
aside the criticisms of more recent years paid tribute to his 
integrity, understanding, patience and tolerance.13 The comment 
of the Melbourne Argus was representative: "The tidings of Mr. 
Lyons's death have filled the people with deep sorrow and with 
dismay. 1114 After a brief pause out of respect for the late 
Prime Minister, political activity resumed in an atmosphere of 
uncertainty and confusion. For as The Bulletin reminded its 
readers, it had been evident for some time that "the Lyons 
Ministry was nearing the end of its natural life."15 Page 
became Prime Minister until the United Australia Party chose 
a new leader. 
The next fortnight witnessed one of the most dramatic 
episodes in Australian politics, as a small group led by Page 
and Casey desperately tried to stop the succession of Menzieso 
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On 12 April Page launched a campaign to secure the Prime Minister-
ship for Bruce.16 Telephone calls and cables were exchanged 
(Bruce was in the United States at the time), meetings were 
held and resolutions were passed, but Bruce set out terms which 
were utterly remote from political practicality. In retrospect 
the affair has overtones of comic opera, for the conditions of 
16 years earlier (when Page in effect deposed Hughes) no longer 
obtained; Menzies had most of the necessary backing within his 
grasp and was not to be denied. 
The division of press opinion indicated that whoever became 
Prime Minister would have to overcome serious handicaps. !a! 
Bulletin declared its support for a Country Party Minister, 
A.G. Cameron of South Australia, because of his frequent demands 
for a return to compulsory training.17 The Sydney Morning Herald 
said that a Government led by Bruce (and preferably including 
B.S.B. Stevens, the Premier of New South Wales) would give 
Australia "political stability and progress, and probably 
achieve a greater degree of national unity than would be 
practicable at present by any other means."18 "Bruce's return 
would solve the problem of appointing a Prime Minister," added 
the Daily Telegraph.19 In Melbourne the Argus claimed that 
"Bruce has the qualifications that no member of the present 
20 Parliament possesses. 11 However the Age, without declaring 
itself in favour of Menzies, ridiculed the suggestion that the 
Australian people would accept a Prime Minister chosen from 
21 
outside Parliament and strongly opposed the recall of Bruce. 
When the United Australia Party met on 18 April, Casey put 
his own chances in jeopardy by proposing Bruce, but the party 
decided to proceed with the election of a leader from within 
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its own ranks. Of the four candidates Casey and T.W. White were 
soon eliminated, narrowing the field to Menzies and the veteran 
22 W.M. Hughes, now 76 years old. In the next count the majority 
of House votes went to Hughes, while Menzies secured a majority 
from the Senate. 23 In the final ballot Menzies prevailed over 
Hughes by the narrow margin of four votes 24 (23 to 19) and was 
declared elected. The Argus thought that the United Australia 
Party neglected a "magnificent opportunity" by not selecting 
25 Bruce, but the !&!_ expressed 11 intense satisfaction" at the 
h ' f M . 26 Th D ·1 T 1 h 1 b d th t c o~ce o enz~es. e a1 y e egrap mere y o serve a 
the new Prime Minister faced "grave difficulties 11 • 27 And so 
Menzies found himself the disputed successor to the leadership 
of an unhappy party. 
But Page was in no mood to yield the Prime Ministership 
gracefully. Submerged under a mounting tide of personal emotion 
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and greatly affected by the death of Lyons, Page became obsessed 
with the idea of destroying Menzies politically. 28 Earlier Page 
had declared his unwillingness to serve under Menzies; the 
United Australia Party having ignored Page's"advice", when 
Parliament met on 20 April Page announced his resignation as 
Prime Minister and delivered a ferocious and extremely personal 
attack on Menzies as a disloyal colleague. In his bitter speech 
Page charged that the incoming Prime Minister lacked the essentuu 
qualities of leadership and impugned his motives, courage and 
judgement. Menzies replied in a restrained, dignified speech 
which did much to earn him sympathy and consolidate support, 
from outside as well as from within his party. 29 
Page coulQ nardly have foreseen that in the process of 
trying to discredit Menzies he himself would be almost ruined. 
But the press was unanimous in denouncing the behaviour of the 
Country Party leader. Page's speech "stamped its author as 
being unfit to hold even temporarily the high and honourable 
post into which the accident of political circumstance had 
thrust him," commented the Sydney Morning Herald. His speech 
"was a violation of the decencies of debate without parallel 
in the annals of Parliament. 1130 To the Melbourne Argus Page 
emerged "with a stain on his record which would seem to be 
permanent. 1131 The Bulletin observed: "The manoeuvres that 
preceded and the scene that followed the selection of a Prime 
Minister have not increased Australia's respect for the way 
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they do things at Canberra ••• Page delivered an attack on 
Menzies which has achieved only one noticeable result - the 
eclipse of Page ••• The speech outraged the average Australian's 
sense of decency and fairness." 32 
The son of a Victorian country storekeeper, R.G. Menzies 
had achieved a brilliant record at school and university, 
success as a barrister and a rapid rise in Victorian politics. 
In 1934 he had entered federal politics and following election 
to Parliament had received the post of Attorney-General, a 
position he continued to occupy until just before becoming 
Prime Minister. In his early years at Canberra Menzies's 
superior gifts had distinguished him as a man whom it would 
be extremely difficult to out-rival, rather than as one whom it 
would be natural to follow. 33 A self-proclaimed "King's man", 
who at times appeared to identify himself more with Great 
Britain than with his own country, Menzies was never one to 
suffer fools gladly, and he was often accused of an excessive 
sense of intellectual superiority, which manifested itself in 
allegedly arrogant speech and conduct. Although his personal 
ability was beyond question, there was considerable doubt about 
his capacity to command popular support in the country. An 
untried leader, Menzies faced a difficult prospect, whether 
it was federal politics, the national economy or the threat 
of war. 
Because of the withdrawal of the Country Party from the 
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coalition the new Prime Minister, who also became Treasurer, 
had to form his Government from the United Australia Party 
minority of 26 members in the House and 17 in the Senate. 
Hughes became Attorney-General, Casey Minister for Supply, 
G.A. Street (who had succeeded Thorby) retained Defence, and 
H.S. Gullett34took over External Affairs. Other leading members 
of the Cabinet were J.V. Fairbairn, E.J. Harrison and Senator 
McLeay • 
An ominous sign for the new Menzies Government was the 
loss of Lyons's old seat to a Labour man. For although the 
Labour Party had not yet succeeded in winning over the Lang 
group in New South Wales, it was obvious that the party was 
rapidly improving its prospects under Curtin's skilful leader-
ship. 
This, then, was the context in which the defence and the 
foreign policy of Australia ~ debated during the next two 
years. 
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For Australia, as for Great Britain, the German annexation 
of Czechoslovakia on 15 March 1939 provided unequivocal evidence 
that appeasement in Europe had failed. Shortly after the 
occupation of Prague, Chamberlain in a speech in Birmingham 
conceded that further attempts at conciliation were hopeless 
and said that resolute action was imperative to check aggression; 
most Australians readily agreed with the British Prime Minister.1 
Britain's hasty extensions of unilateral guarantees to Poland 
on 31 March and to Greece and Rumania on 13 April were symptoms 
of the new spirit of resistance. However, Great Britain once 
again failed to consult the Dominions on a vital change of 
f . 1· 2 •t 1 t 1 . d b th B ·t· h G t ore~gn po ~cy; ~ was a er c a~me y e r~ ~s overnmen 
that the time factor had precluded prior consultationo In 
general the Australian press accepted the new policy while 
expressing dissatisfaction with the manner in which it had been 
inaugurated. The principal dissenter was The Bulletin, which 
noted that Poland was "very far away" and had never been 
guaranteed by Britain before. "It was thrice partitioned with-
out British interference," recalled The Bulletin, implying 
that Britain need not be concerned about a possible fourth 
3 partition of Poland. 
Yet the Australian Government would hardly have disagreed 
with the new British policy had proper consultation taken 
place. In his first broadcast to the nation as Prime Minister 
on 26 April, Menzies reaffirmed the Government's support of 
Great Britain. "The peace of Britain is precious to us," said 
Menzies, because "her peace is ours; if she is at war, we are 
at war, even though that war finds us not in European battle-
fields, but defending our own shores." Australia could not 
depend upon British naval protection but refuse to co-operate 
with Great Britain at a time of common danger. "The British 
countries of the world must stand or fall together." 4 In 
Parliament the Minister for ~ternal Affairs, HoS. Gullett, 
admitted that there were conceivable circumstances in which 
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Australia might not participate in a British war, but he claimed 
that there was complete unanimity between the two Governments 
as to the policy being followed and as to any action which 
might arise out of that policy. 5 In reply Curtin said that 
Gullett's explanation showed that the Government now agreed 
with the Labour Party's conception of Australia's position. 
The Labour leader stressed "the responsibility of the Australian 
Government, and of no other government, for the people of 
Australia being engaged in war."6 Curtin's general endorsement 
of the Government's view of world affairs indicated that his 
party now regarded the situation more directly and simply as 
one of great danger to Australia.7 Not all members of the 
House were satisified with the position, however. A.G. Cameron, 
an influential Country Party spokesman, strongly criticized 
the British commitmentfu the defence of Eastern Europe. 8 E.J. 
Ward was suspicious of the Gove_rnment, which, he said, had 
"committed Australia to a great deal."9 
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The Australian Government's association with the new policy 
of resistance in Europe did not commit it to a similar policy 
in Asia. Menzies's speech of 26 April made it clear that 
Australia still hoped to conciliate Japan and henceforth would 
act more independently in the Pacific. While deprecating 
"exaggerated ideas of Dominion independence," the Prime Minister 
stated that in the Pacific "Australia must regard herself as 
a principal, providing herself with her own information and 
maintaining her own diplomatic contacts with foreign powers," 
especially the United States, China and Japan. 10 The decision 
to open Australian legations, first in the United States and 
Japan, gave substance to the Prime Minister's wordso 11 The 
proposal for separate diplomatic representation was received 
with enthusiasm; at long last both the political spokesmen 
and the public of Australia were apparently becoming "Pacific-
minded".12 
An important aspect of the Government's friendly attitude 
to Japan was the anxiety that any Anglo-French agreement with 
the Soviet Union not be extended to Asia, as such a step might 
further estrange Japan. Menzies alluded to the matter in 
Parliament when he said that (in regard to the negotiations 
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with Russia) "the special interests of Australia in the Pacific" 
had been properly emphasized. 13 The Prime Minister had not 
been very explicit, but the policy of the Government was 
clarified by Gullett a few weeks later. "From the beginning 
of the negotiations for the inclusion of Soviet Russia in the 
European anti-aggression group, it was clear that the effects 
which an eventual agreement might have on Japan could not be 
disregarded ••• It is not intended that such an agreement shall 
have any application outside Europe, and in all the circumstances 
the Australian Government is satisfied that it would not 
prejudice the interests of Japan."14 Although a few newspapers, 
notably the Sydney Morning Herald, favoured an alliance with 
the Soviet Union, Australian opinion was mostly unenthusiastic; 
The Bulletin, predictably, was implacably opposed to the idea~ 15 
Undoubtedly the support of the Australian Government for an 
agreement with the Soviet Union was conditional upon its having 
no positive application outside Europe. 16 Although Australia 
insisted that a pact with Russia must not provoke Japan, it 
is not suggested that this attitude contributed to the eventual 
break-down of the Anglo-Soviet negotiations. 17 
In February 1939, only two months after the announcement 
that the increased figure for the three-year defence programme 
would be £63,000,000, the estimate had been further raised to 
£70,000,00018- an increase of about 330 per cent over the 
amount spent on defence in the three years 1934-1937. The 
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planned size of the volunteer militia, which had been increased 
from 35,000 to 42,000 immediately after Munich and shortly 
afterwards had been raised to 70,000, 19 was again increased. 
Hughes announced on 20 February that recruiting would continue 
until the strength of the militia reached 82,000o 20 
The Menzies Government still resisted strong pressure in 
favour of compulsory training, but at the end of March it was 
decided to establish a compulsory national register of all 
men between the ages of 18 and 64 in order to provide for the 
allocation of labour in the event of an emergency. 21 The 
necessary bill was introduced in Parliament on 11 May by the 
Minister for Defence, who denied any attempt at industrial 
conscription. 22 Labour opposed the bill because, said F.M. 
Forde, "it constitutes a grave danger, both in substance and 
by implication, to the freedom and democratic rights of the 
Australian people." Forde claimed that the national register 
would be a step towards industrial conscription, that it would 
be the fore-runner of compulsory military training, that it 
would make no provision with regard to wealth, that it would 
be unnecessary, and that it would ignore "the imperative need 
for an Australian contribution towards a solution of the 
economic and social problems which have led to the present 
world unrest. 1123 But in view of the fact that eight months 
before, Curtin had called for a manpower survey because it was 
"essential that the number of men able to carry out all forms 
of work be known," Labour's opposition was probably directed 
more against the Government than against the bill itselfo24 
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The debate dragged on for many days; Labour members were united 
in distrust of the Government's motives. In defence of the bill 
Street maintained that a register of wealth was unnecessary 
and impractical. The taxation powers of the Government in 
relation to national wealth and income were "unlimited" and in 
times of emergency "could be exercised in any manner desired 
without the necessity for any preliminary examination as to 
its distribution. 1125 None the less, in the hope of removing 
the hostility to the plan for a national register, the Govern-
ment eventually accepted an amendment which provided for the 
inclusion of a "census of property 11 • 26 In due course the 
legislation was passed on a party vote. From the time it first 
had been foreshadowed, Labour groups repeatedly protested 
against the national register. A few~eks after its enactment, 
a meeting of the Australasian Council of Trade Unions in 
Melbourne called on all trade unionists to "boycott" the 
national register. The Bulletin condemned such . resistance as 
"unpatriotic as well as lawless 11 , 27 but the Government was 
unable to obtain full compliance with the law until after the 
outbreak of war. 
The Government's defence plans included an important 
expansion of the air force. In addition to the purchase of 
aircraft from Great Britain and the United States, at the end 
of March 1939 it had been announced that Australia would begin 
the manufacture of aircraft in 1940 and would complete an 
initial order for 400 by 1942. 28 The number of air force 
personnel was to be doubled. Provision was made for the 
construction of two destroyers and a number of motor torpedo-
boats, all to be completed by the middle of 1941. The naval 
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programme also envisaged the manufacture of mines, the strength-
ening of coastal and harbour defences, the building up of fuel 
and munitions reserves, and the expansion of facilities at 
Darwin. The new Ministry of Supply and Development, headed by 
R.G. Casey, had as its task "to put .Australia in a position to 
be able to withstand a siege", by making the nation "industrially 
self-supporting" and "quite independent" of imported materials. 29 
By the beginning of Parliament's winter recess the three-year 
defence estimate had risen again, this time to £78,ooo,ooo. 30 
One particularly embarrassing item of business for the Prime 
Minister before the start of the recess was the indefinite 
postponement of the national insurance scheme. In the light of 
Menzies's previous stand on the matter, Earle Page called the 
new attitude "perhaps the greatest volte-face ever made by a 
public man in the political history of .Australia. 1131 .Although 
the proposed expenditure on defence (as a proportion of national 
income) was not very high when compared with the efforts of 
other countries, conservative groups opposed to national 
insurance used the rising cost of defence as a justification 
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for deferring an expansion of social services. 
Throughout the final months of peace in Europe,Australia 
adhered to a conciliatory stance towards Japan while watching 
the fatal drift in Continental affairs. The policy of the 
Government in regard to Japan, as expressed by the Prime 
Minister, was "to increase our cultural relationships, our 
personal contacts, to improve all of those things which go to 
make up a real and permanent understanding. 1132 Britain, however, 
in view of the steady encroachment of Japan on British interests 
in China, began to take exception to the Australian policy. In 
August 1939 a British spokesman complained that Australia's 
policy towards Japan appeared to be one of "constant retreat, 
neither likely to succeed in the long run nor consistent with 
the dignity or the interests of the British Empire.u 33 
The principal gain for Australia in the year which elapsed 
between Munich and the outbreak of war in Europe was the 
narrowing of the gap which separated the Government and the 
Opposition on major issues of external policy. Emphases still 
differed, but there was a wide measure of agreement about 
action to be taken. The moral of Hunich was clear for almost 
all to see. 
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For some months the Australian public had been led to 
expect the adherence of the Soviet Union to the Anglo-French 
alliance. 1 The news of the Hitler-Stalin Pact came, therefore, 
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as a profound shock. Newspapers which had supported the abortive 
Anglo-Soviet negotiations reacted with disbelief to the sudden 
reversal. The Sydney Morning Herald, for example, hesitated 
to place a sinister interpretation on the pact because "Russia 
has shown time and again that she believes her ultimate interests 
to lie in the preservation of peace through collective action 
against aggression. 112 The outspoken opponent of any dealings 
with the Soviet Union, The Bulletin, called the Hitler-Stalin 
Pact a "thunderbolt" which fell "under the very noses of a 
press which saw salvation for the democratic world in a 
Russian alliance." 3 Many Australians were in fact relieved to 
learn of the pact, which was regarded as an assurance that 
there would not be an immediate breach of the peace in the 
Pacific. Japan for the time being remained "neutral". 
Australia had been forewarned that Great Britain would 
stand by the undertaking to Poland.4 The Australian Government 
accordingly put into effect previously planned emergency 
arrangements, and on 25 August 1939 the Prime Minister broad-
cast a warning that "the next few hours may find the world 
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at war." Australia would be involved, said Menzies, "because, 
in plain English, the destruction or defeat of Great Britain 
would be the destruction or defeat of the British Empire and 
would leave us with a precarious tenure of our own independenceo" 5 
The days slid by; in contrast to the week which preceded Munich, 
Europe was diplomatically quiet; there were no serious attempts 
to avert imminent war. A glimmer of hope remained to the very 
end, but Australia was hardly surprised by the German attack 
on Poland. "No matter how grim and hazardous the struggle may 
prove, the Nazi challenge has now to be met," declared the 
Sydney Morning Herald. 6 Yet Chamberlain delayed British action 
almost to the point of losing the support of the British 
Parliament. Finally, on 3 September, Britain implemented her 
self-imposed obligation to Poland by declaring war on Germany. 
Shortly after Chamberlain's announcement to this effect, Menzies 
broadcast to the Australian people: "It is my melancholy duty 
to inform you officially that in consequence of a persistence 
by Germany in her invasion of Poland, Great Britain has declared 
war upon Germany, and that as a result Australia is also at 
war." A review of the situation made it clear that Hitler had 
been set upon war. But he would "undoubtedly learn, as other 
great enemies of freedom have learned before, that no empire 
or dominion can be soundly established upon a basis of broken 
promises or dishonoured agreements. 117 The press endorsed the 
Prime Minister's statement. The Sydney Morning Herald said: 
"The guilt of Germany for the invasion which began on Friday, 
and for the appalling consequences which must follow, is as 
clear as the crime itself is heinous."8 The Bulletin accepted 
Australia's entry into the war reluctantly and resented the 
position of the United States. "Now that support for Poland 
has involved Britain in war," wrote The Bulletin, "Australia, 
New Zealand and Canada will not shirk their share of the 
responsibility, whatever the English-speaking republic that 
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has twice the white population of the British Commonwealth may 
choose to do."9 Though the Australian Parliament was in session, 
it was not summoned to ratify or endorse the nation's entry 
into the war, because in the opinion of the Menzies Government 
no separate declaration of war by Australia was required. Why 
was Australia at war? Not because of any commitment to Poland. 
Australia entered the war partly because of the Non-Labour 
view of her membership of the British Commonwealth, partly 
because she saw that the overthrow of Great Britain in Europe 
would eventually mean a direct threat to Australia either by 
Germany or Japan, and partly because of her view of international 
morality and the foundations of a stable community of nations.10 
When Parliament met on 6 September Menzies submitted copies 
of the documents which had been exchanged between Britain and 
Germany. "Nobody can foretell how this war is going to be 
fought, what special dangers Australia may encounter, or what 
are the best services which we can render to Great Britain and 
the Empire," said the Prime Minister. "But we do know that 
we are together in this struggle, and we are confident that 
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our unity and determination, being based upon justice, are 
bound to succeed."ll The Labour Party refrained from challenging 
the manner in which the Menzies Government associated Australia 
with the war. In his speech Curtin promised full support for 
the war effort; his party stood for the defence of Australia 
and the British Commonwealth. At the same time Curtin reiterated 
Labour's traditional refusal to serve in a national government, 
on the ground that the real interests of a democracy could be 
most effectively safeguarded even in time of war by the existence 
of a vigilant Opposition. The Labour leader called for Govern-
ment ownership of factories producing war materials, and for 
control of commodity prices, rents, interest rates and the 
national debt. There should be "the very minimum of interference 
with the civil liberties of the people" in carrying through 
measures for national security;. Parliament should remain in 
session.12 Other Labour speakers stressed the need for vigilance 
in regard to war profiteering; some United Australia Party 
and Country Party members suggested the raising of an expedition-
ary force. In general the debate indicated greater agreement 
and unity of purpose as to external policy than Parliament 
had witnessed for many years.13 The chief concerns of Parliament 
in the first weeks of the war were the training and organization 
of military forces, the maintenance of democratic practices 
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and liberties, and the financing of the war effort. In addition 
to the foregoing,the Government was occupied with the general 
question of establishing the administrative organization for 
14 
war. 
The outbreak of war coincided with the termination of Earle 
Page's long term as leader of the Country Party. Following an 
unsuccessful attempt to re-establish the coalition on Country 
Party terms (understandably rejected by Menzies on the principal 
ground that he could not contemplate a hostile Page in the 
Cabinet), Page's position had become untenable, and he submitted 
his resignation on 13 September.15 A.G. Cameron became the new 
party leader, but Menzies declined further negotiations for 
a coalition. Thus the Country Party remained out of office, 
although it undertook to support the Government on all essential 
matters. 
Less than a fortnight after Australia's entry into the 
war, the Government came under fire for "lack of leadership". 
Many believed that despite the considerable measures already 
initiated, the Menzies Government's attitude was still essentially 
"business as usual". "In many quarters people are slow to 
realize what this war means," complained The Bulletin. "They 
behave as if they were taking up an old familiar round after 
a long sleep."16 The Sydney Morning Herald noted that the 
immediate anxiety was that "the Government is lagging behind 
the people of Australia in determining the part Australia 
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should prepare herself to play."17 Outside of Sydney the press 
was generally satisfied with the performance of the Government, 
but the Sydney Morning Herald and The Bulletin repeatedly 
attacked the Prime Minister. "There may have to be a war leader 
taking over," asserted The Bulletin on 4 October, "or Mr. 
Menzies will need to change. 1118 Parliament adjourned from 22 
September until mid-November, leaving the discussion of foreign 
affairs to the press. 
When the Soviet Union invaded eastern Poland as envisaged 
in the Hitler-Stalin Pact, the Sydney Morning Herald commented 
that if any condonation of Russia's violent opportunism was 
possible, "it must be found less in her attempt to reclaim 
minorities and recapture lands which had been hers for 125 
years, than in her unavowed determination not to risk a German 
absorption or domination of all Poland."19 A month later the 
same newspaper made further observations on the position of 
Russia: "Hitler's main diplomatic aim is now clearly to embroil 
the Soviet Government with the Allies, but Stalin's astute 
diplomacy suggests that he is unlikely to be manoeuvred into 
assisting Germany to fight her battles."20 
The rapid success of German blitzkrieg tactics in Poland, 
coupled with the inability of the Allies to directly aid the 
latter and their unwillingness to take the initiative on the 
western front, contributed to a growing sense of frustration 
in Australia. From early October onwards there was talk of the 
The Bulletin, 25 October 1939 
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possibility of a negotiated peace, and although Hitler's 
proposals were rejected by the British and Australian Govern-
ments, the idea found some support from sections of the press, 
some trade unions, some business men and some intellectuals. 
The Melbourne ~observed approvingly that in rejecting Hitler's 
overtures, Chamberlain "shrewdly did not close the diplomatic 
21 door." A "compromise settlement" would not have been opposed 
by The Bulletin& "For Australia there is one war aim and one 
only- security with guarantees ••• To take less would b& weak-
ness. To insist on more would be madness. 1122 For some time 
there was no fighting anywhere in Europe, and people began to 
refer to the "phoney war". Then at the end of November 1939 
the Soviet Union attacked Finland, much to the discomfort of 
those Australians who believed that eventual Allied co-operation 
with the Russians was unavoidable. "Whatever justification may 
have existed for Stalin's action in forestalling the occupation 
by Nazi troops of eastern and preponderantly Russian Poland," 
said the Sydney Morning Herald, "is entirely lacking in the 
case of Finland.n23 The A&! thought that "the war being waged 
on Finland is not for any morally defensible principles, but 
merely in response to a Soviet urge for imperial expansion by 
violence. 1124 ~ usual only The Bulletin claimed not to be 
surprised by developments: "Nowhere did 'parlour pinks' fall 
heavier for the Soviet peace swindle than in Australia. Right 
up to the day of Stalin's invasion of Finland they were apologi~ 
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for the alleged apostle of peace and his works. They have since 
been turning somersaults all over the place.n25 
Initially the Menzies Government had no plans for the 
despatch of Australian forces overseas to the theatre of war, 26 
but it had been announced on 15 September that a second Australan 
Imperial Force of 20,000 men would be recruited for service in 
Australia or overseas as circumstances required. 27 The Labour 
Party welcomed the Prime Minister's repeated assurances that 
there was "no question of conscription" for overseas service, 28 
but continued to formally oppose compulsory home service and 
expeditionary forces. Curtin did not think compulsory training 
was necessary because the Government had been "turning away 
volunteers" for the militia and had "failed to pay the volunteers 
decently." The expeditionary force was unwise because the 
maximum armed forces were needed at home to ensure Australia's 
own safety. 29 But the Government prevailed, and Labour opposition 
to the two measures gradually weakened as the weight of public 
sentiment became apparent. 30 ~ 
Although, after much hesitation, it was announced that the 
~us~~~~i~ ~~~e~i~~ ¥a~ce ~au~a 1ea~e far a~erseas in ~he 
beginning of 1940, 31 the end of the year found Australia in a 
mood similar to that which prevailed in Great Britain and 
France -uncertain, confused, waiting for Germany to make the 
next move. 
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PART VI- SETBACK IN EUROPE, 1940 
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The more the international situation deteriorated, the 
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more Australians became aware of their isolation in the Pacific. 
Increasingly concerned about the relative decline in British 
power, graphically demonstrated in both Europe and Asia, the 
Australian Government had begun to work for the development 
of closer ties with the United States. The lessons of the 
politically inept policy of trade diversion had been learned, 
and by May 1937 an Australian liaison officer had been appointed 
to serve in Washingtono But for a long time the officially 
isolationist United States remained the "enigma of the Pacific"; 1 
there was much!peculation in Australia about the probable 
American reaction to a war between Japan and the British 
Commonwealth. 
Finally, in January 1940, the long-delayed appointment2of 
an Australian Minister to the United States was announced, and 
there was general satisfaction at the selection of R.G. Casey. 3 
The United States reciprocated with the appointment of Clarence 
Gauss, considered an authority on ~ian affairs. 4 In due course 
Casey resigned from Parliament and travelled to Washington, 
where in his first interview with President Roosevelt he was 
disappointed but not surprised to hear that "the element of 
distance denoted a declining interest in Australia on the part 
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of the United States," in comparison to American interest in 
Canada and Latin America. 5 
The departure of Casey necessitated a by-election for the 
vacant seat of Corio, a mixed constituency in Victoria. The 
principal candidates were J.J. Dedman for the Labour Party 
and J.T. Vinton Smith for the United Australia Party; the by-
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election attracted national interest as a test of the popularity 
of the Menzies Government after almost a year in office and as 
an indicator of possible future trends. Although the Govern-
ment accepted a Labour challenge to treat the Corio by-election 
as a forum for debating external policy, the issue was complicaUd 
by domestic matters including a damaging charge of scandal 
involving the Minister for Trade and Customs, and the United 
Australia Party conducted a campaign "full of blunders".6 None 
the less, on the day of the election the Melbourne Argus said 
that it was generally admitted by the contestants that "the 
great issue before the Corio electors is decision between the 
divergent war policies of the Menzies Ministry and the Labour 
Party."7 In the event Labour won the encounter, Dedman emerging 
with a substantial majority of more than 3,000 votes.8 Comment-
ing on the result the Argus was at variance with its polling 
day opiniona "A great opportunity has been missed ••• The result 
is not a definite pronouncement against a virile and worthy 
war effort by Australia- far from it."9 The Bulletin, however, 
thought that "the electors were determined to show the Government 
"· 
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that they objected to it on grounds unrelated to the war." The 
moral was that the people wanted a Labour Government; Menzies 
ought to resign and advise the Governor-General to "send for 
Mr. Curtin, as the leader of the largest party" in the House.10 
But the Government declined to accept the advice of the 
critical presa. Instead Menzies boldly exploited the electoral 
set-back by announcing that the size of the Australian Imperial 
Force would be greatly increased from one to three divisions, 
requiring a total enlistment for overseas service of about 
90,000 men. It vas then estimated that the cost to Australia 
of two years of war would be at least £180,000,000. Corio also 
produced a renewed attempt to re-establish the coalition with 
the Country Party; Menzies was especially anxious to "harness" 
A.G. Cameron, who had been as persistent and vigorous a critic 
as the leader of the Opposition.11 In a letter dated 7 March 
1940 the Prime Minister offered more liberal terms to the 
Country Party than had been available the year before12- the 
eclipse of Page having removed an important personal obstacle 
to United Australia Party-Country Party co-operation. Men~~ tams 
were accepted and on 14 March five Country Party members 
(Cameron, Thorby, John McEwen, A.Y. Fadden and H.K. Nock) 
joined the Government. For a time the reconstruction of the 
Government yielded the desired increase in stab[ity, but the 
improvement proved to be short-lived, and the Menzies Government 
faced the coming election with declining confidence. 
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The so-called "phoney war" ended with a jarring suddenness 
when the Germans invaded the neutral countries of Denmark and 
Norwa7 on 9 April 1940. "Unity may have weakened and the spirit 
of sacrifice flagged while the war has slowly gathered momentum," 
wrote the Sydney Morning Herald, "but now that it has broken 
in fury over Scandinavia the time has come to close up the 
ranks and give battle as united and resolute peoples to the 
enemy of mankind."13 Yet the Menzies Governaent was slow in 
realizing the gravity of the situation, as indicated by the 
sanguine view of current events taken by the new Minister for 
External Affairs, John McEwen, in the House of Representatives 
ten days after the beginning of the attack on Norway.14 McEwen 
conceded the possibility of an early invasion of Belgium and 
the Netherlands, but he believed that in the preceding seven 
months the Allies had made up part of the initial German 
15 
advantage. "If the attack comes the Allies are ready to meet 
it."16 In regard to Aai~McEwen "noted with gratification the 
American declaration to the effect that intervention by Japan 
in the affairs of the Netherlands East Indies would be "pre-
judicial to peace in the whole Pacific area."17 
Despite Allied attempts at resistance in northern Norway 
and despite a British naval success at Narvik, it was soon 
clear that Norway would be lost. On 10 May the full fury of a 
German blitzkrieg was directed against the Low Countries, but 
again the Australian people at first seemed to be unperturbed.18 
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The resignation of Chamberlain, a logical and indeed long over-
due end to the leadership of a man who vas the symbol of a 
bankrupt policy, and his replacement by Winston Churchill vas 
regarded in Australia as a ground for renewed confidence in 
the Allied cause. "The news of the formation of the Churchill 
Government is a welcoae offset to the anxious tidings received 
from the western front," commented the Sydney Morning Herald.19 
The rapid advance of the German forces through Holland and 
Belgium into France caused apprehension to displace the former 
optimism in Australia. If somewhat overdrawn the reaction of 
the Sydney Morning Herald still reflected the fears of a great 
many Australians: "The future of Australia hangs in the balance 
of the fearful struggle in which the Allied and German armies 
are now locked in France and Belgium."20 Because of the often 
equivocal and inaccurate reports which appeared in the Australian 
press, the news of the cutting off from the coast of the British 
army came as a great shock to the Australian public.21 The 
consequent relief felt at the evacuation of 330,000 British, 
French and Belgian troops from Dunkirk tended to obscure the 
reality of the Allied defeat. Subsequently France's resistance 
crumbled, and on 10 June 1940 Italy entered the war. "Nov that 
the black hand of Fascism has grasped the red hand of Nazidom, 
the ideological line-up is complete," wrote the Sydney Morning 
Herald. "The issue is more than ever clear; and the nations who 
are for justice and freedom must stand together or fall separately 
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beneath the totalitarian heel."22 Yet The Bulletin maintained 
its belief that the opportunity for such a spectacular set-back 
to British prestige should never have occurred: "Non-intervention 
in the affairs of Europe was the policy of the wisest of our 
ancestors, and it has been departed from with results which 
have staggered all, excep.t perhaps those who departed from it. u 23 
The fall of France and the massive German air assault on 
Great Britain had a far-reaching effect on Australia. The nature 
of the war had changed and from then on the watchword was 
"all in".24 Labour opinion was on the move. At a party conference 
on 19 June a series of resolutions was passed which, inter alia, 
called for complete co-operation with the Allies, demanded a 
total war effort,and- significantly- endorsed the Government's 
policy on compulsory training for home defence and the use of 
a volunteer expeditionary force. 25 Following the formation of 
the British National Government there were renewed demands for 
a similar arrangement in Australia, but Curtin adhered to the 
traditional Labour attitude against participating in a coalition. 
The conservative press, in part motivated by fear of the defeat 
of the Government in the coming election, frequently attacked 
the Labour position. For example, the Melbourae Argus said: 
"Mr. Curtin fails to perceive that every word he has ever uttered 
in favour of a maximum war effort, of Labour's part therein, 
and of Australia's worthy participation in the Empire's great 
task has been an argument in favour of a national government. 1126 
On the Government side, new measures aimed at a general 
acceleration of Australia's war effort and an urgent stepping-
up of aid to Britain were announced. 27 
For several months in mid-1940 the Asian policies of the 
United States and the British Commonwealth diverged. The 
Americans were increasing their support of China, while the 
British and the Australians were finding it expedient to 
temporize and to appease Japan. 28 On 27 and 28 June Casey and 
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the British Ambassador, Lord Lothian, met the American Secretary 
of State, Cordell Hull, to review the situation; the two 
diplomats wanted to know how far the British could go in making 
a settlement with Japan without antagonizing the United States; 
it was suggested that American warships be sent to Singapore. 
Hull replied that American ships would not be sent to Singapore, 
for that would seriously weaken Atlantic defences, but the 
United States would continue the policy of economic pressure 
on Japan. Thus "the answer to Japan's demands was largely left 
to Britain."29 The most controversial Japanese demand was for 
the closing of the Burma Road, a major supply route to China. 
Having concluded that the American Government "would not blame 
us in the least if we gave way on the issue of the Burma Road,"30 
Britain and Australia yielded to Japanese pressure. The Burma 
Road was closed for three months from 17 July - the climax of 
British appeasement of Japan. This further revelation of Britain's 
weakness in Asia caused the Australian press to take up again 
the subject of the United States. "We have been insular 
particularly in our relations with the United States," noted 
the Argus. "We have it in our power to alter all that. Too 
long we have been timid and tentative in our approaches.")! 
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The appointment of J.G. Latham as the first Australian 
Minister to Japan in August 1940 indicated the desire to improve 
relations with Japan and to acquire independent information 
about the policies and intentions of the Japanese. But the 
Government stressed that this step did not imply a departure 
from British Commonwealth "close co-operation and collaboration".32 
General approval of Latham's appointment was voiced throughout 
Australia. The appointment "recognizes this country's need to 
cultivate more harmonious relations with a powerful Pacific 
neighbour," commented the Argus.33 
Despite the set-back in Europe, mid-1940 found the Menzies 
Government still faced with the problem of mentally preparing 
the people for war. While a section of the press and public 
opinion believed that the Government needed to be stirred up, 
almost everything the Government attempted met with strong 
resistance from one section or another of the public. The life 
of the community went on much the same as if there were no waro 34 
To remedy the situation the Prime Minister on 8 June announced 
the appointment of a leading publisher, Keith Murdoch, to the 
post of Director-General of an expanded Department of Informatiox?.5 
However, a serious tactical error compromised Murdoch's position 
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and led to his early resignation. 36 "The nation had been deeply 
stirred by danger but had not yet changed many of its peacetime 
h b. •t "37 a 1 s. 
On 13 August 1940 the Menzies Government was dealt a cruel 
blow by the death in an air crash of three important Ministers, 
Gullett, Fairbairn and Street.38 In their places P.A.M. McBride, 
A.W. Fadden and Senator Collett entered the Ministry, the first 
two also becoming members of the War Cabinet. 39 
The Government and some newspapers briefly entertained the 
idea of deferring the constitutionally required national election 
on the ground of wartime necessity; Curtin's reaction was that 
the Labour Party would agree to a postponement if conditions 
warranted, but he saw no need for such an extraordinary step 
at that time.40 Menzies soon came round to the view that a 
postponement was impracticable, and on 20 August he announced 
that the general election would be held on 21 September.41 
Whether or not the Government's period of indecision had any-
thing to do with apprehension over the outcome of the election, 
there can be no doubt that the Labour Party's attitude was 
influenced by a growing confidence in the result. Although the 
Lang faction was still outside the fold, the Labour Party was 
moving with determination towards unity, and the authority of 
Curtin was being more firmly established.42 The month before 
the election Curtin confronted the New South Wales dissidents 
on their own grounds. He reminded a meeting of trade unionists 
in Sydney that Australia was a "workers' country" and that 
the Labour Party had given "its utmost support for the defence 
of the country and for the prosecution of the war." They might 
be opposed to the Government but they were not opposed to the 
country which the Government governed. Australia, New Zealand 
and Great Britain were the only places in the world where 
Labour supporters could raise their heads and be articulate. 
Curtin pleaded for unity and said that victory was within the 
43 party's grasp. 
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Because of the exigencies of war the election campaign of 
September 1940 had to be brief.1 The Labour campaign began 
officially on 23 August, when Curtin broadcast to the nation 
from Perth. The Labour leader adhered closely to the policy 
adopted at the June party conference, and he stressed that the 
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Labour Party, if elected, would vigorously prosecute the war 
in co-operation with the other British Commonwealth countries. 
Curtin also undertook to increase the pay of the armed forces, 
raise invalid and old-age pensions, and guarantee higher prices 
for wheat producers; profiteering would be ended. 2 Labour 
charged the Menzies Government with inefficient conduct of the 
war effort and with special favour for privileged groups. 
The Prime Minister replied on 2 September with a strong 
defence of his wartime administration. He made no attempt to 
match Labour's promises, saying that greater sacrifices would 
be required. Menzies dealt at length with the refusal of the 
Labour Party to agree to the formation of a national govern-
ment, and implied that the electors should take note of thia 
"irresponsible" attitude and return the Government with an 
increased majority.3 The Government campaign referred to 
economic policy in general, finance, price control, primary 
production and marketing, manufacturing and aircraft construction; 
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the disunity of Labour vas emphasized.4 
The endless talk about the alleged need for a national 
government vas largely specious, for such an arrangement vas 
outside the scope of practical politics and could not be brought 
into existence by any vote at the election. 5 Inseparable from 
the foregoing vas the main issue of the governing of Australia 
at war. One indicator of national sentiment vas the general 
attitude of the metropolitan press, which in 1940 shoved less 
enthusiasm for the Non-Labour parties than at any time since 
1929.6 The Bulletin, for example, observing that "the one out-
standing question for decision is which party is likely to 
make the better war effort," declined to make any recommendation. 
It was simply predicted that the general feeling of the nation 
might be that "the Government's achievements in the very limited 
time deserved a fair revard."7 In its next issue The Bulletin 
remained neutral, although it thought that the Labour Party 
had done its worst to lose the definite advantages with which 
it had started electioneering. "The best Government would be 
one drawn from all parties."8 The Sydney Morning Herald, which 
even more than the rest of the Sydney press had been persistent~ 
critical of the Menzies Government (in part because of a 
pervasive feeling in New South Wales that the Government was 
under Victorian domination and that New South Wales interests 
were suffering accordingly), 9 expressed a cautious attitude. 
"Labour's present enthusiasm for 'all-in' war is excellent, 
but it hardly gives them the right to criticize the Govern-
ment's past performance ••• The real need at this critical time 
is not for a change of Government, but for a strengthening of 
the Ministry ••• Pending the creation of a national government, 
the Menzies Government should be given an unequivocal mandate 
10 to carry on." 
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In the other capital cities the press was generally much 
less restrained in supporting United Australia Party and Country 
Party candidates. The Brisbane Courier-Mail said: "The war 
record of the Menzies Government is a record of solid achieve-
ment."11 In Perth the Vest Australian claimed that what mattered 
most in the election was "not what Mr. Curtin and the majority 
of his followers think - they are probably sound enough - but 
what the other sections of the Labour Party think, and the 
unknown extent to which they may be able to impose their wills 
upon official Labour."12 The Melbourne ~' another fairly 
regular critic of the Government, thought that despite its 
mistakes "the Menzies Government has served Australia acceptably 
through a period of unparalleled anxiety and strain."13 Further, 
"all Australia is aware that political Labour is a tripartite 
body, and that it could not form a Government except by attempted 
fusion of groups whose political differences are deep and 
whose personal antagonisms are bitter."14 
There was a record number of candidates in all states for 
election to the House of Representatives and the Senate; in 
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New South Wales the situation was further complicated by 
several unusual developments. On the Government side the 
appearance of multiple endorsements of United Australia Party 
candidates in some electorates led to confusion and dissension. 
The prime mover behind this occurrence was the Sydney Morning 
Herald, which assiduously promoted the candidacies of 
"independently-minded men" who would "strengthen the Ministry" 
{e.g. the former Premier, B.S.B. Stevens}, in opposition to 
officially-selected "party stalwarts". On the other side 
the electors of New South Wales were faced with the unedifying 
spectacle of no less than three Labour parties contending 
for their votes.15 To begin with the federal Labour Party 
nominated candidates in every electorate. Then there was the 
Lang-Beasley group, which had shifted to the right and now 
called itself the Non-communist Labour Party, maintaining 
a separation from the federal Labour Party which had existed 
almost continuously since 1931. The third entrant was the 
so-called Hughes-Evans Labour Party, an extreme lett-wing 
body which had emerged as a result of the suspensions and 
expulsions following the March 1940 state party conference 
(which had endorsed anti-war and "hands off Russia" resolutions, 
16 
much to the embarrassment of the federal Labour Party}. 
The Hughes-Evans group served as a haven for Communists, for 
on 15 June 1940 the Menzies Government had proclaimed the 
Communist Party an illegal organization because of its opposition 
"dV:liONVH WIMS·HQ·)INIS 3Hl. HO.:I l.3S "l"lV 
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to the war.17 
The election was closely contested, and the fate of the 
Menzies Government was in doubt for almost a fortnight after 
polling day - until the final count of postal votes and prefer-
enees. The Government was returned in a much weakened position: 
Party Membership in Parliament, 1940 
before election after election 
~2u!e 2!-~eE~!!!ntative! I 
United Australia Party 25 22 
Country Party 16 14 
Independent 1 2 
- -
Total, Government 42 38 
Labour Party 32 36 
Senate 
------
United Australia Party 16 16 
Country Party 4 
...i 
Total, Government 20 20 
Labour Party 16 16 18 
-----
--~··--
Thus after furnishing a Speaker the Government had a majority 
of only one, and would be dependent upon the support of the 
two Independents. 
The swing against the Government was largely confined to 
New South Wales, where the Labour Party won five seats formerly 
held by the Government parties. Menzies enjoyed a greatly 
increased majority in his Victorian electorate of Kooyong, but 
Curtin was only saved from apparent defeat in Fremantle by the 
arrival of soldiers' postal votes. The most significant indivimuu 
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results for the Labour Party were the election of Dr. H.V. 
Evatt, who had added a great deal of prestige to the Labour 
Party by resigning from the High Court to become a candidate, 
and the return of J.B. Chifley to Parliament after nine years 
in the political wilderness. 
There were varying interpretations of the significance of 
the outcome of the 1940 election. Earle Page thought that 
the vote in New South Yales was "not so much a vote for Labour 
19 
as a vote against the domination of national affairs by Victoria~ 
Another observer, sympathetic to Menzies, wrote: "The real 
issue of the election was not between two parties, but between 
the Government and particularly that part of it led by Mr. 
Menzies, and certain sections of the community and the press." 
Much of the difficulty could be traced to the allegedly arrogant 
personality of the Prime Minister. "It is quite clear that the 
late J.A. Lyons would not have got as much done as Mr. Menzies 
has; there is no doubt, however, that Mr. Lyons would have 
20 
satisfied the Australian democracy at the present moment." 
Whether or not the people intended it, 21 the narrowness 
of the Government's win in the election revived the question 
of a national government; the metropolitan newspapers were in 
the vanguard of the debate. The Brisbane Courier-Mail believed 
that "the people of Australia, by refusing to put all their 
trust in any single party, have remitted to a new Parliament 
the task of welding its elements into a united national front." 22 
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The West Australian agreed: "The vote means as plainly as such 
a vote could express a meaning that Australia wants a national 
government." 23 Less emphatic, the Sydney Morning Herald thought 
that "differences of method, not of principle or patriotism, 
divide the parties. They can and should be reconciled."24 !h! 
Bulletin asserted that the Government was "morally bound to 
invite the Labour Party to take a proper share of responsibility 
for the direction of the war effort.••25 A rather more realistic 
view was taken by the Melbourne ~: ''The formation of a national 
government would be welcomed if a basis of harmonious teamwork 
were to be discovered ••• otherwise its practical merits vanish."26 
The weeks following the election were occupied with political 
manoeuvring. On 7 October the Prime Minister met separately 
with Curtin, Cameron and Beasley to explore the possibilities 
of a national government. Three days later a meeting between 
Menzies and Page resulted in a truce in their long-standing 
feud. 27 When the Country Party met in mid-October a biz&rre 
sequence of events led to the ending of Cameron's leadership 
and his replacement by A.W. Fadden. 28 In due course Curtin 
was re-elected leader of the Labour Party. Although Curtin 
personally had begun to accept the idea of a national govern-
ment, the majority of his party remained fundamentally against 
such an arrangement; thus a national government could have 
been brought about only by splitting Labour and leaving the 
Opposition in the hands of a small, vociferous left-wing group.29 
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A compromise solution to the impasse over the national 
government question was provided by the creation of the Advisory 
War Council, which was composed initially of four Ministers 
(Menzies, Fadden, Hughes and Spender) and four members of the 
Opposition (Curtin, Forde, Makin and Beasley).30 The Advisory 
War Council was to consider in conditions of secrecy high 
matters of state, especially in regard to the national war 
effort, without accepting responsibility. On the day of the 
official formation of the Advisory War Council, 28 October, 
the Prime Minister announced a reconstruction of the Governmento 
The most important changes were the entry into the Cabinet of 
the new Country Party leader, Fadden, as Treasurer, the return 
to office of Page as Minister for Commerce, and the shift of 
Spender to the Army portfolio. 31 Thus the second Menzies 
Ministry began to function and - on the understanding that 
there would be reasonable co-operation from the Opposition 
the Government applied itself to the imperative problems 
associated with the financing of the war. 
Although in late 1940 the need for a maximum war effort 
was almost universally accepted in Australia, there remained 
a basic division on social policy - a division which influenced 
the external policy and defence debate. The people and their 
representatives in Parliament were divided into those who main-
tained that plans for higher living-standards, better housing, 
improved social services, etc. would conflict with war prepara~ 
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and those who contended that privileged groups and vested 
interests were using the war as a pretext to deny the just 
claims of millions of ordinary citizens. The result was a 
crisis in Parliament over the budget and general economic 
poliey. 32 On 21 November the Treasurer submitted a £150,000,000 
budget33which extended income tax downwards and also increased 
the rate on higher incomes. After some hesitation the Labour 
Party decided to challenge the budget; Curtin told the House 
on 28 November that the Opposition did "not seek to- reduce"by 
a single shilling "the provision which the Government regarded 
34 
as necessary'for the conduct of the war. But the Labour 
leader objected to the method of raising the "staggering sum" 
and moved that the proposal to tax previously exempted incomes 
be dropped, that rates for higher incomes be further raised, 
that wheat growers receive an additional payment, that large 
companies pay higher taxes, that pay and allowances for soldiers 
and dependants be improved, and that the resources of the 
Commonwealth Bank be given preference over those of the private 
35 banks. 
Menzies accepted the challenge, but it soon became obvious 
that the Government Yas in grave danger of defeat if the Labour 
amendment came to a vote. So the issue was not forced, and 
there followed a week of urgent consultation and bargaining in 
which belated use was made of the Advisory War Council. The 
Government offered some concessions in the form of small increases 
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in old-age pensions and allowances for soldiers' wives, a 
moderate raising of the income tax exemption level and a further 
advance to wheat producers. 36 Within the Labour caucus Curtin 
won acceptance of the compromise by a reportedly narrow margin 
over a group led by Evatt, who was impatient and anxious to 
propel Labour into p~wer. 37 In due course the budget was passed, 
and Parliament adjourned on 13 December. The Prime Minister 
thanked the Labour leader for his consistent courtesy and under-
standing, and expressed his special admiration for Curtin's 
capacity to "reconcile with the duties of political warfare the 
proper interests of the nation."38 Curtin replied with the 
assurance that he would do his best to promote the good govern-
ment of the nation, and would give complete co-operation to 
those charged with the responsibility of ensuring the safety 
of Australia. 39 
The generous remarks of the two party leaders notwithstanding, 
the prospects for political harmony in the coming year were 
hardly promising. The Government coalition "rested on a mass 
of shifting discontents."40 A section of the Labour Party 
awaited another opportunity to try to force a change of Govern-
ment. Meanwhile Great Britain - greatly bolstered by American 
aid - had successfully emerged from the worst of the German 
air attacks and had dealt grievous blows to the Italian navy. 
Fear of Japanese intentions now began to be a source of rapidly 
growing concern to Australia. 0 
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PART VII- THE JAPANESE THREAT, 1941 
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A defence conference held in Singapore in late October 
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1940 had shown all too clearly the vulnerability of the British 
position in Asia and the "alarming situation in regard to the 
defence of Singapore". However the Australian Government was 
unable to take any substantial action to repair the weakness; 
instead, the Advisory War Council agreed that Menzies should 
go to London for urgent talks with Churchill.1 In Washington 
Casey took advantage of every opportunity to both publicly and 
diplomatically promote the cause of the British Commonwealth, 
and to convince the Americans of the importance to the United 
States of bases in the southwest Pacific.2 But the United 
States continued to avoid new Pacific commitments. 
In January 1941, while popular attention remained focused 
on the activities of the Australian Imperial Force in North 
Africa, the Government increasingly turned its attention to 
the Pacific. The Prime Minister left Sydney by air for London 
on 21 January; at about the same time the Minister for the 
Army, P.C. Spender, stated in a speech in Singapore that 
Australia had no quarrel with Japan. Spender's remarks received 
wide publicity, but in general the Australian press refrained 
from either criticizing or endorsing the statement. 3 Sub-
sequently the Acting Prime Minister, Fadden, spoke of "peoples 
between whom there is no direct conflict finding themselves 
on opposite sides in the universal struggle," a reference to 
Japan's growing ties with the Axis. And the Minister for 
External Affairs, P.H. Stewart (who had succeeded McEwen), 
described Australia's relations with Japan as cordial, but 
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added that "Australia could not lightly contemplate disturbance 
of the status quo" in neighbouring territories.4 
Following a statement by the Japanese Foreign Minister, 
Matsuoka, implying a divergence in the policies of Great Britain 
and Australia, and a public denial by the Australian Minister 
to Japan, Latham, a feeling of tension began to affect the 
leaders of Australia. At a meeting of the Advisory War Council 
on 29 January a statement was released warning that the war 
was entering a more critical phase which might "directly affect" 
Australia. 5 A week later the Council met again to examine the 
likelihood of a Japanese thrust in the immediate future. At 
the instance of Curtin, who felt an urgent need "for the public-
generally to be shocked into a proper realization of the 
position,"6 t~e Council issued a long and rather ambiguous 
statement which triggered war scare headlines in some newspapers.7 
The Advisory War Council next met on 12 February, when it 
received further disturbing reports of Japanese intentions. 
Again the prime mover was John Curtin, whose acute concern with 
Australia's danger was probably the result of his own contemplatwo 
of the war rather than because of the possession of confidential 
information.8 Plans for a partial mobilization were already 
under consideration, and the Labour leader pressed the Council 
to prepare for an immediate mobilization should the necessity 
arise.9 Fadden and Curtin, who had established warm personal 
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relations and "worked with a harmony rarely found among the 
leaders of opposing parties,n10 with the concurrence of Beasley, 
issued a statement which warned that the war had "moved to a 
new stage involving the utmost gravity."ll And following a 
War Cabinet meeting on 13 February the Acting Prime Minister 
said: "In plain words, we find ourselves in serious danger of 
hostile action near if not upon our own coastline."12 In 
Washington Casey advised Hull that the danger to Australia 
was steadily increasing.13 The Australian press indulged in 
rumours and speculation.14 
However, the Australian leaders were not in possession of 
definite information which vitally altered the immediate prospeda 
in the Pacific, and, in fact, Japan was not yet completely 
committed to an extension of the war. Thus it was inevitable 
that the "scare" in Australia would be followed by a let-down. 
Y.M. Hughes was frankly sceptical of the situation; in London 
on 21 February Menzies, somewhat out of touch with developments 
in Australia, was optimistic about the chances for a peaceful 
agreement with Japan.15 The Bulletin summed up the feelings of 
many by obserTing that the judgements of members of the War 
Cabinet and the Advisory War Council were not infallible. "There 
is a very widespread feeling that during the last agitated 
fortnight some of these gentlemen ,said too much or too liit.le. 
People not hitherto friendly to Mr. Menzies have been heard to 
remark that if he had been in Australia there would have been 
no such amateurish handling of official pronouncements."16 On 
3 March Menzies advised a meeting of journalists in London not 
to become victims of "the very pernicious habit of believing 
that a possible conflict becomes inevitable." Australians 
"aimed and a~e aiming at getting near to Japan."17 This caused 
the Sydney Morning Herald to comment that the Prime Minister 
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seemed to have fallen into the error of "minimizing the serious-
ness (Qf a delicate situation), to the bewilderment of public 
opinion in Australia, and in contradiction of his own assertion 
that there should be no pretence about international relations."18 
Apparently there were three main factors which account for 
19 
what turned out to be the false alarm of February 1941. One 
vas the aim of the Labour Party to put a stop to recurring 
industrial disputes by encouraging trade unionists to develop 
a better realization of the need for a greater war effort. A 
second factor vas the special concern with the preparation of 
the country for a possible direct Japanese attack. And finally, 
the Labour Party was not unmindful of the possibility of taking 
office in the near future, and was understandably anxious to 
demonstrate that it was more concerned with the defence of 
Australia than the Menzies Government. 
Labour's prospects were greatly bolstered by the healing 
of the decade-old breach in New South Wales. In early February 
1941 the Lang-led Non-Communist Labour Party meeting in Sydney 
decided overwhelmingly to return to the federal Labour Party 
fold. 20 This step was a belated recognition ot the changed 
times and was a personal triumph for Curtin - the achievement 
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of a goal towards which he had been working for more than five 
years. When Parliament reassembled Beasley formally acknowledged 
that he and his several colleagues were now included in the 
official Opposition led by Curtin.21 And so the stage had been 
set for the Labour Party to return to power after ten years 
of political frustration. The Government parties obliged by 
maintaining a course which was to lead to their self-destruction 
in little more than six months. 
Parliament sat for only three weeks from 12 March to 3 April, 
and a number of its meetings were held in camera - which aroused 
annoyance and suspicion on the part of some Labour members. 
The Labour Party leaders tried to show a co-operative spirit 
(and Evatt, who joined an enlarged Advisory War Council on 
18 March, was pacified for the time being), but extremists like 
E.J. Ward would not be restrained. No sooner had Parliament 
resumed than Ward accused the Government of having issued the 
February warnings in an endeavour to hoax the public. Ward 
claimed that the Government had no information which justified 
the issuance of such warnings; the situation had been exploited 
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for political purposes. 22 Possibly Yard was unaware of the part 
played by Curtin in the "scare", but the Labour leader assured 
the House that he had "subscribed (to the February statements) 
with a full sense of the meaning of every word" in the warnings 
th . 23 ere~n, 
For a time the political atmosphere in Australia appeared 
to be more harmonious, and much of the credit for this went 
to the affable Fadden and the close relationship he maintained 
with Curtin. Fadden also took the initiative in guiding the 
public towards a better appreciation of the United States. Upon 
the passage by the American Congress of the Lend-Lease Act and 
President Roosevelt's pledge of full support for the Allied 
cause, the Acting Prime Minister told the House on 19 March 
that it was indeed a "powerful stimulus" to know that the 
"tremendous resources" of the United States were to be used 
unreservedly to aid the Allies. Australia felt a "deep and 
abiding gratitude" for the timely help. 24 Curtin agreed entirely~5 
On 20 March two American cruisers and five destroyers 
arrived in Sydney for a goodwill visit which elicited a tremend~ 
response. Parliament adjourned and the entire Government went 
to Sydney to greet the visitors. 26 Fadden reflected the hopes 
and fears of his countrymen when he said in his speech of 
welcome& "Nothing in the life of Australia has so stirred, 
inspired and thrilled the nation as has this visit of part of 
the great United States navy." 27 
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The failure of the Greek campaign led to a good deal of 
criticism in Australia.1 The hopefulness of February 1941 
turned into the gloom of May 1941, as a result of the success 
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of the German counter-attack in North Africa and the overwhelming 
German victory over the Allied forces in Greece and Crete; 
Australia lost more than 6,000 men in the latter eampaigns. 2 
Some Sydney newspapers and a section of the Labour Party 
contributed to an impression of strong dissatisfaction in 
Australia, implying that badly-needed troops had been sacrificed 
as the result of a series of British blunders. In fact, the 
Advisory War Council had been seriously misled about Australian 
involvement in Greeee, 3 but this did not deter Fadden from 
denouncing the "insidious and harmful statements emanating from 
a section of the Sydney press," because"& wholly wrong and 
most unfortunate impression had been conveyed overseas."4 To 
some extent the bad feeling generated by the disastrous outcome 
of the fighting in Greece was dispelled by the favourable result 
of the short Allied campaign in Syria - though fighting the 
Vichy French was hardly the same as fighting the Germans. 
Greece illustrated the lack of eo-ordination between Britain 
and the Dominions on the strategy of the war, and Menzies left 
London displeased with Australia's role in the making of war 
policy. For example, Australia had absolutely no say in the 
Anglo-American decision that in the event of American involve-
ment in war with both Germany and Japan, a decision would have 
to be sought first in Europe, which would mean a holding war 
in the Pacific. 5 Menzies also felt that Churchill had too much 
power in the conduct of the war; Churchill had no conception 
of the Dominions as "separate entities", and "the more distant 
the problem from the heart of the Empire the less he thought 
of it."6 In consequence the Australian Prime Minister pressed 
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his advocacy of an imperial war cabinet including representatives 
from each of the old Dominions, but Canada, New Zealand and 
South Africa were not interested.7 Speaking in Parliament on 
18 June after the return of Menzies to Australia, J.B. Chifley 
indicated that Labour vas equally unhappy with Britain's alleged 
domination of war policy.8 
The Prime Minister, profoundly influenced by what he had 
seen of the war in Britain and North Africa, wasted no time 
in initiating preparations for an unlimited war effort. Menzies 
outlined the new programme in a national broadcast on 17 June, 
saying: "The only way in which we can win this war is by being 
prepared to put into pawn every right that we have until 
victory is attained ••• If we are to live as usual and largely 
leave the war to others, we cannot deserve to win, and the 
perfect equipping of our men overseas must be left largely to 
others."9 Some of the measures foreshadowed were a positive 
direction of manpower, expanded participation of women in the 
war effort, a reduction in civilian consumption and the 
elimination of non-essential imports. Petrol rationing would 
be stricter, the production and distribution of coal would be 
controlled, strikes and lock-outs would be prohibited and 
prices would be controlled.10 
Having won a sweeping victory over the Non-Labour Govern-
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ment in the state election held in New South Wales in May 1941, 
the Labour Party - further encouraged in its anticipation of 
office -was little disposed to respond to Menzies's renewed 
appeal for the formation of a national government. Nevertheless 
Curtin ensured that his party adhered to its proclaimed policy 
of co-operation, and he fully endorsed the Menzies Government's 
demands on the nation.11 The Labour leader made recommendations 
of his own, particularly in regard to the trade unions, and 
welcomed the proposal for parliamentary committees designed 
to promote Labour-Non-Labour eo-operation in a number of fields. 
"The great truth to remember," Curtin told the House, "is that 
this Parliament will have no opportunity to serve the people 
unless our cause is crowned with victory."12 Subsequently, and 
in spite of disharmonious utterances from men like Ward and 
Beasley, Curtin managed to convince the Government of the 
inadvisability of a prohibition of strikes, in view of the 
Australasian Council of Trade Unionst assurances of the 
"determined loyalty of the trade unions".13 
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In general the metropolitan press responded favourably to 
the Prime Minister's call for an unlimited war effort. A 
typical observation was that of the Melbourne A&!& "Big 
industrialists and business men, shop assistants and house-
wives all appear to endorse this new speeding-up, all-in 
programme, and declared themselves ready to accept - and accept 
cheerfully - the burdens and sacrifices it must mean ••• 'We 
can take it- and more if necessary,' was the general attitude, 
'and now let's get on with the job. 1 " 14 The Bulletin referred 
to a "good, if belated, programme", but criticized the Prime 
Minister for not proposing to extend conscription to overseas 
. 15 
serv1.ce. 
Less than a week after the call for an unlimited war effort, 
Australian public opinion was confronted with the German 
invasion of Russia, which began on 22 June 1941. The feeling 
which prevailed in Australia upon receipt of the momentous 
news was one of considerable relief mixed with surprise. Un-
certainty about Stalin's intentions and about the extent of 
Russian preparedness, coupled with vivid memories of the 
success of German blitzkrieg tactics elsewhere, prevented 
optimistic forecasts. But there was a widespread feeling of 
anticipation at the prospect of a respite for the British and 
Australian forces in North Africa. In hard-pressed Great 
Britain only a few hours after the launching of the German 
attack on the SoTiet Union, Churchill broadcast an offer of 
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whatever help Britain could give to Russia and the Russian 
people.16 Menzies explained to Parliament on 24 June that there 
had not been time for Churchill to consult the Dominions, but 
"the statement by the Prime Minister of Great Britain is one 
which is completely accepted by the Government of Australia." 
Still Menzies made it quite clear that the welcoming of "any 
aid that can be given by Russia in the way of destroying German 
military power" was "not equivalent to saying that we identify 
our political views with those of Russia. 1117 Curtin agreed 
with Menzies, but interjections by the former Country Party 
leader, Cameron (now a private member), indicated that not all 
members of the House had lost their ideological hostility to 
Communism.18 The official attitude passed without serious 
criticism in the metropolitan press, although the fervently 
anti-Communist The Bulletin wrote that there could be "no 
questiou of an alliance" with the Soviet Union.19 
Attempts by militant anti-Communists to distinguish between 
an "ally" and an "associate" collapsed following the signing 
on 12 July of an Anglo-Soviet agreement, which provided for 
mutual assistance against Germany and no separate peace. 20 
Again the daily press accepted the position as an expedient 
arrangement, but The Bulletin objected that Australia had 
merely been "kept informed" of the negotiations instead of 
having been properly consulted. Churchill was accused of high-
handedness.21 Such arguments were more than offset by mounting 
respect for the Russian military achievement throughout July; 
to most Australians the fact of continued Russian resistance 
meant more than the ideological issue. Some Australian 
Communists began to participate in public meetings which 
urged all possible aid to the Soviet Union and sometimes 
attacked the Menzies Government. The latter refused to remove 
the ban on the Communist Party as an illegal organization. 
Generally speaking, the German invasion of the Soviet Union 
made clearer to Australians of all political persuasions the 
dominant element of nationalistic aggression in the waro 
Confidence grew in the ultimate defeat of Germany, but there 
were new uncertainties in regard to Japan. 22 
A side effeet of the extension of the war was a heightened 
interest in such matters as war aims and the shape of post-war 
society. The signing of the Atlantic Charter on 14 August, 
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in which Churchill and Roosevelt agreed to an idealistic state-
ment of war aims, was welcomed by the press. The Sydney Morning 
Herald spoke of "a charter of liberation to the enslaved 
peoples of Europe", 23 and the Melbourne Argus strongly approved 
of "this fine human programme".24 Indeed, Australian political 
leaders had only just begun to see the connection between 
post-war reconstruction and the strategy of propaganda. The 
Prime Minister had said in June: "People who imagine that at 
the end of the war we will shrug our shoulders and go back to 
our old privileges and comfortable living have a lot to learn ••• 
When the war is over pioneering work will have to be done 
in this country, and I hope we shall do it justly.n25 And 
on behalf of Labour,Evatt had defined the main internal 
problem of reconstruction as one of providing social security 
26 
and constant employment. But Beasley wanted to know "why 
must it always be after the war?" 27 
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Much of the enthusiasm for the unlimited war programme 
announced in June 1941 had dissipated by the beginning of 
August. Despite its undeniable achievements, it was now more 
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than ever apparent that the Menzies Government did not possess 
the full confidence of the nation. A scientifically organized 
public opinion survey conducted in mid-1941 indicated, inter 
alia, that "confidence in our political leaders must be 
regained ••• It is the duty of our leaders to create trust in 
themselves and for Parliament and the political parties to 
help them do this. They must also show an understanding of 
the sense of disillusion, disappdntment, futility, distrust, 
disgust, diffidence and indifference which so many possess 
with regard to politics and society in general and the war in 
particular."! The reasons for such a situation were many and 
varied: the blatant office-seeking of some members of the 
Government parties, the ambitions of the Labour Party, the 
ineffectiveness of the Department of Information, 2 certain 
personal shortcomings of the Prime Minister, etc. Rather than 
grapple with a complex problem many preferred to find a 
scapegoat, and Menzies was the obvious choice. 
The drive to depose Menzies 3began in July at a time when 
the Government was worried about raising the £250,000,000 
which would be required for war expenditure in 1941-1942.4 
A small group of United Australia Party members promoted the 
idea that Menzies should return to London (presumably for 
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the duration of the war), leaving Fadden in charge in Canberra. 
The dissidents found a ready mouthpiece in the Sydney Morning 
Herald, which wrote: "It is being freely questioned among the 
Prime Minister's supporters whether his judicial tolerance, 
his keen analytical brain and the sparkling dialectic are not 
better suited to the higher council chambers of the Empire 
rather than to the post of man of action." 5 On 28 July, at a 
party meeting which had been specifically called to consider 
the leadership question, Menzies succeeded in side-stepping 
the challenge to his position.6 But the matter did not rest 
there. 
In early August the Menzies Government was confronted by 
a grave turn of events in Asia caused by the Japanese occupation 
of Indo-China and the consequent threat to Thailand. Upon 
receipt of news of the latest crisis the Prime Minister 
abandoned plans for a tour of the capital cities, and at a 
Cabinet meeting held on 11 August it was decided that he should 
proceed to London.7 The Labour deputy leader, Forde, promptly 
declared that in view of the dissatisfaction on the Government 
side in regard to his leadership, Menzies's proposed return 
to London was "a compromise to save the face of the Prime 
Minister and of his Government."8 The Advisory War Council 
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considered the proposal on 14 August; Curtin thought that 
Menzies should be allowed to go to London, but the other 
Labour members (Evatt, Forde, Makin and Beasley) argued that 
the Prime Minister should remain at his post in Australia.9 
The debate shifted to Parliament where on 20 August Menzies 
reviewed the progress of the war and recent developments in 
Asia, and then asked for the approval of all parties to the 
suggestion that he leave Australia.10 The House then discussed 
the position in a secret session and subsequently in a public 
session.11 Curtin accepted his party's view that it was 
essential for .Australia to have its Prime Minister "here to 
direct the administration in the organization of a total war 
effort", but offered to co-operate in alternative arrangements 
for the representation of Australian interests in London.12 
Forde was less tactful, however, claiming that "the people 
should be told the whole story of the political manoeuvring 
to get rid of the Prime Minister."13 (Eventually Earle Page 
went to London in place of Menzies.) 
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Menzies's days were now numbered, but on 22 August he made 
a final attempt to retrieve the situation by again inviting 
Labour to join in a national government. The Labour Party 
predictably declined, and the wording of Curtin's reply clearly 
indicated that he had finally overcome his personal reluctance 
to assume the burdens of the Prime Ministership14(without a 
definite majority in the House of Representatives). An impasse 
had been reached. The press divided on the question; the 
Brisbane Courier-Mail, for example, severely criticized the 
Labour Party for "a refusal of the finest service it could 
render to the people of Australia in time of war at the small 
sacrifice of suspending a party rule. 1115 The Sydney Daily 
Telegraph wrote: "Only by a general election can Australia 
get itself a Government - Labour or United Australia Party 
which is capable of dominating the House and implementing a 
16 full war programme." 
An election vas the last thing the political parties 
wanted, however, and the show-down came at a Cabinet meeting 
on 28 August, which resulted in the resignation of the Prime 
Minister.17 Who deposed Menzies? Despite the later claim that 
neither Fadden nor the Country Party were involved, 18 it seems 
more likely that Fadden had the idea that he, although leader 
of the minority party of the coalition, "should, against all 
precedent and political reason, displace Menzies and thus 
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solve the problem of an insecure Government led by an 'unpopular' 
Prime Minister."19 The most vocal anti-Menzies members of the 
United Australia Party had been W.V. McCall, W.J. Hutchinson 
and c.w. Marr, 20 and in the end they were joined by a number 
of others, particularly Spender, Hughes and Holt. 21 The Prime 
Minister accepted his defeat with good grace and issued a 
statement which said, in part, that many of his colleagues 
in the Cabinet had felt that he vas "unpopular with large 
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sections of the press and the people and that this unpopularity 
handicaps the effectiveness of the Government." The statement 
referred to "divisions of opinion in the Government parties 
themselves which would not or might not exist under another 
leader."22 Fadden became Prime Hinister on 29 August and Menzies 
took the post of Minister for Defence Co-ordination; there 
were no other changes in the Government; Curtin described the 
whole operation as only a "face-lifting 11 • 23 The former Independent 
(soon to resume that status), A.W. Coles, left the decisive 
meeting of the United Australia Party and later said: "Mr. 
Menzies has been offered as Australia's scapegoat on the altar 
of political ambition, under the coercion of constantly applied 
pressure ••• It was nothing but a public lynching."24 Indeed, 
momentous decisions affecting Australia had been subordinated 
to attempts to bargain and wrangle over plaee. 25 
Naturally all of the metropolitan newspapers had something 
to say about the change in leadership. The Melbourne Argus 
wrote: "By his resignation of the Prime Ministership in favour 
of Mr. Fadden, Mr. Menzies has performed the most generous and 
public-spirited act of his career." 26 Provincial pride was 
expressed by the Brisbane Courier-Mail (Fadden vas from Queens-
land)z "What is felt in Queensland is that the choice of a 
successor to Mr. Menzies has fallen upon a man who has the 
best prQspects of consolidating the nation's confidence."27 In 
Sydney the Daily Telegraph accurately predicted that Fadden's 
troubles were "just beginning". 28 The Bulletin was rather 
dubious about the whole affair& "One of the things that made 
Mr. Menzies's period of office so uncomfortable was that he 
chose Ministers who were square pegs in round holes and was 
too loyal to them ••• Mr. Fadden is popular enough, if to be 
popular in a jovial way is to be statesmanlike ••• Australians 
would prefer to see Curtin get the chance. Above all things 
they want a Government that will govern whatever its party 
label or labels, and the Fadden makeshift doesn't look that 
sort of Government." 29 
Upon taking office Padden promised to do everything in his 
221 
power "to bring home to Parliament and the people a realization 
)0 
of the urgent need to close our ranks." Unfortunately for 
the new Prime Minister the process of disintegration within 
the Government parties was too far advanced to be con~lled, 
and the two Independents who held the balance of power (Coles 
and Alex Wilson) were drifting inexorably towards the Opposition 
camp, with strong encouragement from Evatt. 31 The Labour Party 
was now anxious to administer the coup de grace to a dying 
Government; Curtin, waiting for the right moment, had to use 
all his influence to restrain his eager followers. 32 
Before the Opposition could challenge the Fadden Government 
on its budget, a minor sensation was caused by the disclosure 
of a "secret fund" which the Government had allegedly established 
for the bribery of trade union officials, as part of a campaign 
to dampen industrial unrest. 33 What came to be known as the 
Winkler Case caused an uproar in Parliament on 24 September34 
and was used to discredit the Government, especially Fadden, 
Menzies and Hughea. 35 The Government managed to defeat an 
amendment condemning the use of the fund by only one vote, 
and the affair was referred to a royal commission. 36 Thus the 
stage was set for the final confrontation which came, as 
expected, on the budget. 
On 25 September Fadden submitted to the House a budget 
for the financial year 1941-1942 which proposed a total outlay 
of £322,000,000, including £217,000,000 for war expenditure 
(compared with £170,000,000 for the preceding year). 37 Padden 
planned to finance the war expenditure mainly on the basis of 
new taxation and loan money; other sections of his budget 
speech mentioned munitions contracts, price control and excess 
profits. On 1 October Curtin attacked the budget on a number 
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of grounds (soldiers,• pay, taxation of lower income groups, 
banking policy, etc.), 38 but it was obvious that the real issue 
was the future of the Government, not the budget. Labour 
promised to administer the nation's war effort on the principle 
of "equality of sacrifice", which in effect meant "the greatest 
possible taxation of incomes of £500 or £600 and over."39 The 
debate ebbed and flowed for three days, but Curtin probably 
knew already that the two Independents had decided to vote the 
Government out of officeo40 At last, on 3 October, Coles rose 
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to address the House. There was a "loss of confidence in the 
Government's ability to carry on and to wage the maximum war 
effort" of which the nation was capable, he said; Coles declared 
that he would support the Labour position in order to achieve 
stable leadership.41 Wilson followed suit but on somewhat 
different grounds. 42 In the event the Government was defeated 
36-33, and shortly thereafter Fadden resigned. The Independents 
pledged their support to Labour, which made possible the 
formation of the Curtin Government. But it was not Coles or 
Wilson but the dissident Non-Labour groups that wrecked the 
Fadden Government and its predecessor.43 
There was a general disposition to hail Curtin's advent to 
office with approval and relief, 44 although some commentators 
were sarcastic about the role of Coles and Wilson. 45 The 
Sydney Morning Herald thought that ''other motives than reasoned 
objection to the budget animated those who were bent upon the 
Government's downfall ••• Mr. Fadden has received a shabby deal 
in his efforts to form a stable administration in a Parliament 
latterly given over to personal intrigue and partisan manoeuvr·e ••• 
The Labour Government will not lack liberal and discriminating 
assistance from the Opposition so long as, eschewing electioneer-
ing manoeuvres, it concentrates on a total war effort."46 
"Australia will give the Labour Party its chance," said the 
Daily Telegraph, "but it doesn't want a continuance of the 
present political set-up under a new label."47 The West Australian 
wrote& "Mr. Curtin is entitled to the support and co-operation 
of the whole community so long as he maintains a vigorous war 
effort .••48 The Bulletin commented that the Curtin Government 
deserved ttan opportunity to show what it can do."49 Perhaps 
the best summary of the position was given by the Sydney 
Morning Herald in its editorial of 9 October: "Lacking an 
independent majority, Mr. Curtin possesses much else - the 
present trust of his whole party, the liking and respect of 
the Opposition and the hopeful goodwill of the nation." 50 
The Curtin Government formally took office on 7 October 
1941. John Curtin became both Prime Minister and Minister for 
Defence Co-ordination; other important posts were allocated 
to Forde,Minister for the Army; Chifley,Treasurer; Evatt, 
Attorney-General and Minister for External Affairs; Beasley, 
Minister for Supply and Development; Makin,Minister for the 
Navy and Minister for Munitions; and Ward,Minister for Labour 
and National Service. 51 On the other side of the House Fadden 
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became leader of the Opposition and Hughes, now almost 80 years 
old, leader of the United Australia Party - a graphic illustration 
of the state of collapse of the principal Non-Labour party. 
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During the political disturbances of September 1941 there 
had been a moderate tendency in Canberra to neglect foreign 
affairs.1 The viewpoint of the Australian press remained fairly 
consistent in this period, however. The West Australian, for 
example, wrote on 29 September& "The plain fact remains that 
while Japan maintains her affiliation with the Axis and while 
she persists in her aggression in China, there is no real 
basis for a firm understanding which could guarantee peace in 
the Pacific."2 
In view of the traditional Labour orientation towards 
home defence, it was not surprising that the new Curtin Govern-
ment /Was even less disposed than the Menzies and Fadden 
Governments to yield to the prevailing Anglo-American view, 
which relegated the Pacific area to secondary status.3 (By 
this time F.Y. Eggleston had taken up his post as the first 
Australian Minister to China - yet another example of Australia's 
growing concern with Pacific affairs.) Meanwhile the Washington 
talks between American and Japanese representatives had made 
little headway. 4 And in Manila Earle Page (who was en route 
to London) met the American commander, General MacArthur, and 
received a mildly optimistic assessment of the chances of 
maintaining the status quo in the Pacific, at least for the 
time being. 5 This view reflected opinions held in Washington 
and London, for in early October there was a widespread belief 
that war with Japan could be averted.6 
The vague optimism of the Australian Government persisted 
throughout October, 7 but most newspapers continued to express 
considerable anxiety. The advent of General Tojo's Cabinet 
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in Tokyo in mid-October was viewed with alarm. "The commission-
ing of General Tojo to form a new Government in Japan, follow-
ing the resignation of Prince Konoye, presages a ruthless 
pro-Axis policy on the part of Tokyo," predicted the Sydney 
Morning Herald.8 In Melbourne the Argus wrote that Japan's 
change of Government could only hasten the denoument of the 
world's tragedy.9 "War in the Pacific, in which Australia is 
vitally interested, appears to be looming ominously."10 ~ 
Bulletin, however, was rather more hopeful: "There will be 
no war in the Pacific unless the Japanese start one; and if 
they start one it will not be in their power to determine 
the shape that the war will take. That will be done by the 
American Government, with the peoples of the Empire giving it 
their full support."11 
The United States and the Soviet Union received much 
editorial attention in October and early November. The American 
movement away from isolation was applauded by the Argus: "When 
the history of this war comes to be written, not the least 
stirring part will be the story of President Roosevelt's patient 
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but persistent effort to win over his fellow countrymen to his 
own realistic grasp of the needs of the situation."12 Speculation 
about the future course of American policy was accompanied by 
a debate on the question of aid to Russia. In the light of the 
determined Russian resistance to the German invasion, most 
Australian newspapers (with the exception of The Bulletin) had 
begun to reflect the general conviction in Australia that 
previous information about the Soviet Union had been, to say 
the least, misleading. The Sydney Morning Herald played a 
leading part in the reorientation of Australian opinion. Its 
editorial of 13 October 1941, for example, stressed that "the 
consequences of a Russian collapse would be so serious for 
the plans and the hopes of the Allies for next year that in any 
counteraction now, designed to relieve pressure on the Soviet 
army, the risks involved might well be justified."13 A fort-
night later the Sydney Morning Herald repeated the pertinent 
question: "Where will the British nation be if Russia is unable 
to hold out?"14 Other newspapers, however, claimed that the 
agitation for aid to Russia was inspired by political motives, 
and had other ends in view than that of stimulating the flow 
of actual aid to the Soviet Union. Thus the Courier-Mail 
attacked those "whose only real interest in the heroism and 
suffering of the Russian people is to get a public hearing for 
political propaganda."15 Yet the alliance between Britain and 
the Soviet Union caused comparatively little internal trouble 
in Australia. The accession of the Curtin Government brought 
no immediate drastic changes in this regard; the ban on the 
Communist Party remained in force, although the control of 
Communist literature was exercised with more tolerance. 
By the latter part of 1941 some 250,000 men had enlisted 
for overseas service in the Australian forces, and a further 
150,000 were training in the militia; about 200,000 men and 
women were directly or indirectly engaged in war industries.16 
In spite of their rapid expansion the services were in urgent 
need of further reinforcements, but Curtin was not yet in a 
position to deviate from the Labour tradition of voluntary 
service. The strongest critic of the Government on this point 
was The Bulletin; typical of this weekly newspaper's outlook 
was its leading article of 26 November, which said, in part: 
"The position today is that, because they place shibboleths 
{i.e. the objection to conscription for overseas service) 
before country, the political leaders are striving desperately 
to avoid facing up to the facts as long as possible."17 
The evolution of an American policy towards Japan which 
eventually was to involve the United States in the defence of 
Australia was a development of enormous significance. For 
some time American strategists had been dubious about holding 
the Philippines in the face of a Japanese assault, and thus 
had been reluctant to send further reinforcements to the area. 
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By mid-1941, however, General MacArthur had managed to convince 
The Bulletin, 8 October 1941 
"Y 
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A GOOD HORSE IN HIS DAY. 
" You'll n~ed better dope than tho•<'. mates-he'a a pretty ai<k hor.;e." 
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Washington that the Philippines could be successfully defended. 18 
This resulted in a plan to integrate the defence of the 
Philippines with the defence of Australia, the Dutch East 
Indies and Singapore,by means of a chain of air bases and 
supply depots throughout the area. In late September the United 
States asked about the availability of air bases at Rabaul, 
Port Moresby, Rockhampton and Darwin, but the initial inquiry 
vas addressed to Great Britain, not to Australia19- a revealing 
commentary on the status of the latter in American eyes at that 
~ime, toT BTi~aiu ot course had no authority over the ~laces 
in question. Eventually the American request for bases reached 
the Australian Government, which on 18 October readily agreed 
and promised the "fullest co-operation possible".20 Although 
plans were prepared, no actual work was done on the bases before 
the outbreak of war in the Pacific. The importance of the bases 
agreement was that it was regarded by the Curtin Government as 
a strong indication that Australia would receive American 
support in the event of war with Japan. In November the American 
Congress accepted {by a narrow margin) Roosevelt's request 
for changes in the Neutrality Act, bringing the United States 
closer to actual participation in the war. The Sydney Morning 
Herald wrote: "The further intervention of the United States 
navy in the Atlantic struggle, arising from the amendment of 
the Neutrality Act, may well have a result of profound importance 
to Britain and to Australia, in that it may permit the transfer 
of powerful British naval units to the Pacific."21 
In November 1941 Australia's relations with Great Britain 
were showing signs of strain. Despite heavy pressure from 
Churchill,the Curtin Government had refused to reverse the 
decision of the Menzies and Fadden Governments to withdraw 
Australian soldiers from Tobruk in order to integrate the 
Australian Imperial Force into a single force. 22 Page arrived 
in London on 4 November and promptly submitted to the British 
War Cabinet Australia's case for the urgent strengthening of 
the Singapore defences as a means of deterring Japan. 23 On 
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10 November Churchill made public the despatch of British 
capital ships to Asian waters, but when the British War Cabinet 
discussed Page's submissions two days later the result was 
inconclusive. Churchill was unwilling to commit reinforcements 
(in particular air detachments) to Singapore; the naval support 
en route would have to do for the time being. Nor was the 
British Prime Minister willing to depart from the policy of 
allowing the United States to be responsible for the handling 
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of the Japanese problem. 
The attitude of the Curtin Government in late November was 
outlined in Parliament by H.V. Evatt, who was making his first 
statement as Minister for External Affairs. 25 Evatt assured 
the House that there had been no vital change in Australia's 
foreign policy. After reviewing the progress of the war in 
Europe and North Africa, Evatt said that, in regard to Japan, 
"we are quite content to allow the leadership and initiative 
to be retained by the United States."26 The Minister for 
External affairs referred hopefully to the American-Japanese 
talks, which was an ironic coincidence - for at approximately 
the same time that Evatt was speaking in Canberra, Casey 
learned from Hull in Washington that the search for a modus 
vivendi with Japan had broken down and been abandoned. 27 
When the Australian Government learned of this Casey was 
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asked to intervene in a last-minute attempt to salvage matters. 
On 29 November Casey met the Japanese envoys to Washington, 
Kurusu and Nomura, but to no avail. 28 The next few days were 
dominated by urgent efforts to align British and American 
policies in regard to war with Japan, for the American Govern-
ment knew that Japan was poised to strike (presumably in the 
first instance at Thailand and the Dutch East Indies), and 
that it was now too late to prevent this. 29 Australia learned 
from the British Government on 5 December that the United 
States would commit armed support if Japan attacked in any 
of certain specified ways. 30 In the hope of using the American 
assurance as a deterrent, Casey saw Roosevelt on 6 December 
and urged him to issue a joint American-British Commonwealth 
warning to Japan. The President deferred this suggestion, 
however, in favour of a direct personal appeal to the Japanese 
Emperor which was sent the same evening.31 Unfortunately 
the Japanese Government had long since made the final decision 
to go to war. 
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The news of the surprise Japanese attacks on Pearl Harbour 
and Malaya reached Australia on the morning of 8 December 1941; 
Curtin promptly declared that the Japanese thrust had brought 
about the "gravest hour of our history".1 The Australian reaction, 
as reflected in the press, was a mixture of shock, determination 
and relief. "Treachery so calculated and on so vast a scale 
was previously unknown in the history of international relation-
ships," commented The Bulletin. "In their madness the Japanese 
have done what neither Hitler nor the last Kaiser, with 
immeasurably greater resources, dared to do - launch felon 
assaults on the greatest republic and the greatest empire in 
history ••• Australia , for its part, has fighting men at 
attacked or threatened points who will fight like demons to 
keep the war from their native shores. It may nevertheless 
come to Australia; if so, it will find the nation united and 
ready."2 And, as the Melbourne A&! pointed out, "this tragic 
development serves to remove some of the ambiguity that has 
prevailed in the international foreground" - the United States 
vas now irrevocably committed to the defence of the Pacific.3 
Although some newspapers thought that capital cities might 
be bombed, 4 and others warned their readers to be prepared 
for "heavy losses", 5 there was no dismay in Australia.6 A 
contemporary commentator noted that the Australian forces 
were at battle stations and the Government was proceeding 
according to plan to do everything necessary for the defence 
of Australian, British and American interests.7 Yet, as the 
Prime Minister later recalled, Australia's ttsmall naval forcea 
were divided in several areas. Our militia forces were only 
partly trained and were very short of modern equipment. We 
lacked air support, possessing no fighters whatever, and our 
bomber and reconnaissance aeroplanes had been reduced to about 
50 machines. 118 Australia's trained forces were overseas and 
her long coastline was virtually undefended. 
It was a time for leadership, and in a national broadcast 
on 8 December Curtin declared that the efforts of Australians 
in the past two years must be as nothing compared with the 
efforts they must now put forward. Australians would maintain 
and vindicate their imperishable traditions. "We shall hold 
this country and keep it as a citadel for the English-speaking 
race and as a place where civilization will persist."9 The 
Brisbane Courier-Mail saw the Prime Minister's speech as a 
"call to self-preservation"; it must be answered by "everyone 
who is not a traitor to his fellow citizens."10 And the Sydney 
Morning Herald observed approvingly that Curtin had developed 
the "qualities of real leadership" and was "acting with 
promptitude and energy in disposing of the nation's defensive 
11 
resources." 
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The Curtin Government asserted its view of the sovereignty 
of Australia on the occasion of the outbreak of war with 
Japan. Rejecting the claim that Australia would automatically 
be involved by a British declaration of war (cf. the Menzies 
Government in 1939), Labour resolved to act separately. Curtin 
cabled London on 8 December for a royal instrument authorizing 
a declaration of war, adding that as time was short "the 
Australian Government may act here in anticipation of the 
issue of such instrument"12- a clear indication that the 
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authorization of the King was regarded as no more than a 
formality. The Government then proceeded to issue on 9 December 
a separate declaration of war on Japan, all documents being 
countersigned by the Prime Minister. The procedure had been 
devised by Evatt, who maintained that the indisputable sovereign 
status of Australia had been determined "once and for all" in 
the Balfour Report of 1926.13 As Evatt told Parliament later, 
it was a necessary consequence of independent status that 
"the vital decision as to peace or war with any country should 
be determined exclusively by the Australian Government."14 
The Opposition did not demur. 
Within a week of Pearl Harbour the Allied position had 
rapidly deteriorated. Two British battleships, the "Prince of 
Wales" and the "Repulse", were sunk by Japanese aircraft, Hong 
Kong and Singapore were bombed repeatedly, and the invading 
enemy forces were advancing relentlessly in Malaya and the 
Philippines. Long-term prospects still appeared favourable, 
as The Bulletin observed on 17 December: "In the long run it 
will be shown that the Japanese lost more than they gained 
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when they attacked Hawaii in the night, while their negotiators 
in Washington were still within the precincts of the State 
Department. They and their European allies will in good time 
realize what it means to have aroused the American spirit.••15 
But short-term prospects were another matter, and the Australian 
Government was understandably alarmed. Curtin directed Page 
in London16and Casey in Washington to do everything possible 
to obtain reinforcements - especially air detachments - for 
Malaya and Australia. President Roosevelt told Casey on 17 
December that he agreed with the proposition that the southwest 
Pacific was one unit. "Australia was just as important as the 
Philippines," although if the latter's defences could be 
restored it might well be possible to "save the whole southwest 
Pacific area."17 Churchill arrived in Washington a few days 
later, and it was quickly agreed that a unified command for 
the American-British-Dutch-Australian area should be set up. 
The American navy would be responsible for the southwest Pacific 
Ocean including the east coast of Australia.18 Curtin and 
Evatt immediately began to press the case for Australia having 
an adequate voice in the southwest Pacific command and in the 
general direction of the Pacific war, but a long time was to 
pass before this question was resolved to Australia's satisfactio~ 
By mid-December 1941 Australia was virtually in a state 
o£ siege. Christmas holidays had been cancelled; a black-out 
vas in force and air-raid shelters were being hastily ereeted 
in the cities; all non-essential travel was banned; record 
numbers of men (and women) were enlisting in the forces; 
hospital patients and elderly people were evacuated to inland 
centres. At Government request newspapers were printing 
silhouettes of Japanese warships and aircraft, urging the 
peopleto~alook-out for enemy intruders. The metropolitan 
press wrote a great deal about the imminent prospect of "bomb-
ing" and "invasion", 19 and this undoubtedly contributed to the 
growing exodus from the capital cities. The Bulletin (which 
had a long tradition of disparaging the daily newspapers) 
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responded on 24 December with a condemnation of "press jitters". 
"Australian newspapers have marked the discovery that the 
country is in a war by an outburst of hysterics, an orgy of 
jitters and a hags' chorus of squeals ••• While the war was 
remote they were marvellously brave and as bold as lions ••• 
They never could understand, any of them, that getting tangled 
up in modern war could mean nothing else but getting involved 
in a struggle for survival ••• Not one of them had the courage 
to make a business of telling Australia that this was total 
war, and that the only answer to it was total national effort ••• 
Search Australian press files over the past 20 years, and it 
will be found that there has been one newspaper only that has 
consistently spoken for Australian defence throughout." That 
newspaper was claimed to be none other than The Bulletin.20 
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A wildly exaggerated charge, of course, but it was nevertheless 
indicative of the intense feelings caused by the onrush of 
Japan. 
As the year 1941 drew to a close most of the press continued 
to express confidence in Curtin's leadership. 21 An exception 
was the Courier-Mail, which tried unsuccessfully to revive a 
dead issue: "Mr. Curtin will not lead Australia fully into war 
until he leads a national government!" 22 But though the Govern-
ment was strengthening the home front in general and its own 
position in particular, the situation in the war zones vas 
deteriorating more rapidly than ever. Hong Kong fell and it 
seemed unlikely that the Japanese tide would be stemmed in 
Malaya. "Singapore must be maintained at all hazards and at 
any cost," declared the Sydney Morning Herald on 27 December, 23 
echoing the widespread apprehension felt at the time. In fact 
Curtin had already acted on the matter, for the day before 
he had sent an urgent appeal directly to President Roosevelt 
(and to Churchill, who was in Washington at the time) requesting 
immediate American assistance for Malaya. "Reinforcements 
earmarked by the United Kingdom for despatch to Malaya seem 
to us utterly inadequate, especially in relation to aircraft ••• 
It is in your power to meet the situation. Should the Govern-
ment of the United States desire, we would gladly accept an 
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American commander in the Pacific area." In order that Australia 
should remain a base, "Singapore must be reinforced." 24 
On 28 December 1941 Curtin released a New Year's "message" 
to the Australian people, which vas widely reprinted and broad-
cast. The message was essentially an Australian challenge to 
the fundamental Anglo-American policy of giving priority to 
the war in Europe. "The Australian Government's policy," wrote 
the Prime Minister, "has been grounded on two facts. One is 
that the war with Japan is not a phase of the struggle with 
the Axis powers, but is a new war. The second is that Australia 
must go on to a war footing. Those two facts involved two lines 
of action - one in the direction of external policy as to our 
dealings with Britain, the United States, Russia, the Netherlands 
East Indies and China in the higher direction of the war in 
the Pacific. The second is the reshaping, in fact the revolution-
izing, of the Australian way of life until a war footing is 
attained quickly, efficiently and without question ••• We look 
for a solid and impregnable barrier of the democracies against 
the three Axis powers, and we refuse to accept the dictum 
that the Pacific struggle must be treated as a subordinate 
segment of the general conflict. By that it is not meant that 
any one of the other theatres of war is of less importance than 
the Pacific, but that Australia asks for a concerted plan 
evoking the greatest strength at the democracies' disposal, 
determined upon hurling Japan back. The Australian Government 
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therefore regards the Pacific struggle as primarily one in 
which the United States and Australia must have the fullest 
say in the direction of the democracies' fighting plan. Without 
inhibitions of any kind, I make it quite clear that Australia 
looks to America, free of any pangs as to our traditional links 
or kinship with the United Kingdom.We know the problems that 
the United Kingdom faces. We know the constant threat of 
invasion. We know the dangers of dispersal of strength. But 
we know too that Australia can go, and Britain can still hold 
on. We are therefore determined that Australia shall not go, 
and we shall exert all our energies toward the shaping of a 
plan, with the United States as its keystone, which will give 
to our country some confidence of being able to hold out until 
the tide of battle swings against the enemy." 25 
Curtin had undoubtedly overstated his case , and i~ was 
widely misinterpreted at home and overseas; 26 Churchill later 
claimed that Curtin's message was "flaunted round the world 
by our enemies."27 The Australian press resented the reference 
to the ties between Australia and the United Kingdom. "Mr. 
Curtin's 'Looking to America' message has created a most 
unfortunate impression," complained the Courier-Mail.28 The 
West Australian wrote: "Australians will not readily believe 
that Mr. Curtin meant to express or imply any disparagement 
of Britain, her efforts or her intentions; they will fully 
approve his efforts to draw closer to the United States in 
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these serious times." 29 And the Sydney Morning Herald commented 
that "Mr. Curtin cannot be supposed to have intended that his 
maladroit references to the British connection should be 
interpreted as suggesting that Britain is indifferent to 
30 Australia's fate or unable to give us any real help." One 
newspaper, the Melbourne ~' was more perceptive: "Mr. Curtin's 
orientation of our Pacific outlook would be generally accepted 
throughout this country, even though Australia's sense of unity 
with our kinsfolk of Britain and the other Dominions is 
undiminished. But there is scope for an educative process in 
correcting insular views, and in promoting among peoples in 
other parts of the world a proper understanding of the Pacific 
conflict.«31 Indeed, the Prime Minister's views were a sensible 
recognition of existing realities, even though his somewhat 
undiplomatic phrasing disturbed the traditionalists. Curtin 
had in fact unknowingly prophesied the shape of things to 
come; for the American alliance proved to be much more than a 
temporary expedient, and in the succeeding years the United 
States increasingly displaced Great Britain in importance to 
Australia. 
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In the latter part of the nineteenth century Australian 
nationalism was manifested, inter alia, in the federal move-
ment, immigration restrictions, and the attitude to New Guinea 
and the islands of the southwest Pacific; nationalism implied 
a concern with foreign policy and defence. When federation 
~ 
was finally consumated in 1901 the population of Australia 
~ 
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was only about two-thirds British, and the large Irish Catholic 
minority was inclined to be anti-British in outlook. Prior to 
the First World War both Non-Labour and Labour governments had 
begun to develop a separate defence policy, but foreign relations 
remained firmly under British control. The war changed many 
things; Australian nationhood was confirmed, yet the two 
conscription referenda divided the country as never before. 
Y.M. Hughes played an aggressive part in the peacemaking in 
1919-1920 and asserted a distinctly Australian policy. The 
six-year term of the Bruce-Page Government was marked by 
internal stability, economic growth and a diminished concern 
with external matters. The Balfour Report of 1926 affirmed 
the full sovereignty of the Dominions, but Australia showed 
little enthusiasm for this development. The Government undertook 
a moderate defence programme, while the Labour Party drifted 
further into isolationism; Australia was active in the League 
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of Nations. The beginning of the depression coincided with 
the accession of the Scullin Labour Government, which two years 
later was destroyed by a split in its ranks. While the economic 
crisis necessitated a severe reduction in defence spending, 
Scullin asserted Australian sovereignty by forcing through 
the appointment of an Australian Governor-General. 
The 1931 election brought to power the Lyons Government, 
a fusion of Non-Labour and right-wing Labour forces under the 
banner of the United Australia Party. A year later a very 
gradual start was made on rearmament. The attention of most 
Australians remained focused on domestic affairs, but the 
Japanese invasion of Manchuria in 1931-1932 was a source of 
anxiety. The press and the political parties were divided in 
their interpretations of the affair, which only later was 
clearly seen as a serious blow to collective security. The 
passage of the Statute of Westminster gave official sanction 
to the status of the Dominions, yet many newspapers opposed 
the step, and the Government delayed adopting the Statute by 
legislation. The Ottawa Conference of 1932 attempted to stimulate 
trade within the British Commonwealth, nevertheless by 1934 
Japan had become a major Australian trading partner and the 
object of trade treaty negotiations. 
The Lyons Government, a coalition with the Country Party 
since the 1934 election, maintained a cautious attitude to 
the Abyssinian war, which broke out in October 1935. The British 
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sanctions policy was supported but restraint was urged; the 
Labour Party opposed any Australian involvement, as did several 
newspapers. In 1936 the Government blundered into a short-lived 
policy of trade diversion, which accomplished little beyond 
antagonizing both Japan and the United States. Australian 
opinion was aroused by the Spanish Civil War and conflicting 
emotions were stirred, although little could be done about it. 
The abdication of King Edward VIII in December 1936 created a 
sensation bordering on hysteria and - because of the obvious 
divisions in Australian opinion - a worried Government and its 
supporters tried to suppress the debate. Meanwhile the defence 
issue was gaining in prominence, with increased argument 
between proponents of a naval strategy and advocates of a 
land-air defence of Australia. The Lyons Government continued 
to adhere to the former, and the Labour Party (now under the 
leadership of John Curtin) supported the latter view. 
At the 1937 Imperial Conference it was apparent that 
Britain intended to give priority to the strengthening of 
defences against Germany, leaving the position in regard to 
Japan unsatisfactory for at least five more years. Australia's 
growing concern for the stability of the region was shown by 
the Prime Minister's proposal for a Pacific non-aggression 
pact, however the suggestion lapsed following the renewal of 
the Japanese attack on China in July 1937. The Government 
pursued a conservative policy towards the Sino-Japanese conflict; 
the press took a firmer line against Japan than in the earlier 
Manchurian affair, especially after the Japanese began air 
attacks on Chinese cities. A section of the Labour movement 
endeavoured to apply "working-class sanctions" against Japan 
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but met with Government resistance. The question of Australia's 
foreign policy and defence played a greater part in the 1937 
e~tion campaign than in any other campaign since the last war. 
Curtin had considerably augmented the defence policies of the 
Labour Party, but had not yet repudiated isolationism, a fact 
made much of by the Government. The eRction gained the Opposition 
only one additional seat in the House, but it almost achieved 
a majority in the Senate. 
Australia was closely associated with the ill-conceived 
Anglo-French policy of appeasing Germany (and Italy) in 1938-
1939. Although some newspapers expressed strong misgivings, 
most of the press accepted the Munich Agreement with reliefo 
In April 1939 a change in the Prime Ministership was brought 
about by the death of Lyons. After much public and press 
uncertainty the succession went to R.G. Menzies, whereupon 
the Country Party withdrew from the coalition.Menzies came to 
power just after faith in appeasement had been rudely and 
irreparably shattered by the German seizure of Prague. The 
Government decided to accelerate the defence effort in line 
with the new policy of resistance in Europe, symbolized by 
Britain's unilateral guarantees to Poland, Greece and Rumania 
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(without British Commonwealth consultation). At the same time 
the Menzies Government retained a conciliatory policy towards 
Japan, even though this began to give offence to Great Britain, 
whose interests in China were under heavy Japanese pressure. 
When Britain declared war on Germany in September 1939 the 
Menzies Government took the position that this act automatically 
involved Australia; although clearly contrary to its traditional 
policy, the Labour Party acquiesced because of the exigencies 
of the situation. 
In early 1940 R.G. Casey was chosen to be the first 
Australian Minister to the United States, and the Labour Party 
won the subsequent by-election. Menzies promptly acted to 
strengthen the position of the Government by inducing the 
Country Party to rejoin the coalition. The overwhelming successes 
of the German blitzkrieg in Europe in April-June 1940 and the 
Italian entry into the war had a drastic effect on Australian 
opinion, especially that of the Opposition, which now favoured 
complete co-operation with the Allies and a total war effort. 
Australia still adhered to a cautious policy to Japan; the 
appointment of J.G. Latham as Minister to Japan in August 1940 
was part of the effort to preserve tolerable relations with that 
country. The Labour Party, which had made substantial progress 
in the direction of unity under the strong leadership of 
Curtin, made impressive gains in the September 1940 election, 
and the Menzies Government kept control of the House only with 
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the support of two Independents. The Labour Party was steadfast 
in its refusal to enter a national government, and a compromise 
was effected by the formation of the Advisory War Council. 
With Menzies en route to Britain, Australia was caught up 
in a Japanese war scare in February 1941. A.Y. Fadden and 
Curtin eo-operated in the issuance of warnings by the Advisory 
War Council, but the result was a false alarm, and from London 
Menzies criticized what had happened. At the same time the 
Labour Party's prospects were enhanced by the formal reineorpora~ 
of the Lang group. Upon returning to Australia the Prime 
Minister announced a programme for an unlimited war effort. 
Australian opinion had hardened following the severe losses 
in Greece and Crete; the German attack on Russia in June 1941 
was received with surprise and relief. Meanwhile dissension 
within the United Australia Party had been growing steadily, 
and at the end of August Menzies was forced to resign the 
Prime Ministership, being replaced by Fadden. This shaky 
arrangement endured for only five weeks; by the beginning 
of October the Labour Party had won over the two Independents 
and was able to take office under Curtin. At first the new 
Government was hopeful of keeping the peace in the Pacific, 
but from mid-October 1941 onwards the situation rapidly 
worsened. Demands were made for British reinforcements and 
American eo-operation was urgently sought; Casey was active 
in Washington. When the Japanese struck in December 1941 the 
Curtin Government used the occasion to assert its view of 
Australian sovereignty by issuing a separate declaration of 
war. The immediate prospects in the Pacific were grim, and 
this impelled the Prime Minister to release a statement at 
the end of the year which proclaimed the vital importance 
of the United States to the survival of Australia. 
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Democratic government is dependent upon an informed citize~. 
Foreign policy and defence are among the most important 
responsibilities of governments, yet in this regard the citizens 
of Australia (albeit like those of most other democracies) 
more often than not have been apathetic and ill-informedo 
Interest in external affairs has been allowed by default to 
be the preserve of an 'lite - a section of which persisted in 
denying the need for and/or the basis of an Australian foreign 
policy. 
It may have been expedient to allow Britain to retain 
control of Australia's external policy up to the First World 
War (on the ground that Britain could and would defend 
Australia), although as early as the 1900s it should have 
been realized that the Anglo-Japanese Alliance was a tacit 
admission that the British navy was no longer supreme in the 
Pacifico The results of the two conscription referenda of 
1916 and 1917 may be interpreted as a partial rejection of 
the implications of the British connection. And under the 
leadership of Hughes Australia played an aggressively independent 
part in the second half of the war and particularly at the 
peace conference. Yet, in spite of the fact that the relative 
power of Great Britain clearly had been greatly reduced as 
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a result of the war, the peace settlements and the Washington 
treaties, Australia reverted to a passive attitude to external 
policy which was based on assumptions that were no longer 
valid. The Balfour Report of 1926 should have settled the 
question of Australia's sovereign status once and for all, but 
tradition, sentiment and vested interests prevailed, and the 
challenge of an Australian foreign policy was left in abeyance. 
On some occasions Australian sovereignty was upheld, as in 
the appointment of an Australian Governor-General, and even 
this was achieved in the face of determined resistance. 
In view of the severe depression it was perhaps understand-
able but certainly deplorable that external policy was 
vntually ignored in the early thirties. Australia deliberately 
evaded the responsibilities conferred by the Statute of 
Westminster in 1931, entered into short-sighted arrangements 
at the Ottawa Conference, and was content to regard the Japanese 
invasion of Manchuria as a British problem - instead of as 
an ominoua development in Pacific security. Support was given 
to ineffective British policies during the Abyssinian conflict 
and the Spanish Civil War in 1935-1936 and thereafter; proposed 
Opposition policy was no better than actual Government policy, 
and the press did little to enlighten the Australian people 
about external realities. The trade diversion affair of 1936 
was a costly and easily avoidable mistake. Had the Government 
allowed an objective test of public opinion in relation to 
the King's abdication, it is likely that a split as deep as 
that over conscription would have been revealed. 
The Lyons proposal for a Pacific pact, put forward at the 
Imperial Conference of 1937, had to be handed over to a 
Britain strongly preoccupied elsewhere and eventually lapsed, 
in part because Australia had failed to establish separate 
diplomatic machinery. The Australian response to Japanese 
aggression against China simply showed that little had been 
learned from the events in Manchuria, Abyssinia and Spain. 
To a considerable extent the elEtion of 1937 was a test based 
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on defence and foreign policy; the people endorsed the manifes~ 
out-dated ideas of the Lyons Government and rejected Labour 
policy, which under Curtin's leadership was now beginning to 
evolve in a positive direction. Most - but not all - Australian 
newspapers rendered a disservice to their readers in uncritically 
accepting and commending the change of British policy signified 
by Eden's resignation in early 1938. Involvement in the 
disastrous policy of appeasement was facilitated by an un-
enlightened press, and consequently Australia must share in 
the opprobrium of Munich. Only with the German occupation of 
Czechoslovakia in March 1939 was the utter failure of appease-
ment conceded by those who should have known better. At the 
same time the Menzies Government was forced to pursue a 
conciliatory policy to a recently-provoked Japan, as the only 
available reaction to the deteriorating position in the 
Pacific. When war broke out in Europe in September 1939 the 
Government in associating Australia acted in a manner which 
ignored the constitutional changes of the preceding 25 years. 
In 1940 Australia at long last took the first tentative 
steps towards an independent external policy. The despatch 
of Casey to the United States and the appointment of Latham 
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as Minister to Japan were belated moves in the right direction. 
With the set-backs of mid-1940 in Europe the Australian 
people finally realized the weakness of their position and 
began to sense the folly of having depended so heavily on 
Britain; but the Menzies Government (whose majority was 
reduced to almost nil in the September 1940 election) was 
greatly handicapped in its task of national leadership by 
the short-sighted and selfish attitudes of many members of 
the coalition. By early 1941 Australia had forfeited much 
of the freedom of action which might have been usefully 
employed earlier. The political upheavals of August-October 
1941 may be regarded as evidence that only a few months 
before the Japanese thrust was to pose an unprecedented 
threat, Australia's leaders were still more concerned with 
internal politics than with national security. The Curtin 
Government inherited an onerous task when it took office, 
but it was unable to proceed with all speed to strengthen 
the nation's defences because of the lingering "business 
as usual" attitude of so many Australians. In a sense, 
therefore, Australia may well have been saved from even worse 
consequences of the years 1931-1941 by the fortuitous events 
of 7/8 December 1941. 
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Of the newspapers {ten daily and one weekly) surveyed in 
this study, it is important to note that only one, the Sydney 
Labor Daily, reflected a Labour viewpoint - in this case that 
of the extremist Lang Labour Party in New South Wales. Thus 
a scholar was able to claim in 1938 (with the single preceding 
exception) that "editorials on foreign policy and world 
affairs can never be accepted as representing more than the 
Non-Labour point of view."1 However, the question of the 
political bias of the Australian press was a more complex 
matter than the above implies. 2 For although it had to be 
admitted that the press was "menacing enough in its one-sided 
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presentation of both foreign and domestic news," such important 
and influential newspapers as the Sydney Morning Herald, the 
Melbourne Argus and the Melbourne ..!:&!, still had a "family-
created sense of responsibility and regard for truth, trammelled 
though it may be by a natural conservatism.") The demonstrably 
anti-Labour bias of the press during the depression years 
weakened considerably in the late thirties; by 1941 the 
Sydney Morning Herald and (to a lesser extent) The Bulletin 
were openly calling for the resignation of the Menzies 
4 Government. 
There was no disagreement between Labour and Non-Labour 
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on such fundamental matters as Australia's membership of the 
British Commonwealth, the maintenance of the White Australia 
Policy and the use of protection to develop Australian industry. 
But there were clashes of view between the Labor Daily and 
Non-Labour newspapers on issues of defence policy, immigration, 
the handling of the abdication, involvement in world affairs, 
etc. Among Non-Labour newspapers there were many differences 
of emphasis, with the Sydney Daily Telegraph showing a sense 
of international obligation and political liberalism, the 
Sydney Morning Herald and the Melbourne Argus sounding traditiowd 
notes of British imperialism, and the Melbourne Age and !a! 
Bulletin5exhibiting a self-conscious, assertive Australian 
nationalism.6 Metropolitan morning newspapers in the four 
smaller states tended to follow the pattern of the Sydney 
Morning Herald (and the Melbourne Argus). 
In the 1930s Australian newspapers seldom maintained their 
own overseas correspondents, which left the press almost wholly 
dependent on two cable services for foreign news.7 The cable 
reports were usually so disconnected as to make impossible 
a coherent view of world affairs. Further, the functioning 
of the cable services was such that Australians generally 
received the official British interpretation of foreign 
developments - a serious defect, except to those who held 
the anachronistic view that Australian and British interests 
were necessarily identical. The space devoted to cable reports 
in Australian newspapers,in a decade in which the destiny of 
Australia was increasingly influenced by developments in the 
United States and in Asia, continued to be dominated by news 
from Great Britain and European countries.8 
The formation of public opinion and the extent to which 
public opinion is influenced by the press are questions which 
can be debated at length.9 It is very difficult to determine 
where to strike a balance between newspapers as an influence 
on their readers and newspapers as a reflection of their 
readers' interests, prejudices and apathies.10 The mere fact 
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that a substantial proportion (sometimes a majority) of readers 
ignore the exhortations of their newspapers at election time 
is an indication that the direct influence of the press is 
much less than is often claimed. Little material on this 
subject is available for the thirties, but a scholarly survey 
conducted in 1941 produced evidence of a widespread sceptical 
attitude to the press at that time.11 It can be inferred that 
this was also the case in the preceding years. 
1. Ball, "The Australian Press and World Affairs", P• 10. 
2. See K.S. Inglis, "The Daily Papers" in Coleman (ed.), 
Australian Civilization, ppo 145-175; Henry Mayer, The Press 
in Australia, Melbourne, 1964, pp. 120-151. 
3o W.H. Ifould, ''Moulding Public Opinion" in Y.G.K. 
Duncan (ed.), Educating a Democracy, Sydney, 1936, P• 129o 
4. See Mayer, The Press in Australia, p. 130. 
5. For a left-wing analysis and criticism of the editorial 
policy of The Bulletin in the late thirties, see Kevin Connolly, 
"The Tragedy of 'The Bulletin'", Point, no. 1, April 1938, 
PP• 9-12. 
6. Ball, "The Australian Press and World Affairs", p. 26. 
7. See J.C.G. Kevin, "Foreign Policy" in J.C.G. Kevin (ed.), 
Some Australians Take Stock, London, 1939, PP• 214-215. 
8. See Ball, 11 The Australian Press and World Affairs", pp. 
9-33. 
9. E.g. E.T. Brown, The Sovereign People: Analysis of an 
Illusion, Melbourne, 1954, PP• 3-63. 
10. See Mayer, The Press in Australia, PP• 228-239. 
11. See Elkin. 
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The Adelaide Advertiser was founded in 1858 and since 
1931 has been the only morning daily newspaper in South 
Australia. From the beginning of the thirties the newspaper 
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was controlled by The Herald and Weekly Times Ltd. of Melbourne 
under Keith Murdocho Circulation 100,000 (1938), 111,000 (194l)o 
The Brisbane Courier-Mail was formed by a merger in 1933 
from components dating back to 1846 and 1903. From the date 
of the merger the newspaper was under the effective control 
of The Herald and Weekly Times Ltd. Circulation 70,000 (1938), 
85,000 (1941). 
The Bulletin, Sydney, a weekly, was founded by J.F. ArchibUd 
in 1880, and by the turn of the century had a national reader-
ship and was known as the "bushman's bible", featuring many 
well-known writers and artists. In the thirties the weekly 
was directed by H.K. and P.H. Prior, J.E. Webb and David Adams. 
Circulation 50,000 (1936 estimate), 55,000 (1940 estimate). 
The Canberra Times began publication in 1926 under ToM. 
Shakespeare. Circulation 10,000 (1939 estimate). 
The Hobart Mercury was founded in 1854 and has been under 
the continuous control of the Davies family. Circulation 
24,000 (1941). 
The Labor Daily, Sydney, first appeared in 1924 under the 
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sponsorship of the Labour movement in New South Wales, eventually 
coming under the personal control of J.T. Lang. The newspaper 
remained under Lang's domination until 1938; in 1940 it ceased 
publicationo1 Circulation 130,000 (1932), 2 84,000 (1935). 
The Melbourne Age first appeared in 1854 and was •ill owned 
by the Syme family during the 1930s. Circulation 100,000 (1938), 
99,000 (1941). 
The Melbourne Argus was started in 1846 and remained under 
the control of the Wilson and Mackinnon families in the thirtieso 
Circulation 105,000 (1938), 108,000 (1941). 
The Sydney Daily Telegraph began publication in 1879 and 
was a leading opponent of federation in the 1890s. Since 1935 
the newspaper has been controlled by Consolidated Press Ltd., 
founded by Frank Packer and E.G. Theodore. Circulation 101,000 
(1935), 160,000 (1938), 213,000 (1941). 
The Sydney Morning Herald first appeared in 1831 and haa 
been under the control of the Fairfax family since 184lo The 
newspaper wielded considerable influence in the 1930s. 
Circulation 216,000 (1935), 230,000 (1938), 225,000 (1941). 
The West Australian, Perth, first appeared under its 
present name in 1879 and has been owned by a public company 
since 1926. Circulation 70,000 (1938), 78,000 (194l)o 
Histories- Wo Sprague Holden, Australia goes to Press, 
Detroit, 1961, pp. 235-245. 
1935 Circulations- Inglis, "The Daily Papers", P• 168. 
1938 Circulations- Ball, "The Australian Press and World 
Affairs", P• 9. 
1941 Circulations- Mayer, The Press in Australia, P• 40. 
1. See J.T. Lang, I Remember, Sydney, 1956, PP• 392-398. 
2. Ibid., P• 395o 
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3- Federal Governments 
----
Election Dates 
-----------
16 December 1922 19 December 1931 
14 November 1925 15 September 1934 
17 November 1928 23 October 1937 
12 October 1929 (House only) 21 September 1940 
Terms of Office 
Bruce-Page Government, 9 February 1923-22 October 1929 
Scullin Government, 22 October 1929-6 January 1932 
Lyons Government, 6 January 1932-7 November 1934 
Lyons-Page Government, 7 November 1934-7 April 1939 
Page-Hughes Government, 7 April 1939-26 April 1939 
Menzies Government, 26 April 1939-14 March 1940 
Menzies-Cameron Government, 14 March 1940-28 October 1940 
Menzies-Fadden Government, 28 October 1940-29 August 1941 
Fadden-Menzies Government, 29 August 1941-7 October 1941 
Curtin Government, 7 October 1941-6 July 1945 
~!!~!~~-~!~!!~!!! 
May 1931 (Labour Party) 
J.H. Scullin, Prime Minister and Minister for External Affairs 
E.G. Theodore, Treasurer 
Frank Brennan, Attorney-General 
A.E. Green, Postmaster-General and Minister for Works 
F.M. Forde, Minister for Trade and Customs 
JoB. Chifley, Minister for Defence 
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June 1932 (United Australia Party) 
J.A. Lyons, Prime Minister and Treasurer 
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J.G. Latham, Attorney-General and Minister for External Affairs 
S.M. Bruce, Resident Minister, London 
Senator G.F. Pearce, Minister for Defence 
J.E. Fenton, Postmaster-General 
H.S. Gullett, Minister for Trade and Customs 
June 1933 {United Australia Party) 
J.A. Lyons, Prime Minister and Treasurer 
J.G. Latham, Attorney-General and Minister for External Affairs 
S.M. Bruce, Resident Minister, London 
Senator G.F. Pearce, Minister for Defence 
R.A. Parkhill, Postmaster-General 
T.W. White, Minister for Trade and Customs 
November 1934 (United Australia Party-Country Party) 
J.A. Lyons, Prime Minister and Treasurer 
Earle Page, Minister for Commerce 
Senator G.F. Pearce, Minister for External Affairs 
R.G. Menzies, Attorney-General and Minister for Industry 
R.A. Parkhill, Minister for Defence 
T.Y. White, Minister for Trade and Customs 
Y.M. Hughes, Minister for Health and Minister for Repatriation 
1935-1936 (United Australia Party-country Party) 
J.A. Lyons, Prime Minister 
Earle Page, Minister for Commerce 
Senator G.F. Pearce, Minister for External Affairs 
R.G. Menzies, Attorney-General and Minister for Industry 
R.A. Parkhill, Minister for Defence 
Y.M. Hughes, Minister for Health and Minister for Repatriation 
T.W. White, Minister for Trade and Customs 
R.G. Casey, Treasurer 
1937-1938 (United Australia Party-Country Party) 
J.A. Lyons, Prime Minister 
Earle Page, Minister for Commerce and Minister for Health 
R.G. Menzies, Attorney-General and Minister for Industry 
W.M. Hughes, Minister for External Affairs 
T.Y. White, Minister for Trade and Customs 
R.G. Casey, Treasurer 
H.V.C. Thorby, Minister for Defence 
April 1939 (United Australia Party) 
R.G. Menzies, Prime Minister and Treasurer 
W.M. Hughes, Attorney-General and Minister for Industry 
R.G. Casey, Minister for Supply and Development 
G.A. Street, Minister for Defence 
H.S. Gullett, Minister for External Affairs 
J.N. Lawson, Minister for Trade and Customs 
November 1940 (United Australia Party-Country Party) 
267 
R.G. Menzies, Prime Minister and Minister for Defence Co-ordinatXn 
A.W. Fadden, Treasurer 
W.M. Hughes, Attorney-General and Minister for the Navy 
P.C. Spender, Minister for the Army 
Earle Page, Minister for Commerce 
F.H. Stewart, Minister for External Affairs 
E.J. Harrison, Minister for Trade and Customs 
August 1941 (Country Party-United Australia Party) 
A.W. Fadden, Prime Minister and Treasurer 
R.G. Menzies, Minister for Defence Co-ordination 
W.M. Hughes, Attorney-General and Minister for the Navy 
P.C. Spender, Minister for the Army 
Earle Page, Minister for Commerce 
F.H. Stewart, Minister for External Affairs 
E.J. Harrison, Minister for Trade and Customs 
October 1941 (Labour Party) 
John Curtin, Prime Minister and Minister for Defence 
F.M. Forde, Minister for the Army 
J.B. Chifley, Treasurer 
H.V. Evatt, Attorney-General and Minister for External Affairs 
J.A. Beasley, Minister for Supply and Shipping 
Norman Makin, Minister for the Navy and Minister for Munitions 
Commonwealth Bureau of Census and Statistics, Official Year 
Book of the Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra, 1931-1941, 
nos. 24-34. 
Commonwealth of Australia, Parliamentary Handbook, Canberra, 
1931-1941, nos. 7-10. 
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